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For three European states in particular, the Covid-19 pandemic has served to catalyze pre-existing territorial disputes. While the United Kingdom, Spain, and Belgium have all had very different responses to the pandemic, in all three cases the actions of central and regional government have put existing structures of regional autonomy under strain. In Spain, the pandemic response has become intertwined with the Catalan independence debate (especially in disputes between pro-independence parties), and elsewhere in the country it has cemented co-operative relationships between moderate nationalists and the statewide left. In Belgium, the pandemic has accentuated territorial disputes and further complicated government formation. And in the UK diverging responses to the pandemic have helped boost nationalist movements in the devolved nations; particularly the cause of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and their ambitions to create an independent Scottish state. While the year has been highly significant for secessionist movements in all three states, only in the UK does a decisive shift towards state-breakup seem to have occurred. The article argues that whether or not a secessionist movement benefits from the pandemic is highly contingent on contextual factors, including the performance of state-level governments in responding to the pandemic and the relative autonomy of regional governments during the response.
The right to arbitration has a liberal foundation. Whether the Constitution should guarantee arbitration as a right, however, is a separate question, which is likely to be answered differently in diverse constitutional traditions. A comparative examination of the United States, Europe, and Latin America on the constitutional status of arbitration is instructive in this regard. Contrasting conceptions about the scope of the constitutional domain of rights, about the intensity of judicial review of legislation, and about the potential effect of constitutional rights in the private sphere, lead to disparate conclusions about the constitutional status of arbitration. There is nevertheless a general argument in favor of constitutionalization: arbitration can be better protected against unduly restrictive legislation, if arbitration is rooted in the Constitution. The government is forced to justify its restrictive norms in a judicial forum.
This introductory chapter provides broad overviews of science, religion, and magic, placing them in historical contexts and establishing some preliminary connections between them. After a brief summary of European society around the year 1400, including the effects of the Black Plague on urbanization and feudalism, the chapter outlines four major themes that run throughout the book: the influence of classical antiquity; the relationship between God and nature; the problem of occult or hidden causes; and the interconnectedness of the premodern world.
Archaeological studies of belief, ideology and commemorative strategies in Ireland, and elsewhere in Europe, neglect the continuation of cremation far beyond the supposed fifth-century AD threshold for the shift to inhumation under the influence of Christianity. A database of radiocarbon dates from first-millennium AD Ireland permits the identification of new patterns in early medieval (AD 400–1100) mortuary practices, including a new phase of cremation. The authors discuss archaeological and historical implications to demonstrate how data-driven approaches can enhance and challenge established metanarratives. They also highlight serious methodological and interpretative issues that these data pose for current narrative frameworks, and their influence on post-excavation strategies.
From the recovery of ancient ritual magic at the height of the Renaissance to the ignominious demise of alchemy at the dawn of the Enlightenment, Mark A. Waddell explores the rich and complex ways that premodern people made sense of their world. He describes a time when witches flew through the dark of night to feast on the flesh of unbaptized infants, magicians conversed with angels or struck pacts with demons, and astrologers cast the horoscopes of royalty. Ground-breaking discoveries changed the way that people understood the universe while, in laboratories and coffee houses, philosophers discussed how to reconcile the scientific method with the veneration of God. This engaging, illustrated new study introduces readers to the vibrant history behind the emergence of the modern world.
Between the sixth and the eighth centuries AD, the practice of depositing grave goods was almost entirely abandoned across Western Europe. To date, however, explanations for this change have focused on local considerations. By collating data from 237 cemeteries from across Western Europe, this article assesses the spatial and chronological development of this phenomenon. Beginning in the mid sixth century, the process accelerated towards the end of the seventh century, before near complete abandonment across the region by the following century. This widespread and rapid transition is interpreted in light of evidence for trade and connectivity, which facilitated the swift diffusion of this and other cultural practices across the region.
Chapter 2 lays out the dual thrust of immigration policy in the neoliberal era, which is to “court” high-skilled immigrants and to “fend off” all sorts of presumably (but not legally) low-skilled migrants, including family migrants. But the heart of the chapter examines the role of immigration in the populist storm. While immigration has been central to both Brexit and Trump, it has been central in different ways. Brexit, though driven by hostility to large-scale intra-EU migration, does not challenge the structure of (neo)liberal immigration policy—it will even make British policy more universalistic because cleansed of favoritism for other Europeans. By contrast, Trump`s immigration policy breaks with the “antipopulist norm” that Gary Freeman, in a classic paper (1995), held constitutive of a liberal immigration policy. Germany during and after the 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis is an interesting negative case of stubbornly holding liberal course, though inadvertently fueling populism at home and abroad.
Chapter 1 maps the new nationalism that dramatically burst into the scene in 2016. It includes a detailed account of neoliberalism, which needs to be distinguished and set apart from liberalism. While some, like Michael Mann (2013: ch.6), subscribe to a narrow view of neoliberalism as economic policy that is specific to the “Anglos” and may have long passed its peak, I take it to be a Pan-Western governing and society-making rationale of deeply transformative reach. Neoliberalism thus understood provides the context of the new nationalism, which arises both in opposition to it but, in a statist variant, may also be complementary to neoliberalism or even constituted by it. The constitutive nexus with its “neoliberal nationalism” proper points to a novel phenomenon on the nations and nationalism map that has so far not received the attention that it deserves.
