This article shows how structured financing can be used to solve the asset substitution problem in a dynamic setting. Structuring induces the firm’s owner to optimally choose the first best operating strategy even though the owner’s value function might be locally convex (concave), which would ordinarily lead to overinvestment (underinvestment) in risky projects. This result is demonstrated in two different continuous time settings—one that is based on the risk-shifting framework of Leland (1998) and one that generalizes the scaled return model of Green (1984). It is shown that the contractual nature of the structuring is a key determinant of the issuing firm’s dynamic asset volatility. Furthermore, unlike nonstructured financing, the default (conversion) probability of a structured debt security may be increasing (decreasing) in the firm’s total assets. Structured securities are therefore hedge assets, which potentially explains the popularity of structured securities among investors and third-party issuers.

We read all news items that came out between 1996 and 2000 on 458 Internet initial public offerings (IPOs) and a matching sample of 458 non-Internet IPOs (a total of 171,488 news items) and classify each news item as good news, neutral news, or bad news. We first document that the media were more positive for Internet IPOs in the period of the dramatic rise in share prices and more negative for Internet IPOs in the period of the dramatic fall in share prices. We then document that media hype is unable to explain the Internet bubble: A 1,646% difference exists in returns between Internet stocks and non-Internet stocks from January 1, 1997, through March 24, 2000 (the market peak), and the media can explain only 2.9% of that.

We investigate the joint dynamics of returns and trading volume of 556 foreign stocks cross-listed on U.S. markets. Heterogeneous-agent trading models rationalize how trading volume reflects the quality of traders’ information signals and how it helps to disentangle whether returns are associated with portfolio-rebalancing trades or information-motivated trades. Based on these models, we hypothesize that returns in the home (U.S.) market on high-volume days are more likely to continue to spill over into the U.S. (home) market for those cross-listed stocks subject to the risk of greater informed trading. Our empirical evidence provides support for these predictions, which confirms the link between information, trading volume, and international stock return comovements that has eluded previous empirical investigations.

This paper establishes liquidity linkage between stock and Treasury bond markets. There is a lead-lag relationship between illiquidity of the two markets and bidirectional Granger causality. The effect of stock illiquidity on bond illiquidity is consistent with flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity episodes. Monetary policy impacts illiquidity. The evidence indicates that bond illiquidity acts as a channel through which monetary policy shocks are transferred into the stock market. These effects are observed across illiquidity of bonds of different maturities and are especially pronounced for illiquidity of short-term maturities. The paper provides evidence of illiquidity integration between stock and bond markets.

In this paper, we propose a nonparametric estimator of the short rate diffusion process using observations of a panel of yields. The proposed estimator can greatly reduce the bias of the nonparametric estimator proposed in Stanton (1997) that uses a single time series of short rate observations. Simulations confirm that the new method significantly attenuates the spurious nonlinearity of the drift function as documented in Chapman and Pearson (2000). We apply the method to estimate the U.S. short rate process using a panel of six Treasury yields. With 42 years’ daily observations of the panel of yields, the proposed drift function estimator achieves the same efficiency as the Stanton (1997) estimator based on 145 years of daily short rate observations. Finally, we show that the proposed estimator also has significant economic implications on the pricing of bonds and interest rate derivatives.

Eleven percent of the largest public U.S. firms are headed by the CEO who founded the firm. Founder-CEO firms differ systematically from successor-CEO firms with respect to firm valuation, investment behavior, and stock market performance. Founder-CEO firms invest more in research and development, have higher capital expenditures, and make more focused mergers and acquisitions. An equal-weighted investment strategy that had invested in founder-CEO firms from 1993 to 2002 would have earned a benchmark-adjusted return of 8.3% annually. The excess return is robust; after controlling for a wide variety of firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and industry affiliation, the abnormal return is still 4.4% annually. The implications of the investment behavior and stock market performance of founder-CEO firms are discussed.

