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III - 62C–64C

The philosopher's readiness to die

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

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Summary

To Cebes and Simmias it seems strange that a philosopher, or indeed any man of intelligence, should be well content to die; for death must mean parting from the gods who have been his kindly masters throughout life. Socrates replies with a declaration of faith that after death he will still be under divine protection; death is not the end: there is a future, and a better one for the good than for the evil.

Called upon to explain and justify his faith, Socrates begins by declaring that the whole life of a true philosopher is a training for death—a doctrine at which, as Simmias remarks, the vulgar will gibe, but only because they do not understand it. They indeed may be ignored; but Socrates must explain it to his friends.

‘I think that is probably right’, said Cebes. 'But to go back to your point, that a philosopher will be ready and willing to die, that strikes me as astonishing, Socrates, if there is good ground for saying, as we did just now, that there is a god who looks after us, and that we are his possessions. That men of high intelligence should not complain at having to leave a service in which theirs were the best of all masters, the gods, is not reasonable; they can hardly suppose that they will look after themselves better than their former masters did.

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Plato: Phaedo , pp. 39 - 43
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1972

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  • 62C–64C
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.005
Available formats
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  • 62C–64C
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.005
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • 62C–64C
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.005
Available formats
×