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² See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7124th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. 5/PV.7124 (Mar. 1, 2014) (statement of Ukraine).Google Scholar

³ See Declaration of Independence of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, The State Council of the Republic of Crimea (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.rada.crimea.ua/news/11_03_2014_1 (declaring Crimean independence from Ukraine and unification with Russia).Google Scholar

⁴ This entity was proclaimed in the March 11 declaration as consisting of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which had a separate status in Ukraine.Google Scholar

⁵ See Executive Order on Recognizing Republic of Crimea, President of Russia (Mar. 17, 2014), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20596.Google Scholar

⁶ See Agreement on the Accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation Signed, President of Russia (Mar. 18, 2014), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20604.Google Scholar

⁷ See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7125th mtg. at 3 and 10, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7125 (Mar. 3, 2014) (statements of the Russian Federation).Google Scholar

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³ See S/PV.7124, supra note 2, at 5 (statement oft he Russian Federation).Google Scholar

¹⁰ See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7134th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7134(Mar. 13, 2014) (statement of the Russian Federation).Google Scholar

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¹³ Afghanistan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, and North Korea.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Syria, and Venezuela.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7144th mtg. at 3–5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7144 (Mar. 19, 2014) (statement by Ivan Snimonović, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights).Google Scholar

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** [L]imited to truly extreme circumstances, such as an outright armed attack by the pa rent state, threatening the very existence of people in question. Otherwise all efforts should be taken in order to settle the tension between the parent state and the ethnic community concerned within the framework of the existence state.Google Scholar

** By Russia's own publicly articulated standards, the conditions for a justifiable unilateral secession of Crimea from Ukraine were not met. See Written Statement of the Russian Federation (Kosovo) 2009 I.C.J. 31–32, ¶ 88 (Apr. 17, 2009).Google Scholar

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²¹ G.A. Res. 68/262, U.N. doc. A/RES/68/262 (Mar. 27, 2014).Google Scholar

²² Id. at ¶ 1.Google Scholar

²³ Id. at ¶ 5.Google Scholar

²⁴ Id. at ¶ 6.Google Scholar

²⁵ See U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 80th plen. mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/68/PV.80 (Mar. 27, 2014).Google Scholar

²⁶ China also did so on several occasions in UNSC debates. See S/PV.7138, supra note 19, at 7 (statement of China); see also S/PV. 7144, supra note 15, at 14 (statement of China).Google Scholar

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³¹ Id. at 74–78.Google Scholar

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³³ Id. at 152.Google Scholar

³⁴ This is not to suggest that there have been, in the wake of Crimea, no views questioning the norm as such. Fora skeptical view, see Voeten, Erik, What is so Great About ‘Territorial Integrity’ Anyway?, Washington Post (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/17/what-is-so-great-about-territorial-integrity-anyway/.Google Scholar

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³⁹ See Brownlie, Ian, International Law and the Use of Force by States 62–64 (1963).Google Scholar

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⁴⁴ Identical Notes from the US Secretary of State to the Chinese and Japanese Governments, January 8, 1932, in Documents on International Affairs 262 (John W. Wheeler-Bennett ed., 1933).Google Scholar

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⁴⁶ See Resolution Adopted by the Assembly on March 11, 1932, 12 Monthly Summary of the League of Nations 106 (1932).Google Scholar

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⁴⁸ See Statement by the Representative of the United Kingdom With Regard to the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 16, 1938, May 10, 1938, 18 Monthly Summary of the League of Nations 102-03 (1938). Hersch Lauterpacht writes that it was on the basis of Italy's failure to maintain the peace that Britain, in 1940, withdrew its recognition of Italian annexation and declared itself in favor of the restoration of Ethiopia's independence and its king. See Lauterpacht, Hersch, Recognition in International Law 356 (1947).Google Scholar

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⁵⁸ During the UNSC debate following Russia's defacto annexation of Crimea, Samantha Power, the US ambassador to the UN, captured the idea thus: “Thenation aland international legal status of Crimea has not changed. A thief can steal property, but that does not confer the right of ownership on the thief.” S/PV. 7144, supra note 15, at 11.Google Scholar

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