A REPRESENTATIONALIST PROGRAM

Representationalism

In the last chapter I have argued against the holistic threat to semantic localism. I have claimed that we ascribe localistic properties to our words for semantic purposes (descriptive), that we ought to do so (normative), and hence that these properties are meanings (basic). This raises the question: Which localistic properties do we and ought we to ascribe for semantic purposes? That question will be my main concern in this chapter. Certain wellknown arguments for eliminativism and revisionism will be set aside until the next chapter. My aim is to present a localistic program rather than a detailed theory.

The program I shall be presenting will be Representationalist. Representationalism is the view that meanings are entirely constituted by “representational” properties (3.11). So the meaning of a sentence is exhausted by the properties that determine its truth conditions} And the meaning of a word is exhausted by properties that determine its reference. Representationalism made an appearance in Chapter 1 in the guise of the Fregean assumption, but it played only a minor role in the critique of the case for holism. In Chapter 3, I argued that Representationalism counted decisively against holism, but I did not rest my case for localism on it. In the rest of this book, with holism rejected, I shall be arguing for Representationalism.