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Reward processing has been proposed to underpin the atypical social feature of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). However, previous neuroimaging studies have yielded inconsistent results regarding the specificity of atypicalities for social reward processing in ASD.
Aims
Utilising a large sample, we aimed to assess reward processing in response to reward type (social, monetary) and reward phase (anticipation, delivery) in ASD.
Method
Functional magnetic resonance imaging during social and monetary reward anticipation and delivery was performed in 212 individuals with ASD (7.6–30.6 years of age) and 181 typically developing participants (7.6–30.8 years of age).
Results
Across social and monetary reward anticipation, whole-brain analyses showed hypoactivation of the right ventral striatum in participants with ASD compared with typically developing participants. Further, region of interest analysis across both reward types yielded ASD-related hypoactivation in both the left and right ventral striatum. Across delivery of social and monetary reward, hyperactivation of the ventral striatum in individuals with ASD did not survive correction for multiple comparisons. Dimensional analyses of autism and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) scores were not significant. In categorical analyses, post hoc comparisons showed that ASD effects were most pronounced in participants with ASD without co-occurring ADHD.
Conclusions
Our results do not support current theories linking atypical social interaction in ASD to specific alterations in social reward processing. Instead, they point towards a generalised hypoactivity of ventral striatum in ASD during anticipation of both social and monetary rewards. We suggest this indicates attenuated reward seeking in ASD independent of social content and that elevated ADHD symptoms may attenuate altered reward seeking in ASD.
Recent research has highlighted a tendency for more rational and deliberative decision-making in individuals with autism. We tested this hypothesis by using eye-tracking to investigate the information processing strategies that underpin multi-attribute choice in a sample of adults diagnosed with autism spectrum condition. We found that, as the number of attributes defining each option increased, autistic decision-makers were speedier, examined less of the available information, and spent a greater proportion of their time examining the option they eventually chose. Rather than indicating a more deliberative style, our results are consistent with a tendency for individuals with autism to narrow down the decision-space more quickly than does the neurotypical population.
Autism and autistic traits are risk factors for suicidal behaviour.
Aims
To explore the prevalence of autism (diagnosed and undiagnosed) in those who died by suicide, and identify risk factors for suicide in this group.
Method
Stage 1: 372 coroners’ inquest records, covering the period 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2017 from two regions of England, were analysed for evidence that the person who died had diagnosed autism or undiagnosed possible autism (elevated autistic traits), and identified risk markers. Stage 2: 29 follow-up interviews with the next of kin of those who died gathered further evidence of autism and autistic traits using validated autism screening and diagnostic tools.
Results
Stage 1: evidence of autism (10.8%) was significantly higher in those who died by suicide than the 1.1% prevalence expected in the UK general alive population (odds ratio (OR) = 11.08, 95% CI 3.92–31.31). Stage 2: 5 (17.2%) of the follow-up sample had evidence of autism identified from the coroners’ records in stage 1. We identified evidence of undiagnosed possible autism in an additional 7 (24.1%) individuals, giving a total of 12 (41.4%); significantly higher than expected in the general alive population (1.1%) (OR = 19.76, 95% CI 2.36–165.84). Characteristics of those who died were largely similar regardless of evidence of autism, with groups experiencing a comparably high number of multiple risk markers before they died.
Conclusions
Elevated autistic traits are significantly over-represented in those who die by suicide.
The literature has demonstrated how the relationship between cognitive or emotional intelligence and age exhibits an inverted-U-shape and that this decline can be mitigated by an individual’s cognitive reserve (CR). Rather less is known, however, about the pattern of changes in cognitive empathy or the ability to recognize the thoughts or feelings of others.
Objectives:
The aim of the present study was firstly to analyze the effect of age, gender, and CR (measured through educational level), on the capacity to show cognitive empathy. Secondly, we aimed to evaluate what type of relationship—linear or quadratic—exists between age and cognitive empathy. We finally aimed to analyze the moderator role of educational level on the relationship between age and cognitive empathy.
Participants:
Totally, 902 Spanish adults aged between 18 and 79 years (M = 43.53, SD = 11.86; 57% women).
Measurements:
Participants were asked to indicate their educational level (primary, high school, or college education) and their cognitive empathy was assessed using the Eyes test.
Results:
Women scored higher than men on cognitive empathy. Participants with a college education had higher scores on cognitive empathy than those with a lower educational level. Additionally, the relationship between age and cognitive empathy fit an inverted-U-shaped curve, consistent with the data found for cognitive and emotional intelligence. Finally, the age-related decrease in cognitive empathy appeared to be mitigated by a higher educational level, but only in those individuals aged 35 years and above. Limitations and clinical implications are discussed.