Analysis of a worldwide sample of sudden deaths of politicians reveals a market-adjusted 1.7% decline in the value of companies headquartered in the politician's hometown. The decline in value is followed by a drop in the rate of growth in sales and access to credit. Our results are particularly pronounced for family firms, firms with high growth prospects, firms in industries over which the politician has jurisdiction, and firms headquartered in highly corrupt countries.

In this paper I examine the likelihood of CEO stock option repricing and its alternatives: namely, option grant, stock grant, and “do nothing.” Multinomial logit results suggest that firms reprice options to increase sensitivity of pay to stock price and to temper down sensitivity of pay to volatility. Moreover, repricing firms are younger and more concentrated in industries where human capital is important. Finally, I find no evidence that internal governance or executive conflicts of interest are relevant in explaining repricing. My results indicate that repricing is motivated by incentive alignment and retention, and not by agency cost considerations.

This paper proposes an alternative characterization of the early exercise premium that is valid for any Markovian and diffusion underlying price process as well as for any parameterization of the exercise boundary. This new representation is shown to provide the best pricing alternative available in the literature for medium- and long-term American option contracts, under the constant elasticity of variance model. Moreover, the proposed pricing methodology is also extended easily to the valuation of American options on defaultable equity and possesses appropriate asymptotic properties.

In 12 sessions conducted in a typical bubble-generating experimental environment, we design a pair of assets that can detect both irrationality and speculative behavior. The specific form of irrationality we investigate is the probability judgment error associated with low-probability, high-payoff outcomes. Independently, we test for speculation by comparing prices of identically paying assets in multiperiod versus single-period markets. We establish that aggregate irrationality measured in one dimension (probability judgment error) is associated with aggregate irrationality measured in another (bubble formation).

This study uses a stochastic frontier approach to evaluate firm efficiency. The resulting efficiency score, based on firm characteristics, is the input for performance evaluation. The portfolio composed of highly efficient firms significantly underperforms the portfolio composed of inefficient firms even after adjustment for firm characteristics and risk factors, suggesting a required premium for the inefficient firms. The difference in performance between the two portfolios remains for at least five years after the portfolio formation year. In addition, firm efficiency exhibits significant explanatory power for average equity returns in cross-sectional analysis.

This paper estimates an internally consistent structural model that imposes cross-sectional restrictions on the dynamics of the term structure of interest rates, inflation, and output growth. Distinct from previous term structure settings, this model introduces both time-varying central tendencies and a stochastic conditional mean of output growth. The estimation of the model, which is based on U.S. data over a 1960 to 2005 sample period, provides reliable estimates for the implicit term structures of real interest rates, expected inflation rates, and inflation risk premia, as well as for expectations of macroeconomic variables. The model has better out-of-sample forecasting properties than a number of alternative models, and it contradicts the puzzling evidence that during the “Great Moderation” in inflation subsequent to the mid-1980s, the forecasting ability of structural models deteriorated with respect to atheoretic statistical models.

We analyze the intertemporal stability of excess returns to technical trading rules in the foreign exchange market by conducting true, out-of-sample tests on previously studied rules. The excess returns of the 1970s and 1980s were genuine and not just the result of data mining. But these profit opportunities had disappeared by the early 1990s for filter and moving average rules. Returns to less-studied rules also have declined but have probably not completely disappeared. High volatility prevents precise estimation of mean returns. These regularities are consistent with the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (Lo (2004)), but not with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis.

We test the luxury consumption hypothesis of Ait-Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo (2004), using a unique international art price, import/export flow, and stock market data set. We find that the demand for art by Japanese collectors is positively correlated with art prices and Japanese stock prices. This correlation is magnified during the “bubble period” of the Japanese economy (the mid-1980s to the early 1990s) and gains even further strength for works of art typically favored by Japanese collectors. Our results suggest that Japanese investors (or Japanese asset markets) indeed affect international art prices—especially during the bubble period and its aftermath.