The EU member states engage in budgeting through a set of supranational fiscal procedures outlined in EU treaties and supporting legislation. The EU itself is a suprnational government with its own budget and budgetary institutions, procedures, and programs. It enforces these macrobudgetary rules that significantly constrain the policy decisions of the individual member states.
Chapter 3 gathers a variety of restrictive trends in the acquisition and loss of citizenship under the umbrella of “earned citizenship”, which is not a “right”, as in the liberal past, but “privilege”. “More difficult to get” and “easier to lose” are complementary sides of the same neoliberal-cum-nationalist logic of making citizenship more exclusive and conditional on the immigrant`s individual behavior and desert. Being neoliberal and nationalist in tandem, earned citizenship is the clearest expression of a neoliberal nationalism. Earned citizenship`s third element, to be “less in value”, seems to contradict the fact that a rich society`s “citizenship premium” (Milanovic 2016) has never been bigger than today. However, the same citizenship that re-nationalizing states have claimed to strengthen by making it more selective, has become internally devalued through its infiltration by immigration law and a neoliberal welfare-to-workfare devolution.
The Monitoring Studies (MS) program, the approach developed by RedETS to generate postlaunch real-world evidence (RWE), is intended to complement and enhance the conventional health technology assessment process to support health policy decision making in Spain, besides informing other interested stakeholders, including clinicians and patients. The MS program is focused on specific uncertainties about the real effect, safety, costs, and routine use of new and insufficiently assessed relevant medical devices carefully selected to ensure the value of the additional research needed, by means of structured, controlled, participative, and transparent procedures. However, despite a clear political commitment and economic support from national and regional health authorities, several difficulties were identified along the development and implementation of the first wave of MS, delaying its execution and final reporting. Resolution of these difficulties at the regional and national levels and a greater collaborative impulse in the European Union, given the availability of an appropriate methodological framework already provided by EUnetHTA, might provide a faster and more efficient comparative RWE of improved quality and reliability at the national and international levels.
To investigate potential age, period and birth cohort effects in the prevalence of suicide ideation in European ageing population.
A total of 50 782 community-dwelling adults (aged + 50) from 20 different European countries were collected in the Survey Health Ageing and Retirement study. A multilevel logistic regression model of repeated measures was modelled to assess the effects of age and other variables, including the variability of observations over three levels: birth cohort groups, time period assessment and individual differences.
The larger effect of variability was attributed to individual-level factors (57.8%). Youngest-old people (65–79 years) showed lower suicide ideation than middle-aged people (50–64 years). No significative differences were found for suicide ideation between middle-aged people and oldest-old (80 + years). Only 0.85% and 0.13% of the total variability of suicide ideation accounted for birth cohort and period effects, respectively. Cohorts born between 1941 and 1944 possessed the lowest estimates of suicide ideation. Conversely, suicide ideation started to rise with post-War generations and reached a significant level for people born from 1953–1957 to 1961–1964. Regarding the time period, participants assessed in 2006–2007 showed a lower likelihood of suicide ideation. The rest of the cohorts and period groups did not show any significant effect on the prevalence of suicide ideation.
Our results suggest that age and suicide ideation relationship is not linear in middle and older age. The European Baby boomers born from 50s to mid-60s might report higher suicide ideation than their ancestors. This scenario would imply a greater need for mental healthcare services for older people in the future.
Latin America is currently caught in a middle-quality institutional trap, combining flawed democracies and low-to-medium capacity States. Yet, contrary to conventional wisdom, the sequence of development - Latin America has democratized before building capable States - does not explain the region's quandary. States can make democracy, but so too can democracy make States. Thus, the starting point of political developments is less important than whether the State-democracy relationship is a virtuous cycle, triggering causal mechanisms that reinforce each other. However, the State-democracy interaction generates a virtuous cycle only under certain macroconditions. In Latin America, the State-democracy interaction has not generated a virtuous cycle: problems regarding the State prevent full democratization and problems of democracy prevent the development of state capacity. Moreover, multiple macroconditions provide a foundation for this distinctive pattern of State-democracy interaction. The suboptimal political equilibrium in contemporary Latin America is a robust one.
The Brexit and Trump shocks of 2016 mark a deep caesura in the history of liberal societies. It is no longer sufficient, if it ever was, to look at Western states' immigration and citizenship policies through the single lens of advancing liberalism. Instead, two additional forces need to be reckoned with: a new nationalism, but also the neoliberal restructuring of state and society in which it is generated. Joppke demonstrates that many of the new policies have their roots in neoliberalism rather than the new nationalism. Moreover, some of them, such as 'earned citizenship', are the product of neoliberalism and nationalism working in tandem, in terms of a neoliberal nationalism. The neoliberalism-nationalism nexus is complex, its elements sometimes opposing but sometimes complementing or even constituting one another. This topical book will appeal to students and scholars of populism, nationalism, and immigration and citizenship, across comparative politics, sociology and political theory.
