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This chapter investigates how ‘society at large’ interacts with the world of international arbitration, now and for the foreseeable future. This broad topic can be made more manageable by breaking down the interaction through four focus groups within society: the media, academia, arbitration ‘clubs’, and civil society NGOs. These groups provide services to the world of international arbitration but are mostly instead what Emmanuel Gaillard terms ‘value providers’ – seeking to influence its normative structure. This chapter also touches on international and professional organisations, which are also significant value providers.
One key question is whether and how international arbitration may be expanding or at least becoming more visible through the four focus groups. A second is whether it may be becoming more diverse and indeed polarised. The chapter presents empirical evidence of ongoing ‘lawyerisation’, hence renewed concern about costs and delays. It also considers the impact of burgeoning investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases and coverage, especially in the general media. Analysis of newspapers in Australia and the United Kingdom as well as social media reports confirms that views about ISDS remain overwhelmingly negative – a new development that could increasingly shape the overall perceptions of international arbitration held within society at large.
After establishing why people migrate, in this chapter we turn to an investigation of how migrants economically re-engage with their homeland. Specifically, we explore how migrants facilitate flows of international financial capital. We argue that migrants, because they possess critical knowledge about investment opportunities in their homelands, help international investors overcome information asymmetries which drives both portfolio and foreign direct investment into their homelands. Our empirical analyses leverage a wide range of data on migrant stocks and portfolio and foreign direct investment to test our argument. We find that migrants are key to explaining international capital flows, especially in environments where formal political institutions that protect property rights are absent or weak.
Migration is among the central domestic and global political issues of today. Yet the causes and consequences - and the relationship between migration and global markets – are poorly understood. Migration is both costly and risky, so why do people decide to migrate? What are the political, social, economic, and environmental factors that cause people to leave their homes and seek a better life elsewhere? Leblang and Helms argue that political factors - the ability to participate in the political life of a destination - are as important as economic and social factors. Most migrants don't cut ties with their homeland but continue to be engaged, both economically and politically. Migrants continue to serve as a conduit for information, helping drive investment to their homelands. The authors combine theory with a wealth of micro and macro evidence to demonstrate that migration isn't static, after all, but continuously fluid.
We provide selective account of how and why the share of Asia in the world economy has more than quadrupled in the past half-century. In 1970, Asia (excluding Japan) accounted for around 9 per cent of the world economy. At the turn of the twenty-first century, this had climbed to 18 per cent and today exceeds 40 per cent. Asian growth has occurred rapidly regardless of political system, institutional arrangements or policy cocktails. We illustrate how far the Asian economies have come and how far they have left to go to attain the living standards of Europe or North America. For example, in India and China income per capita went from just under 5 per cent of the US level each to around 11 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively from 1970 to 2020. The main drivers of growth have been the accumulation of capital and labour along with improvements in the quality of the labour force. We also concentrate on the features that are both a cause and a consequence of the connections world. These include export-led growth, the role of the state, political systems and economic institutions, but also inequality. In so doing, we set the scene for the chapters that follow.
We find that most Asian economies are not very innovative by international standards, though in line with their level of development. Asian economies mostly obtain their technologies from abroad through FDI or via technological diffusion. However, FDI to Asia has been modest and entrepreneurship limited, largely as a consequence of the connections world. Politicians and business groups have been mutually supportive in erecting barriers to entry. As a result, most innovation has been within business groups or by new firms entering new sectors where existing business groups were absent or had not managed to erect unscalable entry barriers. However, three countries have developed some base for innovation: China, India and South Korea. In each, efforts to construct a supportive ecosystem, including policies for education, science and technology, as well as encouraging returning migrants with knowledge, are reaping dividends. Each has adopted a rather different model which we discuss in detail. Despite these achievements, the power and influence of the connections world in these three countries also remains a serious brake on their ability to innovate in the future.
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law in May 2000 to encourage increased trade and investment between the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It provides eligible countries with duty free access to the US market for over 1800 products in addition to those available under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). The benefits extend through 2025. This study explores the link between US trade preferences under AGOA and beneficiary country exports. Using a large US import database, the study examines the extent to which AGOA influences export performance. It also examines the moderating roles of rule of law and foreign direct investment. The results largely indicate that AGOA has a positive and significant effect on beneficiary country exports. It also shows that rule of law moderates the relationship between AGOA and export performance. We believe that AGOA will target foreign direct investment (FDI) to SSA from other advanced regions such as the EU to take advantage of the US market. However, the role of FDI appears to be weak in moderating the relationship between trade preferences (tariff concessions) and exports from beneficiary countries to the US market.
