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The fourth chapter argues that Dean Mahomet’s English memoir, The Travels (1793), and Abu Taleb Khan’s Persian travelogue, Masir-i Talibi-fi-Bilad-i-Afranji [“Travels of Talib in the Lands of the Franks”], are bookend ruminations on Ireland before and after the 1798 revolt. Their ambivalent feelings about war are implicated in the dense web of social relations that link India to Ireland. I first examine Mahomet’s account of the 1781 British capture of the Rajah of Benares Chayt Singh, as mediated by newspaper reports about Irish MP Edmund Burke’s condemnation of unmanly colonial abuses in India during the Hastings impeachment trial (1788–1796). Then I discuss Abu Taleb’s reaction to the 1799 British defeat of the sultan of Mysore Tipu Sultan, as celebrated in the Dublin circus production of Philip Astley’s The Siege and Storming of Seringapatam. These writers’ patriotic responses to the theatrics of power imply a kinship with Irish hosts who, in their minds, belong to an Indo-Celtic Eurasia.
How do politicians in post-war societies talk about the past war? How do they discursively represent vulnerable social groups created by the conflict? Does the nature of this representation depend on the politicians’ ideology or their record of combat service? We answer these questions by pairing natural language processing tools and a large corpus of parliamentary debates with an extensive data set of biographical information including detailed records of war service for all members of parliament during two recent terms in Croatia. We demonstrate not only that veteran politicians talk about war differently from their non-veteran counterparts, but also that the sentiment of war-related political discourse is highly dependent on the speaker's exposure to combat and ideological orientation. These results improve our understanding of the representational role played by combat veterans, as well as of the link between descriptive and substantive representation of vulnerable groups in post-war societies.
During the final decades of the 1600s, French and Spanish residents in Hispaniola had developed a deeply ambivalent yet fluid relationship that ranged from the open violence to collaboration in their daily dealings. By the end of the century, however, Spanish residents on the island, especially in the north, came to rely on French merchants and settlers, who provided Hispaniola residents with a certain level of economic prosperity that legal (and illegal) Spanish traders operating in Santo Domingo could only provide at much higher prices and limited quantities. This rise of the intercolonial trade between both sides of the island happened as the efforts of the Spanish crown to eliminate French settlements from Hispaniola also increased. The participation of Spanish local residents in the war effort allowed them to manipulate the Spanish offensive and foil the imperial objective of consolidating Spanish control over all of Hispaniola, thus choosing the commercial benefits of accommodation to the neighboring French presence, despite the risks, instead of a safe reunification under Spanish control that would once again commercially isolate them.
In this compelling evaluation of Cold War popular culture, Pulp Vietnam explores how men's adventure magazines helped shape the attitudes of young, working-class Americans, the same men who fought and served in the long and bitter war in Vietnam. The 'macho pulps' - boasting titles like Man's Conquest, Battle Cry, and Adventure Life - portrayed men courageously defeating their enemies in battle, while women were reduced to sexual objects, either trivialized as erotic trophies or depicted as sexualized villains using their bodies to prey on unsuspecting, innocent men. The result was the crafting and dissemination of a particular version of martial masculinity that helped establish GIs' expectations and perceptions of war in Vietnam. By examining the role that popular culture can play in normalizing wartime sexual violence and challenging readers to consider how American society should move beyond pulp conceptions of 'normal' male behavior, Daddis convincingly argues that how we construct popular tales of masculinity matters in both peace and war.
Using two data sets I constructed, I show how initiators won only about half the wars they started since 1648, and fewer than 20 percent since 1945. Using case studies, I attempt to show that their lack of success post-1945 has much to do with the emergence of the norm against territorial conquest.
Volume II of The Cambridge History of War covers what in Europe is commonly called 'the Middle Ages'. It includes all of the well-known themes of European warfare, from the migrations of the Germanic peoples and the Vikings through the Reconquista, the Crusades and the age of chivalry, to the development of state-controlled gunpowder-wielding armies and the urban militias of the later middle ages; yet its scope is world-wide, ranging across Eurasia and the Americas to trace the interregional connections formed by the great Arab conquests and the expansion of Islam, the migrations of horse nomads such as the Avars and the Turks, the formation of the vast Mongol Empire, and the spread of new technologies – including gunpowder and the earliest firearms – by land and sea.
