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13 - The Politics of Monetary Union and the Democratic Legitimacy of the ECB as a Strategic Actor

from Part II - The Monetary Dimension

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2023

By
Sebastian Diessner
Edited by
Dariusz Adamski ,
Fabian Amtenbrink  and
Jakob de Haan
Dariusz Adamski
Affiliation:
University of Wroclaw
Fabian Amtenbrink
Affiliation:
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Jakob de Haan
Affiliation:
University of Groningen
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Summary

This chapter contends that if we want to make sense of the politics of Europe’s monetary union, we need to focus on the democratic legitimacy of the European Central Bank as a strategic political actor. The chapter departs from common distinctions in the literature between input, output, and throughput legitimacy and instead seeks to analyse how the ECB has navigated these dimensions strategically. To do so, it develops a theory of legitimation strategies based on distinctions between normal and crisis times and between a central bank’s organizational and systemic interests. The theory is assessed through a discussion of the first two decades of ECB monetary policy-making – from the inception of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union until the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis – and through a comparison of the ECB’s democratic legitimacy with that of other major central banks.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of European Monetary, Economic and Financial Integration , pp. 237 - 251
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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