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Over the past two decades a number of Israeli institutions of higher education have opened gender-segregated programs for the ultra-Orthodox, or haredim. The growth of these programs has generated an intense debate in Israel, reflected throughout Israeli media and in several appeals to Israel's Supreme Court. The issues raised concerning gender-segregated higher education reflect an overarching inquiry that is of great interest to multicultural theoreticians: the relationship of liberal democracies to their illiberal minorities. Multicultural theoreticians agree that healthy democracies must tolerate some illiberal practices while acknowledging that not every illiberal practice can be tolerated. In the case at hand, the essay addresses the question: can a liberal democracy tolerate gender-segregated higher education? Using work by Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, Kwame Anthony Appiah, John Inazu, and others, the essay reviews the arguments for and against gender segregation in higher education for Israeli haredim. The essay explores the limits of toleration of illiberal cultures within liberal democratic societies and finds crucial the right to exit such a culture—a right whose viability is dependent upon adequate education. The essay concludes by discussing the multiculturalism organization development model and what has been termed the manyness and messiness of multiculturalism.
This chapter explores the emergence of black and Asian British writing as it began to become institutionalised: in school curricula, universities and higher education, as well as on the lists of educational and mainstream publishing houses. Examining the material conditions impacting on the recognition of this writing across Britain’s arts and educational cultures, it focuses on the second half of the twentieth century, especially the turbulent political period from the late 1970s onwards, to the present day. Though evidence of this history remains uneven, it is important to view the institutionalisation alongside specific political, cultural, and material contexts, in particular the policies of anti-racism, multiculturalism, and cultural diversity as well as government-driven enquiries like the crucial investigation into structural racial inequalities following the Stephen Lawrence murder in the 1999 Macpherson Report. Examining the political and educational initiatives behind arts funding, the chapter highlights how the growing interest in postcolonial studies since the 1990s has also created a wider market for black and Asian British writing, both for publishers and on university courses.
Cultural intelligence (CQ) refers to an individual’s capability to function effectively in situations characterized by cultural diversity. Unlike many cultural competency models that are developed inductively, CQ offers a theoretically derived and comprehensive framework based on the theory of multiple loci of intelligence. CQ comprises four factors – metacognitive, cognitive, motivational, and behavioral CQ. Since our review in 2011, there has been much theoretical and methodological advancement. In this chapter, we provide a comprehensive and up-to-date review of research on CQ, with a focus on these recent developments. They include an expanded conceptualization of CQ with more granular subdimensions; a new performance-based measure of CQ to complement report-based assessments; and a broader nomological network at the individual, dyadic, team, and firm level of analyses. We conclude with ideas for future research, and suggest ways to leverage on emerging technologies to advance the conceptualization, measurement, and applications of CQ.
This chapter draws attention to the centrality of gender in liberal cultural diversity regimes. It shows that the construction of nations and other cultural groups centrally relies on gender: by helping to generate a sense of familiarity among national/cultural strangers; by serving as a means by which cultural boundaries are drawn between the national/cultural Self and foreign Others; and by assigning women the primary role in the intergenerational transmission of national or ethnic culture. The chapter then challenges claims about a major cultural cleavage on gender equality between 'the West' and 'Islam' by drawing attention to the rise of a transnational constellation of self-identified Western actors that mobilize against gender equality in the name of 'Western' or 'European' civilization. Gender has undeniably become central in mobilizing actors against liberalism. The chapter helps illustrate the editors’ argument that diversity regimes always create social hierarchies, in this case gender hierarchy.
This article examines the exclusion of Afro-Mauritians (or Creoles) in Mauritian multiculturalism. Although Creoles represent nearly thirty percent of the population, they are the only major group not officially recognized in the Mauritian Constitution (unlike Hindus, Muslims, and the Chinese) and they experience uniquely high levels of socioeconomic and political marginalization despite the country’s decades-long policy of official multiculturalism. While scholarship on multiculturalism and nation-building in plural societies might explain the exclusion of Creoles as a breakdown in the forging of political community in postcolonial Mauritius, I build on these theories by focusing on the tension between diaspora and nativity evident in Mauritian public discourse. Using the politics of language policy as a case study, I examine why the Kreol language in Mauritius—the ancestral language of Creoles and mother tongue of the majority of Mauritians—was consistently rejected for inclusion in language policy until recently (unlike Hindi, Urdu, and other ethnic languages). In my analysis of public policy discourse, I map how Creole ethnic activists negotiated Kreol’s inclusion in multiculturalism and highlight their constraints. This analysis shows that through multiculturalism, non-Creole political actors have created ethnic categories of inclusion while reciprocally denoting racially-excluded others defined by their lack of diasporic cultural value. I argue that groups claiming diasporic cultural connections are privileged as “ethnics” deemed worthy of multicultural inclusion, while those with ancestral connections more natively-bound to the local territory (such as Creoles, as a post-slavery population) are deemed problematic, culturally dis-recognized, and racialized as “the Other” because their nativity gives them a platform from which to lay territorial counter-claims to the nation.
