In the 2008 presidential nomination campaigns, both Obama and McCain staked out clear positions on the Iraq war. Exit polls conducted in primary and caucus contests show that the war in Iraq was indeed the key issue of support for the winning contenders. However, it was not agreement with the candidates' positions that drove primary voters into the arms of Obama and McCain; rather, it was concern with the Iraq war. Primary voters treated the war as a valence issue, not as a position issue. Each candidate also won an early contest (the Iowa caucuses for Obama and the New Hampshire primary for McCain) in which concern over the Iraq war was especially strong. Those victories sparked a momentum for both candidates in subsequent contests. As a result, both Obama and McCain owed their respective nominations for president to the combination of war and momentum.

From the infamous blue dress to lewd gesturing under an airport bathroom stall, the scandalous coupling of sex and politics generates a lot of buzz. Political pundits inevitably find themselves on the media frontlines, ruminating on the impact of a particular impropriety, its implications for the dishonored politician's career, and his or her ability to effectively perform his or her job. Comedians gather some of their greatest material from the collision of sex and politics. Their jokes and send-ups, however, are not limited to sexual scandal. Tina Fey's impersonation of Sarah Palin catapulted Saturday Night Live (SNL) to the top of the Nielson ratings map in 2008. The nation collectively busted a gut watching the mock “nonpartisan” television announcement featuring Sarah Palin (dressed in a brightly colored skirt suit and punctuating her statements with emotive winks or cutesy giggles) and Hillary Clinton (sporting a drab pantsuit and underscoring her statements with firm nods or a clenched fist pounding the podium) as they denounced the role that sexism played in the presidential campaign.

Political scientists serve in courtrooms as expert witnesses on many topics related to their professional training: elections, same-sex marriages, employer sanctions for hiring undocumented aliens, school desegregation, political asylum requests, property rights, and racial profiling, among many others. It is not by chance that we—the authors—have chosen to testify as experts in cases concerning elections (see also Cain 1999). Election-related cases compose a large percentage of all cases involving political scientists brought to court: a study of references to expert testimony by political scientists in published federal district court decisions from 1950 through 1989 reports that 61% involved election law issues (Leigh 1991). Our replication of this study for the period of 2000 through December 18, 2010, reveals that 74% of such cases (28 of 38) involved election law issues. These cases involved issues of minority vote dilution, redistricting, alternative election systems (cumulative and limited voting), campaign financing, voting equipment and invalid ballots, voter registration, nominating petition requirements, and a number of other issues.

Previous analysis finds that people respond differently to “financial” (e.g., tax evasion) and “moral” (e.g., sexual misconduct) political scandals. However, experimental and observational studies tend to reach different conclusions about which type of scandal induces a stronger negative reaction from the public. We use an experiment embedded in a national survey to examine the possibility that these divergent findings can, in part, be explained by a failure to consider the effects of abuses of power. Consistent with previous experimental work, we find that people respond more negatively to financial scandals than to moral scandals when they do not involve abuses of power. However, abuses of power substantially affect responses to both types of scandals. We also find that moral and financial scandals affect personal and job evaluations of a politician differently. These findings support our contention that to understand public responses to scandal, it is crucial to consider the relationship between the scandalous behavior and the official's formal responsibilities.

Congressional midterm elections were held in the United States in November 2010. Midterm cycles have historically been unkind to the party of the incumbent president, which has on average lost 24 seats in the U.S. House and 4 seats in the U.S. Senate in midterms during the postwar era. In the 2010 general elections, Democrats, who had enjoyed unified control of the federal government since January 2009, suffered devastating defeats in congressional, gubernatorial, and state legislative races nationwide. Democrats lost a total of 63 seats in the U.S House of Representatives—a loss greater than in any other midterm in the postwar period—relinquishing control to the GOP for the first time since 2007 and ushering in a new era of divided government in Washington. Republicans also made gains in the U.S. Senate, although Democrats ultimately retained control of the chamber by a narrow margin of 51 to 47 (two independents also caucus with the Democrats).

Each election year, colleges and universities across the nation witness a plethora of on-campus voter registration activities. The results of these drives are most often assessed by tallying the number of voter registration cards collected. Little has been done, however, to more carefully investigate these results. As a first attempt to examine postdrive results more thoroughly, we ask two questions. First, do students who register through an on-campus voter registration drive actually make it to the voting booth? Second, does providing basic information about the voting process increase turnout among students who register through an on-campus voter registration drive? In this study, we investigate the overall turnout rate of students registering to vote in the 2008 presidential election through on-campus registration drives by validating votes through the office of the county voting registrar. We then compare the turnout rate of students who registered through the on-campus drives with the turnout rate of similar young people nationwide. Finally, we investigate whether the provision of information through certain avenues boosts turnout. Our findings show that students who registered through an on-campus voter registration drive turned out to vote at a higher rate than similar young people nationwide. Additionally, we found small but important effects of information provision through different formats.