This chapter argues that contemporary Irish-language writing demands a critical response that recognizes its increasingly transnational or global thematic range. The endangered status of the language, far from demoralizing writers, seems to provide them motivation to transcend limiting sociolinguistic realities. The minority subject position becomes a lens for engagement with global issues, as witnessed in a large and diverse body of poetry related to contemporary wars and international conflicts and in a body of fictional writing that engages with transnational history and cultural critique. Contemporary Irish-language writers collectively display an acute awareness of Irish participation or collusion in oppressive imperial or colonial projects. A selection of examples is cited to demonstrate how the resources of the Irish linguistic and literary tradition have been brought to bear on contemporary and historical events and predicaments. In giving voice to global concerns, the Irish language ironically becomes a potent medium with which to question the primacy of national ethnic identification.
The introduction explains the origins and objectives of the book, deriving from a conference on ‘The International Criminal Responsibility of War’s Funders and Profiteers’ held at the Chinese University of Hong Kong on 23-24 June 2017. It sets out the context and provides an overview of the content.
Lebow demonstrates that foreign policies consistent with generally accepted ethical norms are more likely to succeed, and those at odds with them to fail. Constructing original data sets and analyzing multiple case studies, Lebow makes an empirical case for ethics in international relations. His approach looks to create a productive dialogue between those who ask primarily 'ought' questions and those who pose 'is' questions. The former want to establish appropriate criteria for the behaviour of state and non-state actors and the discourses that lead to their policy decisions, whereas scholars who pose 'is' questions are concerned with how political actors behave and the principles and assumptions that might explain their behaviour. Lebow bridges the gap between 'is' and 'ought' questions by making an instrumental argument in favour of ethical foreign policy. He examines policymaking as well as policy, offering ethical guidelines for policymaking that are likely to result in more successful policies.
The conclusion draws together these different levels of analysis – language and discourse; sociability and equality; and music and movement – to underscore that between them they reproduced a radical culture that was hugely intellectually ambitious, but rooted in sets of beliefs, relationships, practices and experiences that pulled in a very much more conformist direction and that worked to undermine the radical literary culture of wartime London, at the same time as loyalist and government forces further curtailed the scope for individual liberty and deliberative activity.
This chapter considers one particular piece of evidence for the perceived importance of artistic skill in the Greek world: the unrestricted mobility of artists. Skill is both a rare and portable commodity. High demand for skill may encourage travel, as artists are tempted by ever higher offers of pay in different locales. On the other hand, variable levels of demand may equally force artists to move in order to gain full employment. Crucially, the fact that Greek cities did not attempt to block the entry of foreign artists from hostile polities testifies to the widespread demand for skilled artists and the respect accorded to their craft.
The Nigeria-Biafra war contributed to the rise of post-colonial moral interventionism, ushering in a new form of human rights politics. During the war, relief agencies evacuated 4,000 children from the conflict zones to Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire to protect them from the conflict. This was part of a broader international humanitarian airlift operation that brought relief supplies to the besieged Biafra territory. At the end of the war, most of the children were returned to their homes in Nigeria through an international humanitarian repatriation effort. Ibhawoh examines how state interests and the politics of international humanitarian interventionism manifested in debates about classifying and protecting displaced children, the most vulnerable victims of the conflict.
Chapter 6 analyzes the impact of casualties on elections during the war. Statewide elections were staggered throughout the calendar in ways that make those election returns function like a tracking poll of partisan support. Contrary to modern war studies, I find Republican vote shares did not deteriorate in response to national casualties. I validate my analytical approach with evidence of highly nationalized and synchronized elections linking party votes for House, governor, and president both before and during the war. However, local deaths moved voters on the margins, with disparate impacts based on the balance of local partisanship. Local deaths depressed Republican vote share in prewar Democratic bastions but not in Republican strongholds. Recent deaths were especially potent. It suggests that the combination of partisan identities, local partisan leaders, and local social environments shaped local interpretations of the war – including its unprecedented human costs. Local casualties did change the electoral behavior of some voters, while most stood pat. Partisan mechanisms guided who responded and how.
