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Delirium frequently occurs among hospital in-patients, with significant attributable healthcare costs. It is associated with long-term adverse outcomes, including an eightfold increased risk of subsequent dementia. The purpose of this article is to inform clinicians of the best practices for spotting, stopping and treating delirium and provide guidance on common challenging clinical dilemmas. For spotting delirium, suggested screening tools are the 4 ‘A's Test (in general medical settings) and the Confusion Assessment Method for the Intensive Care Unit (CAM-ICU). Prevention is best achieved with multicomponent interventions and targeted strategies focusing on: (a) avoiding iatrogenic causes; (b) brain optimisation by ensuring smooth bodily functioning; (c) maintaining social interactions and normality. Non-pharmacological approaches are the first line for treatment; they largely mirror prevention strategies, but the focus of empirical evidence is on prevention. Although sufficient evidence is lacking for most pharmacological approaches, an antipsychotic at low doses for short durations may be of utility for highly distressing or high-risk situations, particularly in hyperactive delirium, but only as a last resort.
The fog of Alzheimer’s is a commonly used metaphor, and I think it’s a pretty good one. It refers to the loss of mental acuity, disorientation, and forgetfulness that are common in Alzheimer’s. But one aspect of the metaphor that is not emphasized is that like the fog bank on the ocean, the fog of Alzheimer’s can come and go. It does for me. Sometimes there is an obvious cause such as running a fever, getting too tired, or having a second glass of wine. On the day after I got my second Covid-19 vaccination I was not mentally sharp and had trouble concentrating despite not having any other side effects. Once or twice a week on first awakening in the morning, I think I am in my childhood bedroom. It only takes a few seconds to get reoriented, and it actually is a pleasant rather than scary experience. Sometimes the fog comes in for no apparent reason, lasts a few minutes or a few hours, and then goes away. I wonder what is behind these mysterious, seemingly unprovoked but temporary episodes of cognitive impairment.
This Article considers how trademark law should interpret the commitment in legislative history to the 1946 (US) Lanham Act that one of the principal purposes of trademark law is “to protect the public so that it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and which it wants to get”. It looks back to highlight the often under-appreciated role of the consumer protection rationale in recent expansions in trademark protection, and then considers the different ways by which that basic objective might now be pursued by trademark law. It concludes that, without disregarding the core consumer protection purpose of trademark law, we need to start viewing the question of ensuring consumers get what they want both with a broader view of consumer interests and more explicit attention to a wider array of values.
Why does human cooperation often unravel in economic experiments despite a promising start? Previous studies have interpreted the decline as the reaction of disappointed altruists retaliating in response to non-altruists (Conditional Cooperators hypothesis). This interpretation has been considered evidence of a uniquely human form of cooperation, motivated by an altruistic concern for equality (‘fairness’) and requiring special evolutionary explanations. However, experiments have typically shown individuals not only information about the decisions of their groupmates (social information) but also information about their own payoffs. Showing both confounds explanations based on conditional cooperation with explanations based on confused individuals learning how to better play the game (Confused Learners hypothesis). Here we experimentally decouple these two forms of information, and thus these two hypotheses, in a repeated public-goods game. Analysing 616 Swiss university participants, we find that payoff information leads to a greater decline, supporting the Confused Learners hypothesis. In contrast, social information has a small or negligible effect, contradicting the Conditional Cooperators hypothesis. We also find widespread evidence of both confusion and selfish motives, suggesting that human cooperation is maybe not so unique after all.
The touchstone of any trademark lawsuit is the likelihood of consumer confusion. Courts calculate this likelihood through a series of notoriously unreliable proxies, lamenting that their effort to understand the consumer must be a “shaky kind of guess.” Through the burgeoning field of consumer neuroscience, scientists can now determine when a subject is thinking about one brand versus another. Take, for example, recent research measuring changes in brain blood flow and oxygenation while subjects viewed several well-known trademarks. According to the researchers, each trademark has a different neural signature, with different brain regions reflecting perceptions like “excitement,” “ruggedness,” or “sophistication” upon exposure to the brand stimulus. By viewing these neural signatures and nothing else, researchers could distinguish whether the subject was thinking about Apple or Microsoft, Coke or Pepsi. Studies like this hint at a near future where fMRI readings replace today’s judicial guesswork about consumer perception.
