INTRODUCTION

Semantic Holism and Semantic Localism

At its most extreme, semantic, or meaning, holism is the doctrine that all of the inferential properties of a token in language or thought constitute its meaning. This doctrine is opposed by semantic localism, which, at its most extreme, denies that any of the inferential properties of a token constitute its meaning.

Despite its prima facie implausibility, semantic holism is ubiquitous. It has, as Jerry Fodor says, “something of the status of the received doctrine in the philosophy of language” (1987: 57). And it is urged, or taken for granted, in psychology and artificial intelligence. In this chapter, I shall look critically at the case for semantic holism.

The case can always be made to fit the folio wing “basic” argument:

1. Some of a token's inferential properties constitute its meaning.

2. If some of a token's inferential properties constitute its meaning then they all do.

3. So, all of a token's inferential properties constitute its meaning.

Fodor is an extreme “atomistic” localist: He resists this argument by rejecting premise (1) (pp. 73–95). Fodor's major reason for rejecting (1) is quite clear: He thinks that it leads inexorably to holism, which he regards as “a crazy doctrine” (p. 60) threatening Life As We Know It. He thinks that (1) has this unfortunate consequence because he accepts (2). Indeed, he is as committed to (2) as the most fervent holist.

I agree with Fodor's view of the holistic conclusion but think that he is quite wrong about (2). My aim in this chapter is to reject the case for (2).