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IV - 64C–67B

The philosopher's detachment from the body

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

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Summary

At death soul and body are separated, but the philosopher will anticipate this separation so far as may be during his life. Setting no value upon bodily adornments and physical pleasures, he will seek to attain intelligence (ϕρόνησις); in this, body is a hindrance, for the activity is that of the soul by itself; ‘the just itself’, ‘the beautiful itself’ and other like objects are not to be apprehended by any of our senses.

The section ends with an impassioned declaration of faith put into the mouth of an imaginary philosopher, in which the opposition of body and soul is given heightened expression: the soul must be purified from the body's infection. Such purification can only be fully achieved at death; but the life of the true philosopher will be a preparation for and an approximation to it.

‘Do we believe there is such a thing as death?’

‘Undoubtedly’, replied Simmias.

‘And by death do we not mean simply the departure of soul from body? Being dead consists, does it not, in the body having been parted from the soul and come to be by itself, and in the soul having been parted from the body, and being by itself. Can death possibly be anything other than that?’

‘No, it can only be that.’

'Well now, turn your mind to this, and perhaps you will find you share my view.

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Plato: Phaedo , pp. 44 - 51
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1972

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  • 64C–67B
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.006
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  • 64C–67B
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.006
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • 64C–67B
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.006
Available formats
×