This chapter offers a narrative and descriptions of the plot, its participants and purposes, of the Cato Street locality and the conspirators’ weaponry, of the gathering in the Cato Street stable on 23 February 1820, of informers in the group.
Using error as a method of looking at initials and marginalia, this chapter considers how artists and scribes went against expected word and image play in the manuscript to reflect on the process of reading and recitation – and the confusions and misunderstandings that could potentially ensue. By focusing on several case studies, the reader is walked through the various interpretations that marginalia and initials deployed and how these (at times conflicting) understandings were generatively put into question and undone by subtle variations in color and placement. The goal of this chapter is to show how illuminators worked alongside the text to generate an illustrative program that was surprising and complex in ways that demanded the concerted attention and focus of readers as they chanted the Gospel text.
To examine the effects of exposure to conflicting nutritional information (CNI) through different forms of media on nutrition-related confusion and backlash among consumers in the UK.
Design:
Cross-sectional survey administered via Qualtrics among 18–75-year-old participants in the UK. The sample was stratified by age and gender with quotas defined according to the 2011 UK census distribution.
Setting:
Qualtrics’ Online panel of respondents in the UK.
Participants:
676 participants comprising nearly an equal number of females (n 341) and males (n 335) and a majority (58·6 %) from households whose income was <£30 000.
Results:
Our findings showed that nearly 40 % of respondents were exposed to some or a lot of CNI. We found that while exposure to CNI from TV and online news increased nutrition confusion, CNI from health professionals increased backlash. Exposure to CNI from social media and health websites was associated with reduced backlash. We also found that nutrition confusion and backlash were negatively associated with exercise behaviour and fruit and vegetable consumption, respectively.
Conclusions:
Our study supports the theoretical pathways that explain the influence of CNI exposure on nutrition-related cognitive and behavioural outcomes. Additionally, different types of online information sources are associated with these outcomes to varying degrees. In the context of obesity and diabetes rates in the UK, our findings call for (a) further experimental research into the effects of CNI on consumers’ diet-related cognitions and behaviours and (b) multi-stakeholder, interdisciplinary approaches to address this problem.
What is confusion? And what does confusion have to do with emotion? This chapter argues that Shakespeare’s depictions of confusion elucidate the care with which he ties affective states and bodily conditions together with rational and intellectual processes. Confusion is a state that grips Shakespeare’s characters in their entirety. Deeper still, Shakespeare’s representations of confusion reveal one of the baseline assumptions in his understanding of human emotional life: no affect, passion, or emotion can ever appear on its own, in isolation. In Shakespeare’s view, feeling always involves mixture and mingling – that is, some degree of confusion. Tracing the contours of a philosophical tradition that illuminates the limitations and affordances of confusion, this chapter explores Shakespeare’s depiction of confusion in such plays as Othello, The Merchant of Venice, and Winter’s Tale, but focuses on Cymbeline, a play in which the lived, felt state of confusion takes centre stage.
Une patiente âgée de 60 ans est adressée au CPOA pour troubles de la personnalité et du comportement chez l’adulte (F60–F69) dans un contexte de voyage pathologique.
Case report
L’histoire retrouve chez cette patiente un départ impromptu pour la Belgique. Elle présente dans ses antécédents un VIH non traité et un paludisme. Elle n’a pas d’antécédent psychiatrique. Un passage dans deux services d’urgences générales montre un examen clinique général normal et des examens biologiques et tomodensitométrique cérébral sans particularité. Elle se présente en état d’incurie et désorientée dans l’espace, avec une bizarrerie. Elle tient un discours désorganisé. Elle est persécutée et agitée de manière fluctuante, et en alternance rapide avec un état de perplexité sans autre symptôme thymique ou catatonique. Un diagnostic de confusion mentale est porté, une imagerie par résonance magnétique encéphalique est réalisée. Il montre un hypersignal FLAIR de la substance blanche péri-ventriculaire, profonde (supra- et infratentorielle) et du tronc cérébral, en faveur d’une leucoencéphalopathie multifocale progressive (LEMP) à VIH. Un transfert en médecine interne et des examens complémentaires confirment le diagnostic.
