Richard Posner’s “What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?” (1993b) is not, as usually believed, the first analysis of judges’ behaviors made by using the assumption that judges are rational and maximize a utility function. That analysis arrived at the end of a rather long process. This paper recounts the history of this process, from the “birth” of law and economics in the 1960s to 1993. We show that economic analyses of judges’ behavior were introduced in the early 1970s under the pen of Posner. At that time, rationality was not modeled in terms of utility maximization. Utility maximization came later. We also show that rationality and incentives were introduced to explain the efficiency of common law. Around this theme, a controversy took place that led Posner and other economists to postpone their analysis of judicial behavior until the 1990s. By then, the situation had changed. New and conclusive evidence of judges’ utility maximizing behavior demanded a general theory to be expressed. In addition, the context was favorable to Chicago economists. It was time for Posner to publish his article.

Unlike standard accounts, recent research in the history of macroeconomics has given increasing attention to the Old Keynesians’ criticisms of the New Classical Economics. In this paper, I address the case of Edmond Malinvaud, who began opposing the New Classical Economics from the early 1980s and did so throughout the following thirty years. This study shows that his opposition was radical, i.e., multi-dimensional and systematic, and owes to the methodology and the practice of macroeconometric modeling. In turn, this twofold result sheds light on the nature and the rationale of the Old Keynesians’ opposition to the New Classical Economics from the 1970s onwards, which can be interpreted along the same lines.

We analyze Milton Friedman’s two visits to Chile, in March 1975 and November 1981. We rely on a number of sources, including Friedman’s archives, press archives in Chile and the rest of the world, interviews, and the papers and recollections of some of those who accompanied Friedman during his meeting with Pinochet. Although Friedman’s 1975 visit has been widely discussed, his 1981 visit has been largely neglected. However, this visit was particularly important as it preceded a severe currency and banking crisis, stemming from an overvalued fixed exchange rate. The crisis put at risk the influence of the “Chicago Boys” and the political and economic liberalization process. We analyze Friedman’s views regarding Chile’s pegged exchange rate strategy followed between 1979 and 1982, and his position on economic and political freedom.

A century ago Arthur Pigou published The Economics of Welfare. Within this volume are a few lines relating to the pricing of traffic congestion. Over the years, these lines have attracted the attention and thoughts of some of the leading economists of their day. These have included Knight, Clapham, and Robertson in the 1920s; Kahn and Viner in the 1930s; Ellis and Fellner in the 1940s; and Buchanan, Vickrey, Solow, Friedman, Walters, Demsetz, Newbery, and Allais in the post-World War II period. Here, I look at the academic arguments from the 1920s concerning how roads should be priced and by whom. I then move to consider the continuation of the intellectual debates after World War II and their implications for policy design and implementation. Finally, I briefly look at the extent to which some of the existing road congestion pricing systems meet the requirements of the economic theory.