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The sources and fate of radiocarbon (14C) in the Dead Sea hypersaline solution are evaluated with 14C measurements in organic debris and primary aragonite collected from exposures of the Holocene Ze’elim Formation. The reservoir age (RA) is defined as the difference between the radiocarbon age of the aragonite at time of its precipitation (representing lakeʼs dissolved inorganic carbon [DIC]) and the age of contemporaneous organic debris (representing atmospheric radiocarbon). Evaluation of the data for the past 6000 yr from Dead Sea sediments reveal that the lakeʼs RA decreased from 2890 yr at 6 cal kyr BP to 2300 yr at present. The RA lies at ~2400 yr during the past 3000 yr, when the lake was characterized by continuous deposition of primary aragonite, which implies a continuous supply of freshwater-bicarbonate into the lake. This process reflects the overall stability of the hydrological-climate conditions in the lakeʼs watershed during the late Holocene where bicarbonate originated from dissolution of the surface cover in the watershed that was transported to the Dead Sea by the freshwater runoff. An excellent correlation (R2=0.98) exists between aragonite ages and contemporaneous organic debris, allowing the estimation of ages of various primary deposits where organic debris are not available.
The science of studying diamond inclusions for understanding Earth history has developed significantly over the past decades, with new instrumentation and techniques applied to diamond sample archives revealing the stories contained within diamond inclusions. This chapter reviews what diamonds can tell us about the deep carbon cycle over the course of Earth’s history. It reviews how the geochemistry of diamonds and their inclusions inform us about the deep carbon cycle, the origin of the diamonds in Earth’s mantle, and the evolution of diamonds through time.
Objective: To determine whether volumetric measures of the hippocampus, entorhinal cortex, and other cortical measures can differentiate between cognitively normal individuals and subjects with mild cognitive impairment (MCI). Method: Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data from 46 cognitively normal subjects and 50 subjects with MCI as part of the Boston University Alzheimer’s Disease Center research registry and the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging Initiative were used in this cross-sectional study. Cortical, subcortical, and hippocampal subfield volumes were generated from each subject’s MRI data using FreeSurfer v6.0. Nominal logistic regression models containing these variables were used to identify subjects as control or MCI. Results: A model containing regions of interest (superior temporal cortex, caudal anterior cingulate, pars opercularis, subiculum, precentral cortex, caudal middle frontal cortex, rostral middle frontal cortex, pars orbitalis, middle temporal cortex, insula, banks of the superior temporal sulcus, parasubiculum, paracentral lobule) fit the data best (R2 = .7310, whole model test chi-square = 97.16, p < .0001). Conclusions: MRI data correctly classified most subjects using measures of selected medial temporal lobe structures in combination with those from other cortical areas, yielding an overall classification accuracy of 93.75%. These findings support the notion that, while volumes of medial temporal lobe regions differ between cognitively normal and MCI subjects, differences that can be used to distinguish between these two populations are present elsewhere in the brain.
This article offers a discussion of James Kreines’s book Reason in the World: Hegel’s Metaphysics and Its Philosophical Appeal. While broadly sympathetic to Kreines’s ‘concept thesis’ as a conceptual realist account of Hegel, the article contrasts two Kantian arguments for transcendental idealism to which Hegel’s position may be seen as a response—the argument from synthetic a priori knowledge and the argument from the dialectic of reason—and explores the implications of Kreines’s commitment to the latter over the former.
This paper considers the prospects for the current revival of interest in Hegel, and the direction it might take. Looking back to Richard J. Bernstein's paper from 1977, on ‘Why Hegel Now?’, it contrasts his optimistic assessment of a rapprochement between Hegel and analytic philosophy with Sebastian Gardner's more pessimistic view, where Gardner argues that Hegel's idealist account of value makes any such rapprochement impossible. The paper explores Hegel's account of value further, arguing for a middle way between these extremes of optimism and pessimism, proposing an Aristotelian reading which is more metaphysical than Bernstein recognizes, but not as at odds with thinking in current analytic philosophy as Gardner suggests, as it finds a counterpart in the work of Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson, Rosalind Hursthouse and others.
This article is a discussion of Hegel’s conception of the principle ‘omnis determinatio est negatio’, which he attributes to Spinoza. It is argued, however, that Spinoza understood this principle in a very different way from Hegel, which then sets up an interpretative puzzle: if this is so, why did he credit Spinoza with formulating it? This puzzle is resolved by paying attention to the context in which those attributions are made, while it is also shown that the British Idealists (unlike many contemporary commentators) were aware of the complexities in the Spinoza–Hegel relation on this issue. The paper also addresses some of the philosophical debates raised by this question, and the light it sheds on Hegel’s critique of Spinoza as a monist.
