Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of European Monetary, Economic and Financial Integration
- The Cambridge Handbook of European Monetary, Economic and Financial Integration
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I The Economic and Monetary Union
- Part II The Monetary Dimension
- 9 The Overburdened Monetary Policy Mandate of the ECB
- 10 Government Bond Buying by the European Central Bank
- 11 ECB Monetary Policies
- 12 From Market to Green Economics
- 13 The Politics of Monetary Union and the Democratic Legitimacy of the ECB as a Strategic Actor
- 14 How Can Courts Contribute to Accountability in EU Monetary Policy?
- Part III The Economic and Fiscal Dimensions
- Part IV Financial Integration
- Index
- References
14 - How Can Courts Contribute to Accountability in EU Monetary Policy?
from Part II - The Monetary Dimension
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2023
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of European Monetary, Economic and Financial Integration
- The Cambridge Handbook of European Monetary, Economic and Financial Integration
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Part I The Economic and Monetary Union
- Part II The Monetary Dimension
- 9 The Overburdened Monetary Policy Mandate of the ECB
- 10 Government Bond Buying by the European Central Bank
- 11 ECB Monetary Policies
- 12 From Market to Green Economics
- 13 The Politics of Monetary Union and the Democratic Legitimacy of the ECB as a Strategic Actor
- 14 How Can Courts Contribute to Accountability in EU Monetary Policy?
- Part III The Economic and Fiscal Dimensions
- Part IV Financial Integration
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter is devoted to analysing the extent to which courts and legal institutions can contribute to improving the accountability of EU monetary policy. To do so, it draws on a framework designed to examine the normative goods underlying accountability claims, namely the use of accountability to improve the openness, non-arbitrariness, effectiveness, and publicness of official action. Analysing the jurisprudence of both national courts and the European Court of Justice, the chapter examines the extent to which judicial interaction has improved or detracted from these goods. It concludes that judicial intervention (in the absence of meaningful channels of political accountability) has made a modest contribution to improving the accountability of the ECB’s monetary policy.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023
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