To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure email@example.com
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter outlines existing theories of company law and corporate governance and related insights that are used to frame the analysis in this book, including those of Adam Smith, Berle and Means, Coase, Klausner, Alchian & Demsetz, Jensen & Meckling, Hart, Roe and Bainbridge.
Even when we grant that social punishment is permissible in principle, justifying particular practices of social punishment presents new difficulties. Many of the challenges to punishing justly that are familiar from the legal realm reappear in new ways in the social realm. These include guilt-determination, maintaining proportionality, and establishing the authority to punish. This chapter explores these problems by considering cases of naming and shaming in social media. It defends a set of norms for limiting the application social punishment.
As a result of the spread of International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs), international organisations face crucial questions of representational design. We introduce a distinction between citizen-centred and state-centred IPIs in international organisations (IO). Drawing on original data, we show that, even though parliaments might seem likely to foster citizen representation in the international realm, they in fact often follow state-centred representational designs. We further find that citizen-centred IPIs are a near exclusive phenomenon of a few, democratic regional integration projects. Given the prevalence of state-centred representational designs, we conclude that IPIs’ potential to represent different cross-border communities, concerns, and conflict lines than intergovernmental IO bodies remains institutionally limited. IPIs are thus unlikely to challenge these bodies in similar ways as often observed in the relationship between the European Parliament and the European Union's Council of Ministers.
This chapter examines the legitimacy of international law. It begins with an analysis of the concept of legitimacy, or perhaps more precisely, of legitimate authority. It then considers four possible grounds for international law’s legitimacy: enhancing its subjects’ ability to act as they have most reason to act, the consent of those it claims as subjects, considerations of fair play, and international law’s democratic credentials. The chapter concludes with an examination of reasons why we should care about international law’s legitimacy; indeed, why from a moral point of view increasing the international legal order’s legitimacy might even take priority over making it more just.
This chapter challenges the commonly held assumption that the ‘ulama have been displaced by their Islamic nation-states. I demonstrate the clerics’ contemporary relevance by interrogating conjunctures of dispute and rivalry between Pakistani Sunni ‘ulama and their state’s religious arms, particularly the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII). The CII is a constitutional body charged with advising the president, Parliament and Provincial Assemblies on how to Islamize the legislation and the country more broadly. At the chapter’s heart lie recent debates between the CII and the ‘ulama over women’s rights. Through exploring these contestations, I assert that despite challenges from the state’s religious institutions, the ‘ulama retain their religious authority and prestige. I highlight how Pakistani ‘ulama – some with and some without affiliations with the state apparatus – partake in constituting and cultivating the state by pressuring political functionaries to acquiesce to their demands. In concluding, I use the ‘ulama’s discourses and demands to comment on the nature of the Pakistani public sphere and how religious authority operates in that sphere. Finally, by drawing on ‘ulama–state debates on the rights of women, I propose a novel manner of appraising the function of the Council of Islamic Ideology, particularly during 2006–2008.
This chapter rewrites the history of Egypt’s constitutional period (1923–1952) by examining a ‘culture war’ that broke out between graduates of Dar al-ʿUlum and Europhile modernist intellectuals such as Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Taha Husayn, and ʿAli ʿAbd al-Raziq. From 1930, Europhile modernist calls for westernisation fell on deaf ears due in large part to the darʿamiyya. Darʿamiyya continued to exercise significant influence over the teaching and reform of Arabic, including as members of the Royal Arabic Language Academy (Majmaʿ al-Lugha al-ʿArabiyya) from 1932. Furthermore, darʿamiyya Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood and Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani of Hizb al-Tahrir advanced explicitly Islamic alternatives to state-led projects of modernity. Their example established a new mode of religious leadership, the new religious intellectual, available to individuals without significant religious education. Europhile modernists responded differently to this loss of sociocultural authority. Haykal’s switch to writing about Islamic topics can be seen as an attempt to co-opt darʿami influence over popular views of religion. Husayn’s call for Dar al-ʿUlum to be subsumed into the Egyptian University’s College of Literature was a direct attack on the darʿamiyya’s sociocultural and professional authority.
Over the past seventy-five years, the UN secretary-general has come to occupy a highly visible position in world politics. While the UN Charter describes the post merely as the “chief administrative officer” of the organization, today it is widely recognized that the secretary-general also plays a central role in political matters. What makes the role of the UN secretary-general special? Where does the office's authority come from? As part of the special issue on “The United Nations at Seventy-Five: Looking Back to Look Forward,” this essay looks back at the tenures of previous UN secretaries-general and applies ideas from sociological institutionalism to argue that the UN secretary-general holds the position of a “guardian” of the UN Charter. The UN secretary-general, more than anyone else within the UN system, represents the UN overall. From this flows great responsibilities and challenges, as the UN secretary-general is often expected to step in when other parts of the UN are unable or unwilling to act, and to take the blame when things go wrong. But this special position also endows the office with a substantial degree of authority, which future holders of the office can use to shape policies and mobilize support as the UN seeks to address urgent global challenges.