Research in developmental neuropsychiatric conditions has revealed morphological and functional divergences in the brain. In some cases, the divergences occur due to one or two highly penetrant genomic mutations. In case such as autism, mutations in varied sets of genes may produce a convergent autism behavioral phenotype. It is thus likely that there may be other forms of non-genomic regulation of gene expression during development affecting behavioral outcome. Epigenetic gene regulation is one such mechanism that can permanently switch on or switch off gene expression, and these epigenetic changes can be inherited from one cell stage to another during differentiation, mimicking the effects of genomic mutations. Epigenetic gene regulation occurring during early developmental stages of cellular differentiation, which are highly sensitive to environmental cues, is the primary mechanism responsible for the phenomenon known as evolutionary development or “evo-devo.” This chapter discusses these mechanisms in the context of autism and the environmental factors that influence it.
There is limited information on the presentation and characteristics of psychotic illness experienced by people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD).
Aims
To describe autistic and psychotic phenomenology in a group of individuals with comorbid ASD and psychosis (ASD–P) and compare this group with populations affected by either, alone.
Method
We studied 116 individuals with ASD–P. We compared features of their ASD with people with ASD and no comorbid psychosis (ASD–NP), and clinical characteristics of psychosis in ASD–P with people with psychosis only.
Results
Individuals with ASD–P had more diagnoses of atypical psychosis and fewer of schizophrenia compared with individuals with psychosis only. People with ASD–P had fewer stereotyped interests/behaviours compared with those with ASD–NP.
Conclusions
Our data show there may be a specific subtype of ASD linked to comorbid psychosis. The results support findings that psychosis in people with ASD is often atypical, particularly regarding affective disturbance.
Autism research has previously focused on either identifying a latent
dimension or searching for subgroups. Research assessing the concurrently
categorical and dimensional nature of autism is needed.
Aims
To investigate the latent structure of autism and identify meaningful
subgroups in a sample spanning the full spectrum of genetic
vulnerability.
Method
Factor mixture models were applied to data on empathy, systemising and
autistic traits from individuals on the autism spectrum, parents and
general population controls.
Results
A two-factor three-class model was identified, with two factors measuring
empathy and systemising. Class one had high systemising and low empathy
scores and primarily consisted of individuals with autism. Mainly
comprising controls and parents, class three displayed high empathy
scores and lower systemising scores, and class two showed balanced scores
on both measures of systemising and empathy.
Conclusions
Autism is best understood as a dimensional construct, but meaningful
subgroups can be identified based on empathy, systemising and autistic
traits.
This study assessed the dimensionality of the Systemizing Quotient-Revised (SQ-R), a measure of how strong a person's interest is in systems, using two statistical approaches: Rasch modeling and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Participants included N = 675 with an autism spectrum condition (ASC), N = 1369 family members of people with ASC, and N = 2014 typical controls. Data were applied to the Rasch model (Rating Scale) using WINSTEPS. The data fit the Rasch model quite well lending support to the idea that systemizing could be seen as unidimensional. Reliability estimates were .99 for items and .92 for persons. A CFA parceling approach confirmed that a unidimensional model fit the data. There was, however, differential functioning by sex in some of these items. An abbreviated 44-item version of the scale, consisting of items without differential item functioning by sex was developed. This shorter scale also was tested from a Rasch perspective and confirmed through CFA. All measures showed differences on total scale scores between those participants with and without ASC (d = 0.71, p < .005), and between sexes (d = 0.53, p < .005). We conclude that the SQ-R is an appropriate measure of systemizing which can be measured along a single dimension.
We explore why people with autism spectrum conditions (ASC) not only show deficits but also areas of intact or even superior skill. The deficits are primarily social; the areas of intact or superior skill involve attention to detail and systemizing. Systemizing is the drive to analyse or build a system. We review the evidence related to systemizing in ASC and discuss its association with sensory hypersensitivity. We close by considering the evolution and adaptive features of systemizing and how – taken to an extreme – this can also give rise to disability.
Introduction
Paradoxes emanating from human brain functioning have long been noted – patients with amnesia who cannot explicitly recall information but who nevertheless reveal implicitly that they do recall information; patients with reported blindness who nevertheless demonstrate some ‘unconscious’ vision (‘blindsight’); Brazilian street children who fail academic mathematics tests but who are lightening quick in performing calculations in the market place; and individuals who experience perceptions in one sensory modality when a different sensory modality is stimulated (‘synaesthesia’). In some sense, paradoxes in brain functioning should perhaps not be so surprising given the number of different ‘modules’ and pathways in the brain, such that some functions may be impaired whilst others may simultaneously be either intact or even superior.
Whilst we are familiar with syndromes where most, if not all, cognitive functions are impaired (such as in certain forms of learning disability or dementia), this chapter focuses on what can be learnt from syndromes displaying uneven cognitive profiles.
The editors of this volume, Ilona Roth and Payam Rezaie, have assembled a valuable collection of chapters providing an excellent overview of a wide range of areas relevant to autism research. The book tackles the challenge of early detection; the complex biology of autism, including genetics (from linkage, to association, to CNVs), the autistic brain (from the perspectives of MRI, DTI, MEG, neuroanatomy and epilepsy) and molecular aspects of autism (from serotonin to oxytocin); the complex psychology of autism (from cognitive models, language, memory and executive function); and the challenge of education in autism.