The late Samuel Huntington publicized the idea of a clash of cultures between the West and the rest. The idea of an irreducible clash has been absorbed into our angry political discourse, often conducted under the banner of “multiculturalism” pro and con. The central issue, the author writes, is how should persons with liberal views on social issues like gender equality and sexual identity and with cosmopolitan sympathies relate to groups, both native and migrant, embracing illiberal norms and practices and seeing the world through sectarian or xenophobic lenses. Should the issue be restated as: What are the proper limits of liberal tolerance? Or do liberal norms require adherents to view cultures as standing on a level plane and to accept the idea of national societies as cultural archipelagos, the position urged by Chandran Kukathas and in a more qualified way by Will Kymlicka? Can societies remain peaceful and democratic if they lack what Michael Walzer calls a common moral standpoint? The chapter explores the possible constituents of such a standpoint and illuminates the considerable overlap in values between liberal multiculturalists like Bhikhu Parekh and classical liberals like Brian Barry.
The author discusses both the push factors promising intensifying pressure on the borders of Europe (and ultimately, perhaps, the United States) and the problematic condition of the European economy marked in some important countries by high unemployment, particularly among youth; stagnant middle- and working-class incomes; and, in the United Kingdom, for example, growing strains on the welfare state. He uses demographic, employment, and income data to expose the extraordinary increase in population projected for areas (Africa, Middle East, West Asia) marked by dysfunctional government, grossly insufficient employment opportunities, and the combination of deep poverty yet increasing means to afford clandestine passage to Europe. An increase of one billion people is projected for 2050. State breakdown, internal violence, environmental deterioration, and natural disasters will drive people across borders. The author then explains the gap between Western governments’ promises to reduce migration and their failure to fulfill them. The pro-migration coalition brings together corporate interests, liberals, civil rights and civil liberties constituencies and organizations, and political leaders representing earlier generations of migrants from the Global South. The very nature of the liberal state makes borders porous and forced repatriation difficult.
The Nordic societies share liberal social values, generous welfare states, sunny hedonism as a kind of secular faith, efficient public institutions, greater equality among classes than in most other Western democracies, high ratings in global surveys of popular happiness, and, until recently at least, a kind of cosmopolitan idealism baked into their respective national identities. Also until about the 1990s, they were more or less culturally homogenous. But in public and electoral attitudes toward Global South, largely Muslim migrant families, they diverge. In Denmark the governing coalition includes a far-right party, and particularly since the notorious affair of Danish cartoons satirizing Muhammad, the government has strongly discouraged asylum-seekers from approaching its doors and does not exert itself to make the settled Muslim population feel at home. In proportion to its population, Sweden took in far more refugees even than Germany during the great surge of 2015, but, despite a well-funded effort, has encountered serious integration problems recorded by liberal and conservative observers. Discourse and policy have become less welcoming. In Norway, smaller and more economically buoyant, the political backlash to Muslim migration is more muted, but integration remains a work in progress.
The book is driven by the conviction that the alt-right is effectively using the linked issues of migration from the Global South and cultural difference to erode liberal values and institutions in rich democratic states. In this introductory chapter, the author elaborates the nature of the liberal perspective from which he views the questions of how open borders should be and the experience and policies of Western governments in response to several generations of migration from Global South. His liberalism draws on both the individual rights liberalism associated with John Locke and the French Revolution’s linking of liberty with equality and fraternity, as well as John Rawls’s Difference Principle and Amartya Sen’s vision of equalized opportunities for the expression of capabilities. He notes liberalism’s internal tension stemming from the fact that it is both a recipe for peaceful coexistence of different faiths, both secular and religious, and a faith with a crusading impulse of its own. And he recognizes the leftist critique of the very liberalism he proposes to defend.