“From the outside, the market in India is often seen as an exchange arena bound by state-imposed rules. Those within - buyers and sellers, producers and consumers, brokers and advertisers, financiers and debtors, police and inspectors - understand it differently. Such parties collude and compete in myriad everyday activities. These include those of accumulation and circulation, of production and speculation, and of arbitrage and management.
Involved actors, in short, experience the Indian market dissimilarly from the ways in which many planners and policymakers comprehend it. This market is best understood as an ensemble of practices and institutions. It has active and reactive patterns of economic and sociocultural practices, flexible adjustment and coping mechanisms, unforeseen contingencies and aberrations, and strategies of ambiguity and transgression. Transactional agents navigate gray areas and tacit understandings. They reproduce durable informal relations and customary practices. These dynamics only partially relate to state-led market-framing processes.”
Chaucer’s Nun’s Priest’s Tale, a version of the well-known tale of the cock and the fox, has been read as a Menippean parody of a spectrum of authors: various forms and kinds of knowledge, from proverbs to dream theory to poetics to anti-Pelagian theology, proffer a myriad of ways in which to read the world without cohering in the slightest with one another, or solving the immediate, practical problem faced by the cock and his hens: the threat of death at the hands of a creature that they have not yet directly encountered. This chapter suggests how modern readers of the tale might negotiate its formidable critical legacy and find their way to a fresh, unique encounter with a tale in which direct experience promises a means of liberation from the plethora of discourses in which narration is always in danger of becoming mired. In pursuing experience rather than authority, the chapter argues, we are following a trail that begins within the tale itself.
While auctoritas may seem to be a crucial prerequisite for the Roman orator, Cicero sometimes took on a nonauthoritative persona, especially in periods of domination by Pompey and Caesar: he made a show of fear, self-effacing humor, or stubborn silence. He performs fear especially in the introductions of Pro Milone and Pro Deiotaro in order to play down his own power to threaten Pompey and Caesar, and perhaps to provoke resentment of their power to threaten him. In Pro Milone and Pro Ligario, he makes a potentially comical statement that he will shout to be heard, acting foolishly to break political tension. In his letters and in the Brutusunder Caesar’s dictatorship, he proclaims his refusal to speak in public in order to show resistance to the new regime, using silence as an act of protest. I read this as rhetoric of withdrawal or disengagement rather than a transparent reflection of reality.
Mozambique’s land law is notable for its intent to balance the recognition and protection of smallholder land use rights with attracting foreign and domestic investment to rural areas. However, the state’s legitimacy may be undermined through the process of recognition, as state actors and local elites circumvent the law for private gain. Walker focuses on two areas where the law has failed to protect smallholder rights: issues of women’s land rights, and the expansion of protected areas. These issues speak to the problem of recognition, revealing ways the state produces authority, but not necessarily legitimacy, in rural settings.
The debate over rival conceptions of political legitimacy tends to focus on first-order considerations—for example, on the relative importance of procedural and substantive values. In this essay, I argue that there is an important, but often overlooked, distinction among rival conceptions of political legitimacy that originates at the meta-normative level. This distinction, which cuts across the distinctions drawn at the first-order level, concerns the source of the normativity of political legitimacy, or, as I refer to it here, the grounds of political legitimacy. If we focus on the grounds of political legitimacy, there are three main conceptions of political legitimacy: will-based, belief-based, and fact-based conceptions. I present an objection to each of those main conceptions and defend a hybrid account of the grounds of political legitimacy.
In recent years there has been a proliferation of international institutions that address climate change and energy governance, not least in the field of renewable energy. Given scarce resources, policy-makers need to prioritize which institutions to engage with. Central to this choice are considerations of the institutions’ legitimacy. The aim of this chapter is to understand how the legitimacy of international institutions is perceived under conditions of institutional complexity – i.e. in a context, where multiple actors work on the same issue area without overarching coordination. A questionnaire-based study examines common understandings of what makes an institution legitimate and how these understandings diverge amongst policy-makers and key stakeholder groups from different countries. Theoretically, the chapter unpacks the meaning of legitimacy under institutional complexity. Empirically, based on mixed methods, the chapter offers an assessment of legitimacy of a set of climate and energy governance institutions with different but overlapping mandates (the Clean Energy Ministerial, International Energy Agency, International Renewable Energy Agency, Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). This chapter thus provides societally-relevant insights to the literature on legitimacy, with implications for how to strengthen climate and energy governance.