Chapter 3 shows how polarized elites guided partisan followers on the war and its elections with nationally representative content analysis from 24 newspapers in the loyal states. I find large partisan gaps in war support, enlistment advocacy, and rhetoric that rationalized support and direct participation in the war’s violence. The newspapers also show extreme partisan vilification within the North, which helps support my claim that partisanship defined contentious Civil War politics, beyond the primary partisan violence inaugurated by the rebellion.
The Hebrew Bible is permeated with depictions of military conflicts that have profoundly shaped the way many think about war. Why does war occupy so much space in the Bible? In this book, Jacob Wright offers a fresh and fascinating response to this question: War pervades the Bible not because ancient Israel was governed by religious factors (such as 'holy war') or because this people, along with its neighbors in the ancient Near East, was especially bellicose. The reason is rather that the Bible is fundamentally a project of constructing a new national identity for Israel, one that can both transcend deep divisions within the population and withstand military conquest by imperial armies. Drawing on the intriguing interdisciplinary research on war commemoration, Wright shows how biblical authors, like the architects of national identities from more recent times, constructed a new and influential notion of peoplehood in direct relation to memories of war, both real and imagined. This book is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Rehabilitating the legacy of deceased leaders is a phenomenon particularly salient in Southern Africa, insofar as memories of liberation wars provoke considerable debate. After a protracted civil war, Angolans remain divided about the contributions of their historical leaders. Jonas Savimbi sits at the center of this division, a binary representation of both heroism and villainy. Martins demonstrates how Savimbi’s memory is invoked both as a moral source of hope for an alternative Angola—one imagined and disseminated by Savimbi and UNITA and appropriated by social protest—and as a technology of fear and control employed by the MPLA to assert political dominance.
In the Lake Titicaca Basin during the Late Intermediate period (LIP; AD 1100–1450), people's lives were overwhelmingly structured by warfare. Previous research in the region has shed light on how martial conflict between and possibly among competing ethnic groups motivated people to live in fortified villages on defensive hilltops. At the same time, there was a centuries-long drought that threatened agricultural production. Little is known about the plant use of people living in hillforts during this arduous time. Drawing on macrobotanical information collected from Ayawiri, one of the largest hillforts in the northern Titicaca Basin, I argue that the food stuffs and plants used were locally grown. Additionally, these findings indicate a possible departure from earlier symbolically charged and ritually important plant consumption practices based on the lack of imported maize. This research sheds light on how people adapted their domestic and agricultural strategies to warfare and climate change during the LIP.
A key piece of conventional wisdom among scholars of modern armed conflict is that collateral damage is often strategically costly in war. Yet most combatants already know this and take actions after mistakes—most prominently, the distribution of “condolence payments” to civilian victims—in order to mitigate these costs. Do these payments work? This question is important not only for policymakers but also for deeper theoretical debates about how civilians respond to combatant signals in war. To examine these issues, I use micro-level conflict event data on 4,046 condolence payments made by Coalition forces to civilian victims during the Iraq War from 2004 to 2008, matching it with corresponding data on collateral damage and insurgent violence. The results of this analysis reveal that post-harm compensation does significantly diminish local rates of insurgent violence, and that this is true across different types of payments (cash handouts or in-kind assistance). Ultimately, these patterns can be best explained by a rationalist mechanism in which civilians update their beliefs about violent events based on new information about combatants’ wartime intentions. The results thus provide a compelling strategic rationale for combatants to compensate their victims in war, and suggest that civilians are not blinded to new information about conflict dynamics by their preexisting biases.
Contemporary studies of conflict have adopted approaches that minimize the importance of negotiation during war or treat it as a constant and mechanical activity. This is strongly related to the lack of systematic data that track and illustrate the complex nature of wartime diplomacy. I address these issues by creating and exploring a new daily-level data set of negotiations in all interstate wars from 1816 to the present. I find strong indications that post-1945 wars feature more frequent negotiations and that these negotiations are far less predictive of war termination. Evidence suggests that increased international pressures for peace and stability after World War II, especially emanating from nuclear weapons and international alliances, account for this trend. These original data and insights establish a dynamic research agenda that enables a more policy-relevant study of conflict management, highlights a historical angle to conflict resolution, and speaks to the utility of viewing diplomacy as an essential dimension to understanding war.