Tax evasion can be considered as a systemic fraud in which different parties such as taxpayers, lawyers, banks, and multinational entities interact. Here, accountants are key agents owing to their legal liability in tax reporting and their knowledge on accounting rules. The present study analyzes the role that accountants play in firms tax evasion by presenting evidence from a randomized field experiment carried out with microenterprises in Ecuador’s tax system in early 2016. The article evaluates to what extent a notification of accountants is more effective in increasing tax reporting than a notification of taxpayers, through five different treatments. The results show that simultaneous persuasive notifications of both accountants and taxpayers were the unique treatment that significantly increased firms’ declared income tax. Furthermore, it was shown that penalty notifications of accountants, rather than taxpayers only, were the most significant treatment at reducing revenue underreporting.

Despite agreement on many points, including our shared insistence that ‘corporation’ and ‘firm’ are different concepts, Jean-Philippe Robé still maintains that they are mutually exclusive: no corporation is a firm, and no firm is a corporation. In contrast, we follow standard nomenclature when we point out that all (business) corporations are firms, but some firms are not corporations. We show here that this is a standard practice among lawyers writing in leading law journals and note that Robé seems to have abandoned the task of defining the firm.

How do coalitional dynamics matter for the capacity of states to maintain social inclusion in coordinated models of capitalism? Taking its departure in scholarship emphasizing the influence of employers on the extent of state intervention in post-industrial economies, this paper argues that employer influence depends on which actors they team up with – unions or parties. If unions depend on employers for their organizational influence in a policy field, unions become a strong coalitional partner for employers in weakening demands for inclusiveness from the parliamentary arena. Conversely, if unions have influence independent of any coalition with employers, both unions and employers are likely to team up with political parties aligned with their preferences. This makes the level of inclusion resulting from increased state intervention more fluctuating, depending on who holds government power. A comparative study of reforms of Danish and Austrian vocational education institutions corroborates the empirical purchase of the argument.

China after Mao is typically characterized as a country where economic opportunities are based on merit instead of ideological conformity. However, the salience of ideology has grown under the rule of Xi Jinping. Using a large-scale resume audit experiment and a conjoint survey experiment of hiring managers in China, we find that firms in China do not reward job candidates for expressing conformity to the ideology of the regime, but job candidates who express support for Western democracy are less employable. Results suggest that firms in innovative industries designated as strategically important by the Chinese regime (e.g., artificial intelligence) penalize support for Western democracy by the largest magnitude while the remaining firms in innovative industries do not penalize political non-conformity.

In his recent book on Property, Power and Politics, Jean-Philippe Robé makes a strong case for the need to understand the legal foundations of modern capitalism. He also insists that it is important to distinguish between firms and corporations. We agree. But Robé criticizes our definition of firms in terms of legally recognized capacities on the grounds that it does not take the distinction seriously enough. He argues that firms are not legally recognized as such, as the law only knows corporations. This argument, which is capable of different interpretations, leads to the bizarre result that corporations are not firms. Using etymological and other evidence, we show that firms are treated as legally constituted business entities in both common parlance and legal discourse. The way the law defines firms and corporations, while the product of a discourse which is in many ways distinct from everyday language, has such profound implications for the way firms operate in practice that no institutional theory of the firm worthy of the name can afford to ignore it.

This article asks whether firms should exempt employees when they object to elements of their work that go against their conscience. Fairness requires that we follow the rules of an organization we have joined voluntarily only if these rules express mutual advantage. In corporations, I argue that subordination and exemption provides for mutual advantage better than subordination plus right of exit. This is because agents want to protect their conscientious convictions, even in hierarchical organizations geared towards efficient preference satisfaction. Thus exemptions should be granted in unforeseeable circumstances, provided the costs are limited.

Political economists have paid increasing attention to distinctions between exporting and nonexporting firms, particularly with regard to their preferences on trade policy liberalization. A multitude of past studies focusing on economically advanced democracies characterized exporters as a small, elite group of large and highly productive firms, but this profile of a prototypical exporter is not necessarily representative of the body of firms operating under different domestic contexts. Using current and methodologically consistent cross-national surveys of firms conducted by the World Bank, this paper re-evaluates the link between certain firm-level characteristics and firms’ propensity to export, taking into account how national-level political, economic, and geographic conditions affect these relationships. The pooled sample of firms from approximately 100 countries spanning different political regimes and levels of development confirms that, generally speaking, exporters are large, productive, and innovative. However, in less democratic and less developed settings, productivity and innovation do not appear to be a prerequisite to export orientation. When developing generalizable theories of firms’ participation in the policymaking process, we must therefore be careful not to treat export behavior as an unqualified predictor of pro-free-trade attitudes.

Policies to mitigate global climate change entail significant economic costs. Yet a growing number of firms lobby in favor of regulation to mitigate carbon emissions. Why do firms support environmental regulations that directly increase production costs? This question is all the more puzzling in a globalized economy where regulation may undermine the competitiveness of domestic firms at home and abroad. By imposing differential costs on participants in the domestic market, policies designed to mitigate carbon emissions shift market share toward firms with low anticipated adjustment costs. I develop and test a model of climate change policymaking in the presence of market competition and open borders. Heterogeneity in adjustment costs induces a preference for regulation among low-cost firms. Firms facing import pressure—or export competition—may prefer stringent regulation if costs are sufficiently asymmetric. Firms embedded in global value chains also benefit if regulation raises the costs of domestically produced intermediate goods.

This paper identifies recurrent patterns in the political activity of American corporations that support trade. These firms have made public coalitions a central element of their pro-trade activities, and their collective efforts vastly outstrip those of trade's corporate opponents. This superiority in organization is paired with dramatically greater volumes of lobbying and campaign contributions. I explain these striking divergences by integrating collective action theory into a firm-centred model of trade politics: the heavy concentration of gains from trade among a small number of firms makes both individual and collective political action easier for pro-trade firms than for producers opposed to trade. This explanation is supported in panel analysis of firms’ participation in pro-trade coalitions, which shows that size, multinationality, and heterogeneity in global networks of production and sales drive participation in pro-trade groups. Globally engaged firms have supported trade by matching pro-trade preferences with highly organized political action.

What determines whether or not firms lobby on the same policy issues? Scholars offer two broad answers to this question. Firms that are (1) similar or (2) connected through interorganizational ties target the same policy issues. In this article, I argue that the co-occurrence of these two conditions produces the opposite outcome, namely a tendency to lobby on different issues. This expectation draws on ideas from collective action theory and the literature on issue niches. From these, I derive the following assumptions: similar firms share political objectives and they should, when possible, act collectively by jointly delegating their lobbying activities. The reason for doing this is that it allows them to focus on their issue niches. However, the ability to delegate hinges on coordination and monitoring, which is facilitated by interorganizational relations. To test this proposition, I study the largest American corporations. The dependent variable is activity overlap, a measure of the extent to which firms lobby on the same issues. According to expectations, activity overlap is reduced when firms operate in the same industry and, simultaneously, enjoy favorable conditions for social interactions, such as a concentrated market structure. These results lend support to collective action theory.