In August of 2009, the American Psychological Association adopted the report of its Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation and urged mental health professionals to avoid telling their patients that sexual orientation can be changed (APA 2009a). The report examined the efficacy of “conversion therapies”—also called “reparative therapies”—wherein the patient and therapist attempt to change the sexual orientation of the patient from gay or lesbian to heterosexual. The report is over 160 pages and examines over 80 peer-reviewed, published studies spanning five decades of research. Despite the heft of the report, the findings are briefly and well summarized by the chair of the task force, Judith M. Glassgold, Psy.D.: “Contrary to the claims of sexual orientation change advocates and practitioners, there is insufficient evidence to support the use of psychological interventions to change sexual orientation” (APA 2009b). Of course, this conclusion is a given among all but minor fringe elements in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) community or among this community's friends and affiliates. While sexuality collectively seems to present itself along a scale, it seems for individuals to become fixed at some point along that scale. The APA report provides a useful framework for considering the role of sexuality in political science and raises several important questions for political science as both an endeavor and a discipline.

Confused students researching papers not knowing where they are going. Articles, lectures, and books on exciting topics that turn out to be boring. Such familiar phenomena are symptoms of a widespread, largely unconscious methodological habit of focusing on topics rather than problems. This habit rests on views about knowledge that are deeply ingrained in commonsense knowledge and in the methodology of mainstream social science. Such views saturate the understanding of scientific inquiry assumed by most methods textbooks. This article criticizes the method of topics and contrasts it with the method of problems. The word “topic” suggests that there is some surface to cover, but not why covering it might be interesting. Interesting research is problem-driven. It begins with a sense that something is amiss with existing knowledge and requires explanation. Problem-driven research begins, not with collection of data or facts, or with clarification of concepts, but with identification of inconsistencies or gaps in existing knowledge. It seeks to solve problems through free invention and severe criticism of hypotheses.

Political science is diverse in its methods, theories, and substantive interests. A quick perusal of our flagship journals reveals just how heterogeneous we are, with articles ranging from mathematical treatments of theoretical problems to textual exegesis of Plato, and qualitative studies of single countries standing in contrast to quantitative analyses of experiments designed to mobilize voters. At times, the discipline's boundaries are so fuzzy that our territory is alternatively claimed by philosophers, anthropologists, economists, sociologists, and psychologists.

The number of radio stations airing political talk shows—predominantly conservative talk radio—has surged in the past few years. This massive change in the radio industry says something about the demand for such shows, but attributing the rise of talk radio to a corresponding rise in conservative popular opinion is misleading. We argue that this remarkable growth is better explained by the collision of two changes that have transformed the radio business: deregulation and the mainstreaming of digital music technologies. Regulatory changes have shifted much of radio production and control from local to mass production (managed by industry giants such as Clear Channel Communications) and created a context ripe for nationally syndicated hosts such as Rush Limbaugh, Glenn Beck, and Mark Levin. Meanwhile, rapid technological changes have given consumers more control over the way they listen to music. Technologies such as MP3 players, Internet radio, smart phones, and Pandora Radio have made it more difficult for stations with a music format to be profitable. As music programming has become more problematic, many stations have developed a highly successful business model by converting to talk formats airing nationally syndicated shows.

An examination of the results of the recent midterm elections indicates that the new House of Representatives will probably be the most conservative and ideologically polarized House since the end of World War II. Republicans will hold 242 seats after a net gain of 63 seats, constituting the largest Republican majority in the House of Representatives since the 80th Congress (1947–49), which also had 242 Republican members.

The purpose of this article is to examine the potential impact of Hispanics on the electoral geography of the southern United States after the 2010 decennial census. Hispanics are the largest and fastest-growing minority group in the United States today. In addition to traditional Hispanic destinations such as Florida and Texas, many of the areas experiencing the most rapid growth in Hispanic population are southern states such as Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia. Geographic information systems are used to determine where majority-minority and influential districts are likely to emerge in southern states. We argue that although the Latino population has increased significantly over the past decade, the proportion of Latinos living in southern states remains relatively low in comparison to the general population. Therefore, no new majority-minority or influence districts will emerge in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Tennessee. Majority-minority and influence districts are likely to emerge in Arkansas, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia at the state and local levels, but not at the U.S. congressional level. Texas and Florida are the only southern states where new majority-minority and influence districts are likely to emerge at the U.S., state, and local levels after the 2010 decennial census.