Discussion
La LEMP est une affection démyélinisante due au virus JC qui survient généralement avec un taux de CD4+ < 100/mm3 . La littérature montre qu’une infection VIH peut s’exprimer par des troubles psychiatriques au stade SIDA avec une prévalence de 0,23 %–15,2 % . Les troubles psychotiques sont plus rares que les troubles thymiques . L’IRM est l’examen de choix pour confirmer le diagnostic de LEMP. Le traitement étiologique est la restauration immunitaire. Le traitement symptomatique de référence est la risperidone et la clozapine en raison d’une plus grande sensibilité aux effets secondaires extra-pyramidaux de ces patients.
Conclusion
Des troubles psychiatriques accompagnés de confusion mentale dans un contexte d’infection VIH doivent faire suspecter une atteinte neurologique, le diagnostic psychiatrique étant un diagnostic d’élimination.
Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.
To test the effect of news media exposure to contradictory information about carbohydrates and dietary fats on levels of confusion, nutritional backlash and dietary intentions.
Design:
We conducted an online survey experiment between 11 and 28 February 2018, randomizing participants to one of six experimental conditions. Two ‘contradictory information’ conditions asked participants to read one news article on the risks of a low-carbohydrate diet and one article on the risks of a low-fat diet. Two ‘convergent information’ conditions asked participants to read two articles with similar information on the risks of one of these two diets. A fifth ‘established health recommendations’ control condition asked participants to read two articles on the harms of smoking and sun exposure. A sixth ‘no information’ condition served as a second control group. We used general linear models to test hypotheses on the effects of exposure on confusion, nutritional backlash and dietary intentions.
Setting:
USA.
Participants:
Adults (n 901) registered with Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (M-Turk).
Results:
Exposure to contradictory information about carbohydrates and dietary fats increased confusion and nutritional backlash compared with exposure to established health recommendations for non-dietary behaviours and a no-exposure control. Exposure to contradictory information also increased confusion compared with exposure to consistent nutrition information regarding carbohydrates and dietary fats.
Conclusions:
Contradictory nutrition information in the news media can negatively affect consumers’ attitudes, beliefs and behavioural intentions. Dietary debates that play out in the media may adversely influence both short-term dietary decisions and future efforts to communicate about unrelated nutrition issues.
Chapter 7 describes how 3D printing technology will disrupt trademark law’s core function of indicating the source or origin of manufactured goods. The technology dissociates product design from product manufacturing. Design is embodied in a 3D printable file, while manufacturing is commoditized and democratized. When 3D printable files, as opposed to manufactured goods, are offered for sale, symbols appearing “inside” of the digital files (i.e., on the digital object) do not indicate the source of the file. Rather, source indicators are found “outside” of the file, on the websites that offer the files for sale. 3D printing technology will also radically disrupt the doctrine of post-sale confusion. At the same time, current, expanded theories of trademark law condemn uses of symbols that might dilute a trademark or suggest a connection to a trademark owner. These stronger versions of trademark protection, which are widely criticized, would give trademark owners to the right to control most uses of their marks “inside” of files. This would inhibit innovation and creative expression without a clear benefit to the public. Therefore, I recommend against these stronger protections for DMFs.
Ludwig Wittgenstein has a recognizable approach that he regularly pursues in his philosophical investigations. There is a problem that he often presses, a form of criticism that he often develops, against traditional pursuits of philosophy. It is surprisingly difficult to say clearly what this problem is. But it is worthwhile to try, for this criticism is not only a hallmark of his thought but is also closely connected to other central features of it, for instance, to his conceptions of language and of the nature of philosophical investigation. These features can be properly understood only in concert with a correct view of his terms of criticism of traditional philosophy. In this essay, Alexander George articulates a problem Wittgenstein sees with philosophy, shows how it illuminates otherwise peculiar features of Wittgenstein’s investigations, and finally considers an interesting situation in which Wittgenstein’s goals might be thwarted.
Primary triage in a mass-casualty event setting using low-visibility tags may lead to informational confusion and difficulty in judging triage attribution of patients. In this simulation study, informational confusion during primary triage was investigated using a method described in a prior study that applied Shannon’s Information Theory to triage.
Hypothesis
Primary triage using a low-visibility tag leads to a risk of informational confusion in prioritizing care, owing to the intermingling of pre- and post-triage patients. It is possible that Shannon’s entropy evaluates the degree of informational confusion quantitatively and improves primary triage.