Autism research is currently enjoying considerable growth, with hundreds of researchers joining in the hunt to understand this important set of conditions. This book showcases some of the best autism scientists in the UK who are contributing to this international effort. The editors are to be congratulated on pulling this collection together, since this will inspire a new generation of autism scientists among contemporary students. The hope is that an anthology of this kind will be produced every few years, so we can track this fast-changing field. This multi-disciplinary book nicely illustrates how autism is a multi-level phenomenon that will need integration across levels. This book exemplifies how each level must be represented and contributes to the bigger picture.
Barresi & Moore contrast two theories of autism: (1) in autism there is a general inability to integrate first and third person information (of any kind), and (2) in autism there is a specific inability to represent an agent's perceptual or volitional mental state being about another agents mental state. Two lines of experimental evidence suggest that the first of these is too broad, favoring instead the more specific “theory of mind” account.
Recent reports estimate the prevalence of autism-spectrum conditions in
the UK to be 1%.
Aims
To use different methods to estimate the prevalence of autism-spectrum
conditions, including previously undiagnosed cases, in
Cambridgeshire.
Method
We carried out a survey of autism-spectrum conditions using the Special
Educational Needs (SEN) register. A diagnosis survey was distributed to
participating schools to be handed out to parents of all children aged
5–9 years. The mainstream primary school population was screened for
unknown cases.
Results
The prevalence estimates generated from the SEN register and diagnosis
survey were 94 per 10 000 and 99 per 10 000 respectively. A total of 11
children received a research diagnosis of an autism-spectrum condition
following screening and assessment. The ratio of known:unknown cases is
about 3:2 (following statistical weighting procedures). Taken together,
we estimate the prevalence to be 157 per 10 000, including previously
undiagnosed cases.
Conclusions
This study has implications for planning diagnostic, social and health
services.
Carruthers' “mindreading is prior” model postulates one unitary mindreading mechanism working identically for self and other. While we agree about shared mindreading mechanisms, there is also evidence from neuroimaging and mentalizing about dissimilar others that suggest factors that differentially affect self-versus-other mentalizing. Such dissociations suggest greater complexity than the mindreading is prior model allows.
An important regulatory process in the development of behavior is cognition. However, cognition as a blanket term is far too broad to be useful. Rather, specific types of cognition need to be examined separately. One proposal is that one type of human reasoning evolved in a social context, to solve social problems. Here, we report two experiments that use autism to test a prediction from that theory: that social intelligence should be independent of nonsocial intelligence. Autism was chosen because deficits in social reasoning (“theory of mind”) are well known. The question we tested was whether their theory of mind deficit was dissociable from abstract and relational reasoning ability. In particular, we expected that the abnormalities in the behavioral development of children with autism would be regulated by abnormalities in theory of mind reasoning rather than other forms of reasoning. Children with autism and matched controls were given tests of abstracting reasoning, which did not involve mental state understanding. Results showed that children with autism performed comparably to the control groups, both on a test of transitive inferential reasoning and on a test of analogical reasoning. These results lend support to the specificity of the theory of mind hypothesis for autism and to Cosmides' theory of the evolution of social intelligence. They also show that cognition as a regulatory process in development needs to be examined in highly specific ways.
Previous studies of theory of mind abilities in young people with autism have found that their understanding of false belief is specifically impaired, but that simple aspects of desire are understood in line with mental age. We explored the possibility that more complex aspects of desire (in which comparison of goals with outcomes is not a sufficient strategy) are not understood by children with autism. In two experiments, we found that these children were specifically impaired in understanding desire satisfaction and desire change, when compared with children with mental handicap and normal 4-6-year-olds. Although there was some evidence that understanding of desires may be easier for individuals with autism than understanding false belief, it would appear that they have difficulties in understanding both epistemic and volitional mental states.
Previous studies have revealed a “theory of mind” impairment in children with autism. The aim of this study was to assess whether it is possible to intervene by teaching children with autism to understand the mental states of emotion, belief, or pretence. Results showed that it is possible to teach children with autism to pass tasks that assess emotion and belief understanding. Introducing unfamiliar materials in structurally similar tasks did not adversely influence teaching effects, either immediately after teaching, or 2 months later. However, teaching effects did not generalize to tasks in domains where children received no teaching. In addition, no significant progress in spontaneous pretend play resulted from teaching. These results indicate that children may be passing tasks using rules rather than any genuine understanding of the concepts involved.
Several authors have recently suggested that imitation may be a developmental “precursor” of a theory of mind and have linked impaired imitation in children with autism to their failure to develop a theory of mind. The present study investigated early-emerging procedural and gestural imitation abilities in children with autism. Children with autism were found to have intact basic-level gestural and procedural imitation. We discuss these results in terms of their relation to a specific developmental delay hypothesis of autism and re-assess the status of imitation as a developmental precursor of a theory of mind.