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XIV - 91C–95A

Refutation of Simmias's theory of soul

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

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Summary

Socrates briefly recapitulates the theories advanced by Simmias and Cebes, and proceeds to develop three arguments against the former. First, it is incompatible with the doctrine of Recollection, to which both the interlocutors proclaim their continued adherence. Secondly, the theory leads to ethical consequences plainly unacceptable. Thirdly, soul can control the bodily feelings, as it could not do if it were merely something that resulted from the ‘attuning’ or adjustment of the bodily parts.

‘And now to proceed’, said Socrates. ‘First of all remind me of what you were saying, in case I prove not to have remembered. Simmias, I think, is sceptical, and fears that the soul, despite its being a fairer and more divine thing than the body, may nevertheless perish before it, because it is a sort of attunement. Cebes, on the other hand, seemed to agree with me on that point: he thought that the soul is longer-lasting than the body, but that nobody could be sure that it might not wear out a whole series of bodies, yet itself perish with the last one left behind: death might really be just this destruction of the soul, not of the body, for of course the body is incessantly and always perishing. Am I right, Siromias and Cebes, in thinking these to be the points for our consideration?’

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Plato: Phaedo , pp. 112 - 120
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1972

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  • 91C–95A
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.016
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  • 91C–95A
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.016
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • 91C–95A
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.016
Available formats
×