Scholars often use referenda as the plural for referendum. This choice is a hypercorrection—it may sound like proper Latin, but it is not. Referendums is always the correct choice. However, we maintain that there is value in using referendums for multiple events and referenda for multiple propositions.

The results of the 2010 congressional elections were indeed historic. The loss of 63 seats by the Democrats was the biggest electoral loss by any party since 1948, making the more recent 1994 and 2006 turnovers pale by comparison. The question that political scientists naturally ask after an event of this magnitude is—why? This article addresses this question by analyzing the role played by the public's attitudes toward Congress.

This article examines how the American civil response to September 11 profoundly transformed the core of American Muslim political identity for a generation. I outline the evolving contours of the American Muslim as citizens after September 11 through an analysis of the impact of race and religion on two relationships: state to citizen and citizen to citizen. The American political response to September 11 had both positive and negative impacts for domiciled Muslims. At the national level, this event has forced American Muslims into a period of institution building and active citizenship while the federal government's response has problematized the Muslim as a continuous potential security threat. One simmering question for the American citizenry in general concerns the loyalty of the American Muslim. In the future, the American Muslim political class will be engaged in a continued effort to write Muslims into the American narrative in the same way that previous immigrant groups have fought to reappropriate “Americanness.” The larger philosophical question in this process is how, in doing so, this group can prove its loyalty to the nation while maintaining a distinctive religious culture and heritage. What will be the future core of the maturing American Muslim as both a citizen of the republic and a servant of his or her god?

The academic community studying terrorism has changed dramatically in the past decade. From a research area that was investigated by a small number of political scientists and sociologists and employed mainly descriptive and qualitative studies that resulted in limited theoretical progress (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Crenshaw 2000), it has in a short time become one of the more vibrant and rapidly developing academic realms in the scholarly world today. Scholars from different branches of the social sciences have engaged in an effort to unravel this phenomenon, introducing new theoretical outlooks, conceptualizations, and methods.

In a sense, the study of comparative politics is the study of the role that context plays in structuring behavior. Institutional contexts, such as the nature of the electoral system or the existence of an independent judiciary, drive differences in electoral outcomes or human rights across nations. Individual-level contextual factors such as norms, culture, or ethnic or religious identity can be determinative in understanding when social movements will likely flourish and which cleavages will lead to political parties or ethnic strife. Variation in context leads to variation in political outcomes and behavior across both peoples and nations, and provides comparative politics with its richness.

This article addresses Andrew Rehfeld's attempt to ensure a place for political theory within political science, which he does partly by showing how political theory fits into a defensible definition of political science and partly by excluding much political theory from the discipline in order to safeguard the rest. His account of what the discipline should comprehend is overly narrow, however, and does not serve the interests of the sorts of political theory he strongly believes are worth doing. I argue instead that political science must be defined by its subject matter alone, and that political theory's contribution to this subject matter must be defended.

By winning the presidency and strengthening its majority in both chambers of Congress, the 2008 election gave control of the government to the Democratic Party. However, as the 2010 election season unfolded, the news for the Democratic Party could not have been much worse. Economic conditions had not improved dramatically. A bitter and lengthy fight over health care reform signaled to citizens that little had changed in how Washington, DC, governed. The stimulus package and its impact on the federal debt caused unease in a segment of the electorate that was concerned with the size of government. In this context, observers of American politics began to take note of the number of citizens affiliating with, or at least expressing favorability toward, a loose coalition of groups known as the Tea Party movement. Tea Party rallies began to occur throughout the United States, seeking to draw attention to the movement's primary issues.

The ubiquity of data in the twenty-first century provides unprecedented opportunities for social science research, but it also creates troubling possibilities for privacy violations. The emerging field of statistical disclosure control (SDC) studies how data collectors and analysts can find an optimal solution to balancing privacy protection and data utility. This article introduces SDC to readers in the applied political science research community and outlines its implications for analyzing individual-level data. The vocabulary of SDC is introduced and is followed with a discussion emphasizing just how easy it is to break almost any release of supposedly “anonymized” data. The article then describes how SDC measures almost always destroy the ability of researchers to accurately analyze complex survey data. These results are in conflict with increasing trends toward greater transparency in the social sciences. A discussion of the future of SDC concludes the article.