The Classic Maya represent a newly important topic for political anthropology and the study of pre-Modern societies. The decipherment of their script offers a trove of primary sources that allow us, uniquely in the ancient Americas, to compare and contrast a rich material record with a significant historical one. Whether our goal is to comprehend social power in its broadest sense, or to understand the nature of specific institutions such as monarchy, complex societies isolated from the cross-fertilisations of the Old World have clear comparative value. As such, what we can learn about the Maya casts useful light on universal themes and will be of wider relevance to the field.
Applies the results of the previous chapters to larger questions about early Jewish textual culture. Argues that rewriting cannot be associated narrowly, as it has been in the past, with “authoritative” or “scriptural” texts, and cannot be construed primarily as a type of biblical interpretation. Though inherently interpretive because of its engagement with earlier traditions, rewriting was a much more widespread textual strategy. The chapter then situates early Jewish rewriting in the broader historical context: unlike in neighboring Mesopotamia, where increased interest in the divine origins and authorship of texts resulted in a decrease in rewriting, early Jewish rewriting persisted despite a comparable textualization of revelation. Whether due to ideas of scribal inspiration or concepts of revelation as limitless/gradually unfolding, early Jewish scribes saw it as their duty to actively reshape the sacred traditions handed on to them.
The article examines some key writings in the works of Bishop John Rawlinson with relation to the development of Anglican Liberal Catholicism in the early twentieth century. The article aims to show how he contributed to the development of Anglican Liberal Catholic thought and practice in the period, especially with regard to views on authority and ecumenical relations.
The C40 city-network claims a position of global leadership in the governance of climate change. This chapter provides a brief overview of the history of the network, its member cities, and their collective aims and objectives. The chapter introduces the empirical puzzle around which the book is organized, namely the ability of the C40 to achieve coordinated action from a diverse collection of cities despite relying on voluntary participation and engagement. The ability to do so sets the C40 apart from other similar city-networks and begs the question as to how it has been able to achieve coordination and collective effort. The chapter asserts that such voluntary coordination is only possible through the formation of a collective identity and draws on ideas from the scholarship on social fields, social constructivism, and social movements to develop a theory of global urban governance fields that explains when, how, and why the C40 has managed to generate convergence around a set of governance norms and a shared governance identity.
Whereas the C40 was fragmented in its early years, the network underwent a process of transformative change that began with the selection of Michael Bloomberg, as mayor of New York City, as C40 Chair in late 2009. As described in Chapters 1 and 3, both coordination and convergence around a common set of governance norms and a collective identity were increasingly apparent during the four-year period (2010-2014) in which New York occupied the C40 Chair. The theory of global urban governance fields is applied to explain why Bloomberg and New York were able to achieve what both the Clinton Climate Initiative and previous C40 Chairs could not. Bloomberg and New York brought with them considerable claims to material, reputational, and institutional capital, but it was the ability to link these to securing recognition for the cities of the C40 from external audiences – international financial institutions like the World Bank, multinational corporations, private capital markets – that authorized them to set the terms upon which such recognition would be granted within the governance field. In so doing the C40 began to converge toward a common set of governance norms – autonomy and global accountability – that underpin the production of coordinated action.
While voluntary city-networks lack formal mechanisms of coercion, they remain subject to complex political and power relations that shape their capacity to produce collective efforts. This chapter develops a general theory of global urban governance fields that brings to light the ways in which power is present in city-networks like the C40. The chapter starts from the premise that coordination in these networks requires convergence around a shared sense of what it means to “be” a global urban climate governor. While multiple actors – not only cities but also private corporations, philanthropic foundations, civil society organizations, and international organizations - seek to shape the content of field norms, practices, and collective identity, in newly created governance fields the authority to do so is contested. Actors make particular claims to authority, based on material resources, expertise, reputation, and institutional position, but only through the mechanism of recognition are these acknowledged as authoritative. The ability to secure recognition for the members of the governance field enables those actors to secure deference to particular terms of recognition (the governance norms, practices), shaping how governance is understood and practiced by those within the field.
The C40 is in many ways a success story. It has generated increased engagement and coordination, with the vast majority of member cities now committed to the collective goal of carbon neutrality by midcentury. This level of coordination was virtually unthinkable a mere decade ago, and the theory of global urban governance fields helps to identify and explain its origins and underpinnings. The ability of the C40 to generate convergence and consolidation around a common understanding of how to “be” a global urban climate governor has enabled the C40 to generate collective effort in the face of voluntary participation. This chapter sets out the ways in which this insight contributes to pushing forward the scholarship on cities, global climate governance, and the role of cities in international relations more broadly. It also highlights important questions that emerge as a result, including the relationship between the content of C40 norm/identity convergence and the potential contribution it can make to achieving collective goals of decarbonization and transformative sustainability, how to measure and assess progress and performance, and for whom/to whom cities are rendering themselves accountable as global climate governors.