The authors of this article consider the relationship in European prehistory between the procurement of high-quality stones (for axeheads, daggers, and other tools) on the one hand, and the early mining, crafting, and deposition of copper on the other. The data consist of radiocarbon dates for the exploitation of stone quarries, flint mines, and copper mines, and of information regarding the frequency through time of jade axeheads and copper artefacts. By adopting a broad perspective, spanning much of central-western Europe from 5500 to 2000 bc, they identify a general pattern in which the circulation of the first copper artefacts was associated with a decline in specialized stone quarrying. The latter re-emerged in certain regions when copper use decreased, before declining more permanently in the Bell Beaker phase, once copper became more generally available. Regional variations reflect the degrees of connectivity among overlapping copper exchange networks. The patterns revealed are in keeping with previous understandings, refine them through quantification and demonstrate their cyclical nature, with additional reference to likely local demographic trajectories.
The vast body of inquiry into nationalism has traditionally seen Europe as a main center for the emergence of nationalism, but scholars of “national indifference” have countered with the idea that nationalism may not matter much at all as a motive for most people. The concept of national indifference calls into question the power of nationalism as a motive for action and the mass appeal of nationalism. Studies of national indifference have constructed an alternative non-national narrative, but face particular challenges accounting for major themes and episodes of discrimination and violence. At its core, national indifference paradoxically both rejects and accepts binary notions of identity and incorporates binary assumptions about motives. It is tempting to resolve the contest between parallel accounts of pervasive, powerful nationalism and national indifference by choosing a victor, but this contrast between models shows the fluidity and dynamism of nationalism. The debate between the now classic accounts of nationalism and the alternative of national indifference points to the importance of often overlooked variables: frames and sense of time.
The reception of asylum seekers in Europe is a highly debated topic: while national governments oversee the implementation of reception conditions, European member states are bound by European directives on minimum standards. Asylum seekers in collective reception facilities should be provided with at least a minimum of reception standards, including housing, food, material reception standards, and legal assistance. However, reception practices not only largely differ across member states but also constantly draw boundaries between asylum seekers and the host society through geographical, architectural, and bureaucratic measures. Using case studies from Austria and Italy, this contribution investigates how, on the one hand, certain (minimum) standards are applied in relation to restrictive integration claims and discourses and how, on the other hand, resources (e.g. for integration measures or housing) are strictly bound to exclusive structures that complicate the inclusive partaking of refugees in host societies. It highlights the mechanisms whereby national reception practices amplify the ‘othering’ of migrants in the context of asylum seeking.
Governance in higher education has been described as ambiguous, elusive, and abstract. Both the concept and the practice of governance are recognized as contested, given tensions between different levels of authority and constituency interests: lay or state, academic or institutional, faculty or students. We focus on developments in public and private higher education to illuminate potentially contradictory trends of convergence and divergence in emerging governance arrangements. The chapter draws on a range of disciplinary and theoretical perspectives for interpreting current governance arrangements in the field of higher education and to highlight gaps in our understanding. The first section addresses the changing landscape of higher education and public–private distinctions in particular. The second focuses on governance arrangements in the arenas of public and private higher education and at the levels of system and institutional governance. The third section discusses theories of governance and their application to public and private higher education domains. The conclusion draws the analyses together, noting gaps and pointing to directions for further research.
This chapter suggests that that the similarities in approaches to internationalization lead to convergence across higher education systems, actual practices and governance arrangements also show continued divergence. By adopting a cultural / phenomenological approached as part of the world society theory perspective (Meyer et al., 1997), this chapter aims to provide a cultural rather than a functional explanation for the remarkable degree of convergence, while not losing sight of divergence. Taking this cultural perspective to both frame and explain the proliferation of the internationalization discourse in higher education — and the resulting convergence and divergence — has, to the best of our knowledge, not been done before in the academic literature. To further our understanding of the internationalization discourse and the implications for governance of higher education, we ask the following research question: how can the rationales and practices underpinning the internationalization of higher education be understood from a world society perspective? To answer this question, we first outline the world society theory. We then highlight patterns of convergence, followed by signs of divergence, in rationales and practices.
The Schengen Agreement was meant to create a 'borderless Europe'. Yet, from the outset, countries have had a very ambivalent relationship to what Schengen stood for politically – an enhancement of the economy – and what it meant in practice: not being able to properly monitor the movement of flows of people across intra-Schengen borders. Whereas there should be no borders for so-called bonafide, or trusted, travellers, the lack of border control was seen as problematic in keeping out the 'crimmigrant other': the irregular migrant, the criminal migrant, the terrorist migrant. By investing in various modalities of the policing of movement and mobility, one could say that the border is everywhere in an area that was meant to be borderless and that the process of 'othering' is central to its functioning. By bringing together the literature on 'othering' and 'bordering', this chapter considers the utility of borders not just as sites of enquiry in their own right but as ‘epistemological viewpoints’ from which to analyse the processes of differential 'othering' that are at the core of bordering practices in intra-Schengen border zones.