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XVIII - 105B–107B

The argument concluded. Soul is both deathless and indestructible

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

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Summary

Applying the principle just established, Socrates argues that soul always ‘brings up’ life into that which it ‘occupies’ (as an immanent form), and excludes death. Hence we have proved that ‘soul is deathless’. But this is not, in his view, the same as proving that it is indestructible or imperishable; hence the rest of the section consists mainly in an attempt to establish this further proposition, and the imperishability of each individual soul is proclaimed at the end of 106E.

Some doubt still lingers in the mind of Simmias, despite his assent to the foregoing argument; whereupon Socrates recommends a further examination of ‘the original assumptions’.

'Well now, go back to the beginning, will you? And please don't meet my questions with that safe answer we spoke of, but copy my example. I say that because the course of our argument has led me to discern a different kind of safety from that which I mentioned originally. Thus, if you were to ask me what must come to be present in a thing's body to make it hot, I should not give you that safe, stupid answer “heat”, but a cleverer one now at my disposal, namely “fire”. Again, if you ask what must come to be present in a body to make it sick, I shall not say “sickness” but “fever”. Similarly, what must be present in a number for it to be odd? Not oddness, but a unit; and so on.

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Plato: Phaedo , pp. 158 - 166
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1972

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  • 105B–107B
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.020
Available formats
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  • 105B–107B
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.020
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • 105B–107B
  • Plato
  • Edited by R. Hackforth
  • Book: Plato: Phaedo
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511620287.020
Available formats
×