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XII - 85B–88B

Simmias and Cebes explain their doubts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

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Summary

Simmias, after some general reflexions on the right attitude to problems of this sort, proceeds to elaborate a theory of the soul as an ‘attunemen’ (ἁρμονία) of the bodily constituents. Then Cebes argues that, despite the fact that any soul endures longer than any body, we cannot be sure that it can outlast the whole series of bodies which (as he contends) succeed one another throughout a man's lifetime, any more than a weaver can outlast the whole series of cloaks that he weaves and wears.

‘Thank you’, said Simmias. 'Then I will tell you my difficulty, and Cebes here in his turn will say what he finds unacceptable in the argument. What I feel, Socrates—and perhaps you feel the same yourself—is that certainty of knowledge on matters like this is either impossible of attainment in this life or very difficult; nevertheless he would be a very feeble-spirited person who failed to subject current opinions about them to the closest scrutiny; one should not desist until he has worn himself out in a thoroughgoing inquiry. In fact we ought to achieve one of two things: either to find for ourselves, or learn from some other, the truth about these matters: or else, if that is impossible, to seize upon the best and most irrefutable doctrine that mankind can offer, and take it as a raft on which to accomplish the dangerous voyage of life; unless indeed we can come to harbour in a safer and less dangerous fashion, resting on the firmer support of doctrine divinely revealed.

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Plato: Phaedo , pp. 97 - 104
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1972

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  • 85B–88B
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.014
Available formats
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  • 85B–88B
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.014
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • 85B–88B
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.014
Available formats
×