How do views about national identity shape support for multiculturalism? In this paper, we argue that individuals who view national ingroup belonging as “achievable” are more likely to support multiculturalism than individuals who view belonging as “ascriptive.” Using data from the 1995, 2003, and 2013 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) Nationality Identity survey waves across 35 advanced democracies, we find achievable national identities correspond with support for multicultural principles but not for programmatic aspects involving government intervention. Robust analyses reveal these patterns are specific to the content, rather than the strength, of one's national identity. Our findings underline the role of both national belonging and outgroup attitudes on building support for policies of inclusion—and therefore social solidarity—in diverse democracies.
Both Canada and Singapore express support for—and have the reality of being—multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious; and both jurisdictions have an avowed commitment to the freedom of religion. Yet, this commitment expresses itself in different ways in these two contexts. Although both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Singaporean Constitution guarantee the freedom of religion, juridical definitions of what this freedom means may differ quite profoundly.
This Article explores and analyzes these two different environments that nonetheless share important features. We argue that the approaches of Singapore and Canada do not fall simply into the categories of being “liberal” or “illiberal,” but instead invite reflection and reconsideration on the concepts of pluralism, secularism, and liberalism in interesting ways. This Article thus highlights the significance of contextual factors in understanding the ways in which religious diversity is dealt with, particularly in Canada and Singapore, but also more generally.
Using a historical institutionalist approach, I demonstrate how institutionalized norms stemming from the liberal tradition in America have informed its language regime by tracing the path dependency of language policy and the critical junctures when changing norms lead to policy shifts. In the early republic, liberal norms enshrined in the Constitution informed a minimalist language regime. At the turn of the 19th century, norms shifted to reflect rapid industrialization and mass immigration, informing attempts at restrictive language policies. At the critical juncture of the civil rights movement, the monolingual language regime was challenged by new norms of what constituted a liberal democratic society. Neoliberal norms of the Reagan presidency facilitated the success of the English-only movement in changing language policies at the state-level. Neoliberal cosmopolitanism of the new millennium re-introduced minimal multilingual policy initiatives. I conclude by suggesting that Trump’s election represents a shift to nationalist, albeit possibly illiberal, norms.
The political theorizing of language is unavoidably reliant on at least certain basic assumptions concerning the nature of language and linguistic agency. In multilingual and multicultural societies such as Canada, the task of identifying, articulating, and ultimately evaluating such assumptions is more complex, given their more heterogeneous linguistic landscape, and the (sometimes conflicting) clusters of beliefs, attitudes, anxieties, hopes, and expectations attached by speakers to particular languages as well as to the broader repertoire. The chapter focuses its attention on the debate over multiculturalism/interculturalism in the Canadian context. It explores and defends the argument that this debate can be seen in fact as a debate between two distinct conceptions of language and linguistic agency, namely the designative (“Lockean”, i.e., language as detached from a partial and intersubjective human experience) and the constitutive (“Herderian”, i.e., language as inextricably linked to a contextualized social epistemology), respectively. The distinctive logic and reasoning of both models, the chapter argues, can only be defended by embracing a non-holistic “in-betweenness” experience (and conception) of language as an underlying constitutive commonality.
This chapter examines the common assumption that Canadian Official Bilingualism of French and English fosters progressive and tolerant multiculturalism, including multilingualism of any non-official variety. The chapter uses the former Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada (2006-16), Graham Fraser, to interrogate the argument that the Canadian English/French language duality, having two Official Languages, is positively connected to general multilingualism and with it an openness towards a multitude of languages and cultures that make up Canadian society. After a shorter discussion of a similar position held by former Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin (2000-17), this chapter turns to the theoretical grounding of such positions in the work of Charles Taylor. Ultimately this chapter questions the extent to which these celebrations of bilingualism really foster a truly multilingual and egalitarian multicultural society, although it appreciates and agrees with their insistence that language and culture are deeply inextricable.