Methods
The Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) triage method was employed. In Setting 1, entropy of a triage area with 32 patients was calculated for the following situations: Case 1 – all 32 patients in the triage area at commencement of triage; Case 2 – 16 randomly imported patients to join 16 post-triage patients; Case 3 – eight patients imported randomly and another eight grouped separately; Case 4 – 16 patients grouped separately; Case 5 – random placement of all 32 post-triage patients; Case 6 – isolation of eight patients of minor priority level; Case 7 – division of all patients into two groups of 16; and Case 8 – separation of all patients into four categories of eight each. In Setting 2, entropies in the triage area with 32 patients were calculated continuously with each increase of four post-triage patients in Systems A and B (System A – triage conducted in random manner; and System B – triage arranged into four categories).
Results
In Setting 1, entropies in Cases 1-8 were 2.00, 3.00, 2.69, 2.00, 2.00, 1.19, 1.00, and 0.00 bits/symbol, respectively. Entropy increased with random triage. In Setting 2, entropies of System A maintained values the same as, or higher than, those before initiation of triage: 2.00 bits/symbol throughout the triage. The graphic waveform showed a concave shape and took 3.00 bits/symbol as maximal value when the probability of each category was 1/8, whereas the values in System B showed a linear decrease from 2.00 to 0.00 bits/symbol.
Conclusion
Informational confusion in a primary triage area measured using Shannon’s entropy revealed that random triage using a low-visibility tag might increase the degree of confusion. Methods for reducing entropy, such as enhancement of triage colors, may contribute to minimizing informational confusion.
AjimiY, SasakiM, UchidaY, KanekoI, NakaharaS, SakamotoT. Primary Triage in a Mass-casualty Event Possesses a Risk of Increasing Informational Confusion: A Simulation Study Using Shannon’s Entropy. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2016;31(5):498–504.
To assess the psychiatric side effects of ketamine when administered in subanesthetic doses to hospitalized patients. It is hypothesized that such effects occur frequently.
Methods
In this retrospective study, the medical records of 50 patients hospitalized on medical and surgical units at our facility who had continuous intravenous infusions of ketamine for pain or mild sedation were reviewed. Patient progress in the days following the start of ketamine infusion was reviewed and response to ketamine was noted.
Results
Twenty-two percent of the patients were noted to have some type of psychiatric reaction to ketamine, including agitation, confusion, and hallucinations. These reactions were relatively short lived, namely, occurring during or shortly after the infusions. No association was found between patient response to ketamine and gender, age, or infusion rate.
Conclusion
Awareness of the psychiatric side effects of ketamine is an important consideration for clinicians administering this medication either for pain control or for depressive illness.
Some older patients on treatment wards suffer from poor mental status in addition to a primary illness condition. This research 1) compared the relative prevalence of cognitive dysfunction when indexed by a mental status questionnaire (MSQ), physician reports, and nurse ratings, respectively, and 2) examined relationships of the MSQ to other variables. The sample was the entire inpatient population on medical and surgical wards at two general hospitals during a one-week period. Data were obtained from the patients (i.e., the MSQ), case notes by physicians (i.e., diagnoses or symptoms indicative of cognitive dysfunction), and ward nuses (i.e., ratings on several variables). The findings were that prevalence of cognitive dysfunction was greater by the MSQ than by physician reports, than by nurse ratings. Against the criterion of MSQ classification, both physicial reports and nurse ratings exhibited false positive and false negative errors; however, false negative errors were more frequent. The strong correlates of MSQ included capacity for independent living, use of geriatric chair, and physician evaluation. Other signs of normalcy or dysfunction were specific to only one MSQ category: tube feeding, restraint, and basic function capability.
This chapter presents a review of the Warren Goldfarb's remarks in his paper 'Wittgenstein on understanding'. However, according to the author, we can learn something from Wittgenstein about how to picture understanding and so forth as definite or particular states without having the picture reflect confusion. The chapter discusses the strand in Wittgenstein that Goldfarb focuses on, the strand which deals with a way of being confused by such a picture. There are certainly passages in Philosophical Investigations that point in the direction Goldfarb indicates. Goldfarb's main focus is on what he calls 'the scientific objection'. The chapter considers parts of Wittgenstein's text in which he shows, in effect, how the picture of meaning, understanding, and so forth as definite states of mind can after all be innocuous. There is nothing wrong with saying the connection with the person one means exists.