China has become a leading source of outward foreign direct investment (FDI), and the Chinese state exercises a unique degree of influence over its firms. We explore the patterns of political influence over FDI using a comprehensive firm-level data set on Chinese outward FDI from 2000 to 2013. Using six country-level measures of affinity for China, we find that state-owned and globally diversified firms appear to conform most closely to official guidance. Official investment directives and state visits link investments to state policies; Taiwan recognition and Dalai Lama meetings anchor our political interpretations; and UN General Assembly voting and temporary UN Security Council membership suggest that this intervention may be systematic. The results are robust to country, year, and sector fixed effects, and most do not hold for private or small firms. The results suggest that China uses FDI by prominent state-owned enterprises as an instrument to promote its foreign policy.
What drives public discontent about Chinese investment on the ground? This study probes the “ground truth” of public reaction in Zambia by documenting both the public perception and the actual impacts of Chinese investments. We find a “reputation deficit” for Chinese investment: Zambians are significantly less likely to support Chinese investment than investment from other countries. Combining results from an original household survey, interview records, and official statistics, we examine the drivers of this reputation deficit. Chinese firms are no worse at generating employment or adhering to labor and environmental standards than Western corporations operating in Zambia, according to official statistics as well as public opinion. However, Chinese firms possess a lower degree of localization, specifically in managers’ knowledge of local languages and the provision of culturally relevant benefits, and they are less likely to engage with the media. Our study highlights these previously overlooked causes of the reputation deficit.
In this article I develop a new theory of how globalization in the form of increasing potential foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows affects democratization. As the level of potential FDI inflows increases, workers become more willing to support democratization because of the large wage benefits from liberalizing FDI under democracy, while capitalists become less willing to support democratization because of their increasing need for protection from the dictator in the form of FDI restrictions. Increased demand for protection allows dictators to extract larger share of rents from capitalists. The effect of increasing potential FDI on democratization is ambiguous because it increases both workers’ incentive to revolt and dictators’ resistance to democratization.
Both the knowledge and technology diffusion literature largely focus on adoption and adaptation at country and firm levels. The literature on how knowledge and technology are transferred, adopted and adapted at the level of the individual remains under-researched. Based on a unique employees and managers MNE in Ghana in 2015 and using social network analysis, this chapter examines the transfer of knowledge at the individual level and presents new evidence on the role of managerial knowledge diffusion from MNEs to host countries. Our results indicate that knowledge flows occurs from MNEs to local people. We, however, found that foreign knowledge transfer, particularly from Chinese MNEs and EU MNEs, is similar. The results also suggest that firm network structures influence knowledge transfer within firms, with the more decentralized MNEs and local workers in Chinese MNEs tending to perform better. In terms of policy recommendation, the chapter suggests that trade policies must focus on the stimulation of FDI inflows through MNEs that have decentralized subsidiary structure as they tend to serve as a better conduit for knowledge transfer to local employees
Foreign knowledge and technology enhance the technological capability of local firms. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are key channels through which foreign knowledge flows and is transferred. This chapter reviews different types of foreign knowledge sources and the factors that ensure success in the adaption of foreign know-how to the local context. The results show that formal firms tend to have higher local technological capability are more likely to adopt and adapt foreign knowledge and technologies. Interaction with foreign firms through imports and collaboration are important sources of knowledge. The managerial localisation strategies in Chinese firms is also identified in our case study to offer an essential learning potential for local firms.
Based on the concept of limited and open access orders (LAO/OAO), this paper explains what appears to be a paradox: how was it possible that a former civil war country, Mozambique, which had been extremely successful in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and which the International Monetary Fund praised as a great Sub-Sahara African success story in 2007, only a few years later found itself on the brink of a new civil war? We argue that the destabilization of the country was the result of a toxic mix of domestic politics and a massive inflow of FDI. FDI provided rents to an increasingly dominant state party, FRELIMO, which could be appropriated one-sidedly. It then used these rents to oppress RENAMO, its previous civil war enemy and currently its main opposition party, to monopolize power. This strategy seemed to be successful until RENAMO, faced with the risk of being politically marginalized (and of losing its rents accordingly), returned to armed conflict in 2013. By analyzing the links between the macro-level of national politics and the micro-level of an enterprise and by embedding the interplay between polity and economy into an international context, the paper also makes a theoretical contribution to the LAO/OAO concept.
In Chapter 7, we focus on the domain of foreign direct investment (FDI). We claim that states often refrain from sharing sensitive economic information, even though it can be important to adjudicating investment disputes. We demonstrate that properly designed IOs, such as the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), can ameliorate this problem by receiving and protecting sensitive information. We assess our hypotheses using new data on specific pieces of information shared – along with information withheld – from this institution. Specifically, we pair a measure of redactions in publicly released panel reports with qualitative case evidence. We show that key reforms designed to safeguard sensitive information increased the provision of this information and boosted FDI, especially in areas where sensitive information is particularly common. We conclude the chapter by discussing how solving this pervasive issue puts international investment institutions in tension with the normative goals of transparency and accountability.