From Brazil to the United Kingdom, 2016 was a critical year in global politics. Heritage, ethics and the way that archaeologists relate to the public were and will all be affected, and it is time to reflect critically on the phenomenon of ‘reactionary populism’ and how it affects the practice and theory of archaeology. ‘Reactionary populism’ can be defined as a political form that is anti-liberal in terms of identity politics (e.g. multiculturalism, abortion rights, minority rights, religious freedom), but liberal in economic policies. It is characterised by nationalism, racism and anti-intellectualism, and as Judith Butler states in a recent interview, it wants “to restore an earlier state of society, driven by nostalgia or a perceived loss of privilege” (Soloveitchik 2016). Our intention here is to argue that the liberal, multi-vocal model of the social sciences and the humanities is no longer a viable option. Instead, we ask our colleagues to embrace an archaeology that is ready to intervene in wider public debates not limited to issues of heritage or of local relevance, is not afraid of defending its expert knowledge in the public arena, and is committed to reflective, critical teaching.
In this article So-Rim Lee closely investigates the Mahābhārata in relation to – but quite distinct from – The Mahabharata: a Play (1985) by Peter Brook and Jean-Claude Carrière. Since the ancient text of the Mahābhārata does not have a definitive author, version, or form, So-Rim Lee argues that Brook and Carrière's framing of their modern reading as an adaptation of the ancient text poses a series of questions regarding the politics of recontextualizing a South Asian text in Western terms, the methodological process involved in doing this, and the ethical stance espoused by the transcultural adapters. She then questions whether the audience actually finds Brook and Carrière's international, multi - racial production as cosmopolitan and multicultural as the authors claim it to be. If The Mahabharata: a Play is a matter of cultural appropriation rather than adaptation, what transgressions are involved in reframing the source text and how does it produce what Gayatri Spivak calls ‘epistemic violence’? Lee is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Theater and Performance Studies at Stanford University. She has previously reviewed for Theatre Survey and Performance Research.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the use of the term multiculturalism by Canadian justices. The goal is twofold. First, identify the context in which it has been used and delineate the meaning given to multiculturalism by Canadian Courts. Second, contrast the Federal State’s conception of multiculturalism with the courts’ implicit understanding. Although Canadian courts often refer to multiculturalism, their conception is much less unequivocal and its scope quickly widened, going beyond what had been planned at the time of its adoption in 1971.
In the 1990s, Colombia decentralised politics and passed multicultural reforms as part of wider strategies to strengthen the state. Multiculturalism produced a complex institutional environment marked by jurisdictional overlap and legal plurality. The literature on Colombia's multiculturalism confirms that violence, indigenous rights abuses and the lack of enabling legislation on indigenous territorial entities limited ethno-political autonomy and instead enhanced the capacity of the state to transform indigenous identity and bureaucratise local decision-making practices. However, some indigenous authorities used the new institutions to take control of communal matters, changing local governments along the way. The better-known case of indigenous self-government is that of the Nasa people in Cauca, characterised by the capture of local institutions to advance ethnic rights. In my study of the Embera Chamí of Karmata Rúa (Antioquia) I argue that they represent an alternative approach centred on institutional embeddedness, or the repetition of ethnic autonomy rules by multiple layers of government.
This article shows a novel facet in the complex relation between multiculturalism, the state and the market. Contrary to conventional theories in political science, sociology and anthropology, it shows that it is not just the success, but also the failure of the state and the market to commoditise nature and turn it into property that can actually help to foster ethnic identity. While state-driven market incentives to expand the agricultural frontier in Colombia during the 1960s and 1970s failed, they did help to foster differentiated indigenous identities and organisations, which converged around the revival of long-forgotten nineteenth century indigenous laws and other political opportunities to reclaim lands that had been taken away from them. Moreover, this article also shows that during a period of institutional openness in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the political emergence of indigenous identities became an important component of Colombia’s state-building processes by helping this country to maintain its territorial integrity through a model of delegated indigenous governance.
There has been much talk about the retreat or even death of multiculturalism. Much of this discussion confounds multiculturalism with explicit policy under that name. I argue in this paper that liberal law itself, in particular majority-constraining constitutional law, requires multiculturalism, understood as multiple ways of life that cannot and should not be contained by a state that is to be neutral about individuals’ ultimate values and commitments. The workings of legal multiculturalism are demonstrated through a comparison of benchmark jurisprudence on gays in America and Muslims in Europe. An interesting difference is that for Muslims, liberal law has also functioned as constraint, not only as resource, especially in the post-2001 period of heightened integration concerns.