Objectives: Cognitive impairment is common in Parkinson’s disease (PD). Three neurocognitive networks support efficient cognition: the salience network, the default mode network, and the central executive network. The salience network is thought to switch between activating and deactivating the default mode and central executive networks. Anti-correlated interactions between the salience and default mode networks in particular are necessary for efficient cognition. Our previous work demonstrated altered functional coupling between the neurocognitive networks in non-demented individuals with PD compared to age-matched control participants. Here, we aim to identify associations between cognition and functional coupling between these neurocognitive networks in the same group of participants. Methods: We investigated the extent to which intrinsic functional coupling among these neurocognitive networks is related to cognitive performance across three neuropsychological domains: executive functioning, psychomotor speed, and verbal memory. Twenty-four non-demented individuals with mild to moderate PD and 20 control participants were scanned at rest and evaluated on three neuropsychological domains. Results: PD participants were impaired on tests from all three domains compared to control participants. Our imaging results demonstrated that successful cognition across healthy aging and Parkinson’s disease participants was related to anti-correlated coupling between the salience and default mode networks. Individuals with poorer performance scores across groups demonstrated more positive salience network/default-mode network coupling. Conclusions: Successful cognition relies on healthy coupling between the salience and default mode networks, which may become dysfunctional in PD. These results can help inform non-pharmacological interventions (repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation) targeting these specific networks before they become vulnerable in early stages of Parkinson’s disease. (JINS, 2016, 22, 205–215)
In what follows, I first review some of the major influences that shaped my early years. I then relate the subsequent developments in my professional career, including my research orientation, chief publications, collaborative relationships, and long-standing involvement in undergraduate and graduate teaching and supervision.
The Early Years
Growing up for the most part in Brookline, Massachusetts, I had the benefit of a first-class education in the local public schools. I remember in particular Ms. Fitzgerald and Ms. Frame, my seventh- and eighth-grade English teachers at the Edward Devotion primary school, for their instruction and care in imparting the main elements of written expression to me and my fellow students. It was then that I first really learned how to write and the need for clarity and conciseness in written expression. I have carried forward these lessons and have found great satisfaction in my own professional writing and the writing of my students.
Different elements in the reception history of German Idealism have had different impacts – such as the Young Hegelians on the philosophy of religion, neo-Kantianism on the philosophy of science, Kojève on accounts of recognition, Croce on theories of art, and so on. When it comes to the British Idealists, arguably the most obvious candidate for such impact is in the idea of ‘my station and its duties’; for while the British Idealists engaged with many aspects of the thought of both Kant and Hegel (and to a lesser degree also of Fichte and Schelling), it seems that it is their notion of ‘my station and its duties’ that has the greatest resonance today, while their accounts of the Absolute, of relations, of the concrete universal, and other aspects of their idealist metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind have been largely forgotten.
In this essay, I want to look again at this idea of ‘my station and its duties’, particularly as it figures in the work of T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley, who pioneered its significance. For, while it is widely used as a slogan to represent both their ethical and political philosophy and that of Idealism more generally, and while it is of continuing influence within certain strands of contemporary ethical and political thinking as an alternative to other approaches, it is rarely given any detailed treatment in historical terms. In particular, I would like to ask precisely what theory of duty or obligation this position is meant to embody: that is, how an appeal to this notion is meant to answer a fundamental question in ethical theory, namely how moral obligation is to be accounted for and best understood. It is most usually assumed, I think, that in tying obligations to social roles, the British Idealists were offering what I will call an identificatory account of obligation: that is, acting in a certain way has an obligatory force because it relates to a role which constitutes your identity.
In this paper, I consider Charles Taylor's classic article ‘The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology’, in which Taylor presents an account of the Consciousness chapter of the Phenomenology as a transcendental argument. I set Taylor's discussion in context and present its main themes. I then consider a recent objection to Taylor's approach put forward by Stephen Houlgate: namely, that to see Hegel as using transcendental arguments would be to violate Hegel's requirement that his method in the Phenomenology needs to be presuppositionless. I concede that Houlgate's criticism of Taylor has some force, but argue that nonetheless Taylor can suggest instead that although Hegel is not offering transcendental arguments here, he can plausibly be read as making transcendental claims, so that perhaps Houlgate and Taylor are not so far apart after all, notwithstanding this disagreement.