3 - A Case for Semantic Localism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 January 2010
Summary
A PRINCIPLED BASIS
Introduction
My concern in this chapter is to reject semantic holism and defend molecular semantic localism. The methodology described in the last chapter will play a central role.
I have pointed out (1.1) that holism is usually accompanied by a no-principled-basis consideration along the following lines:
There is no principled basis for the molecular localises distinction between the few inferential properties of a token alleged to constitute its meaning and all its other inferential properties. Only a token that shared all the inferential properties of the original token would really share a meaning with it.
Many who are not sympathetic to holism are impressed by the no-principled-basis consideration. Lepore and Fodor (1993) are striking examples. Quine has shown that an epistemic criterion like aprioricity cannot provide the principled basis. Lepore and Fodor think that the possibility of a nonepistemic criterion providing the basis is near enough empty:
there might, in principle, be something wonepistemic that distinguishes meaning constitutive inferences from others; something that does not have to do with the conditions under which the inferences are accepted. Maybe it's their length; or whether they are tokened on Tuesday, etc. But it is, to put it mildly, hard to imagine what this distinguishing feature of inferences could be.
(p. 674; see also 1.7, n. 25)So, if we accept that some inferential properties constitute meanings, we have no principled basis for denying that they all do. Molecular localism is untenable. Fodor, at least, concludes that no inferential properties count, thus embracing an atomistic localism.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Coming to our SensesA Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism, pp. 87 - 135Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1995