This chapter examines (1) publicly available data on the municipal activities of TNCs culled from their own corporate reports, (2) the powers of local governments enshrined in local laws vis-a-vis the protections of TNCs under international law, (3) public opinion of municipal residents as captured in various surveys, (4) the results of scientific studies, including those that test the chemical composition of fuels sold by TNCs, and (5) those studies that subject the exercise of political power to social scientific analyses.
On these bases, it can be argued that, although they are not accountable to any electorate, transnational corporations (TNCs) in Africa play significant roles in planning and governing cities in Africa. TNCs effectively manage important aspects of African life through control of municipal utilities, through the corporate governance of natural resources held by Africans in common, and through ad hoc investment practices that facilitate the private appropriation of socially created rents.
Rather than a wholesale rejection of neoliberalism, emerging powers are engaging in policy eclecticism: adopting some of the tenets of liberal ordering while rejecting others, applying liberal disciplines asymmetrically in pursuit of strategic self-interest, creating other fora for negotiations and adopting different regulatory priorities. In this chapter, we examine how emerging countries’ discontent with the status quo transpired, and what is left of the liberal ordering in the practice of emerging countries. The first part assesses how developing countries are utilizing WTO law to further their own economic policies, but also denotes how they are strategically breaching some rules and resisting the adoption of new disciplines. The second part analyzes how and why bilateral investment treaties and related institutions are falling out of favor with emerging countries after the initial wave of adoption of these instruments. This chapter highlights the tensions between emerging countries’ developmental policies and IEL, along with the more specific clashes that have transpired in recent decades in their practice of trade and investment law.
The past three decades have witnessed a spectacular evolution in policies toward foreign direct investment (FDI). Whose interests do these policy innovations reflect? While existing theory suggests popular pressure drives openness, I argue reforms occur when shifts in financial access change local economic elites’ policy preferences toward FDI. When large domestic firms no longer have access to cheap credit through political connections, liquidity constraints outweigh firms' preferences to exclude foreigners. Economic elites then pressure governments to pursue liberal FDI policy environments. Using a combination of measures of FDI policy for up to 166 countries from 1973–2015, I find increases in financial constraints are robustly associated with decreases in foreign equity restrictions, and this relationship is strongest when domestic political institutions favor business interests. A financing constraints explanation of FDI policy reform has important implications for explanations of policy change, theories of business power amid increased interdependence, and expectations over the distributive effects of globalization.
Environmental protection is an issue that all developing countries must cope with when inviting foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the high correlation between FDI and pollution does not necessarily indicate that foreign firms are to blame. In this study, we apply firm-level panel data from Vietnam and unique information on waste discharge to demonstrate that foreign firms are actually more proactive in acquiring ISO14001 certification. ISO14001 is a voluntary environmental standard, the adoption of which improves a firm's performance in terms of waste control, and increases its welfare and productivity level. This study provides robust evidence that firms' efforts toward corporate social responsibility eventually benefit them as well.
Jiangsu and Zhejiang are of two of China's most prosperous and dynamic provinces. This paper first presents a factual account of two empirical phenomena: 1) FDI has played a more substantial role in the economic development of Jiangsu than in Zhejiang, and 2) ownership biases against domestic private firms in Jiangsu were more substantial than in Zhejiang. The paper hypothesizes that there is a connection between these two empirical phenomena. Specifically, ownership biases against domestic private firms increase preferences for FDI because FDI provides a measure of relative property rights security. Thus a biased domestic private firm has an incentive to move its assets and/or future growth opportunities to the foreign sector. The paper uses two private-sector surveys—one conducted in 1993 and the other in 2002—to provide an empirical test of this hypothesis. Our analysis shows, controlling for a variety of firm-level attributes and industry and regional characteristics, those private firms which perceive ownership biases to be more severe are more likely to form joint ventures with foreign firms.
This study examines the influence of foreign direct investment (FDI), overseas development aid (ODA), and remittances on the enrollment of girls and boys in 103 countries over the years 1970–2011. The results suggest that remittances have a contemporaneous robust significant influence on enrollment, with the positive effect being slightly higher for girls than for boys. FDI and ODA have an influence on the enrollment of girls and boys only after a significant time lag. The results also suggest that the impact of remittances on enrollment is increased through income and a well-developed financial sector; FDI through better institutions and a well-developed financial sector; and ODA through better government policy.
This study seeks to unravel the puzzle underlying China's and India's differing experiences in attracting two types of foreign investment: namely foreign direct investment (‘FDI’) and foreign venture capital investment (‘FVCI’). Complementing the law and finance literature, we argue that foreign investors prefer the direct investment mode in China despite its poor governance environment because direct investment provides private means of control over the business, and China's institutional environment provides a more facilitating arena for FDI than India's. In contrast, India's legal infrastructure and related institutional settings prove to be better than China's in accommodating foreign portfolio (indirect) investment especially in the form of venture capital. The conclusion of this article has implications for the two countries' legal reform in the direction of the desired type of foreign investment. It also provides comparative insights into the legal institutions of China and India in fostering national innovative capacity and entrepreneurship.