This article analyzes the special historical characteristics of prefecture-level regional financial administration during the latter half of the Tang Dynasty, which had as its primary revenue source the twice-a-year tax legally established in 780. Prefectural financial administration during this period consisted of three components: the portion of the twice-a-year tax retained by prefectures (liuzhou), “money for public use” (gongyongqian), and the ever-normal and charity granaries (changping yicang). Each of these elements made its appearance at separate times from the Northern Wei to the Sui. Following the establishment of the twice-a-year tax law, they became consolidated as components of prefectural financial administration at the beginning of the ninth century. At the same time, these components of prefectural financial administration became subject to the control of the central government, especially with regard to the “money for public use,” the section over which prefectures exercised the broadest discretion. In the early Northern Song, at the end of the tenth century, all revenue sources (beyond those used to meet obligatory expenses such as the stipends of bureaucrats) came to be retrieved by the central government, and prefectural financial administration came to be placed directly under central control.

Beginning in 1260, the Mongol ruler Khubilai Khan embarked on the creation of a Chinese-style bureaucracy to govern his realm more effectively. At the same time, the court began to promulgate a salary code for its officials. Though both processes were led in large part by Chinese scholar-officials, this group continually complained about the shortcomings of the salary code and its negative effects on the bureaucracy. By studying their writings on salaries and official government records, this article will demonstrate that the Chinese literati used their complaints about the salary code to level criticisms against flaws in the administration and to push for bureaucratic reform, and that the Yuan court was genuinely concerned about the salary problem and took measures to alleviate it. Yet the court never actually reformed, and this article will ultimately aim to show how the response to the issue of salaries reflected the Mongols’ desires to cling to the power and privilege that was afforded to them by a bureaucratic structure which preserved much of their traditional steppe institutions and values.

Depending on conditions, Chinese peasants strategically adopted one of two types of transactions: either a single one-time transaction without reference to any particular buyer, or repeated transactions dependent on one regular broker. Based on the different sizes of market zones and responding to seasonality, Chinese peasant households allotted their labour to maximize income and avert risk. Generally, in early modern China, the volume of exchanges among peasants was much greater than the volume of exchanges between peasants and merchants from towns. One-time transactions were dominant not only by the choice of peasants for concluding local transactions but also by the petit traders who connected villages and towns. Thus, price movements in local currencies such as copper coins in local marketplaces did not follow the movements of inter-regional trade made in silver. Maintaining the independence of local trade, local merchants established a system for settlements through account books and issued native notes to respond to chronic shortages of currency. In Japan, peasant households showed similar characteristics of seasonal allocation and division of intra-household labour, but in the nineteenth century were less dependent on local marketplaces and maintained more continuous relationships among villagers as well as with merchants from towns. The differences between China and Japan during the early modern era, when economies depended heavily on small-size peasant households with less specialization, reveals the inadequacy of conventional conceptions of markets such as Smithian growth, which ignore the differences between local trade and inter-regional trade, and underestimate the importance of proximate exchanges among peasants, which reflected their desire for a higher degree of freedom when making transactions.

Analyzing the messages and the responses that Chinggis Khan sent to and received from Ong Khan and his allies after his defeat at the hands of the latter at the battle of Qalaqaljit Elet in the spring of 1203, and explicating the terms of cimar (chimar) and törü that appear in the messages, this article looks at the political order and culture where the Chinggisid state rose. The article argues that pre-modern Mongolian and Inner Asian politics was guided by the idea of törü, which resembles the Indo-Buddhist idea of dharma, the Chinese idea of dao, and the European idea of natural law. It also argues that the hereditary divisional system that the Inner Asian state builders regularly employed to govern their nomadic populations, the institutions of dynastic succession, and the hereditary rights of princes and the nobility for inheritance fundamentally structured Inner Asian politics. Hence, it questions the conventional wisdom that depicts pre-modern Inner Asian politics not only as pragmatic, fluid, and fractious but also dependent on the personal charisma of leadership, and the personal bond and loyalty between leaders and followers, as if it were lacking enduring social, political institutions and order.

This article focuses on the mobile peoples who engaged in piracy on the borders beyond the territories negotiated by the imperial Chinese and colonial Spanish and Dutch powers, and by doing so, reframe our perception of early modern imperial and maritime history. In pre-modern times, the control of territory within the administrative borders was incomplete, and small pockets of territories with porous borders were beyond governmental rule. The people and the groups that lived along the coast of the northeastern South China Sea were, at different times, recognized differently and many of their activities were at times sanctioned and at other times outlawed. This article reveals a facet of how the non-stateless peoples lived on the borders beyond, claimed their own order in their own way, and worked and became naturalized or classified inside the strengthening borders in pre-modern societies according to the agenda and discourses of the dominant powers. I argue that the coastal societies had their own “order” that created groups “beyond control” or “being registered gradually.”

This study aims to discuss the significant role of “peasant society” in understanding the economic history of both modern and early modern Japan.

Independent peasant households proliferated in Japan in the seventeenth century, and from around the turn of the eighteenth century onwards they underwent a transformation into entities called ie, which owned family properties and bore responsibility for conveying these properties to the next generation. Although the development of the market economy also contributed to maintaining and activating the peasant society, the function of the labour market was strongly influenced by the strategy of peasant households to pursue the optimal utilization of slack labour generated by the seasonally fluctuating labour demand from agriculture. Under these constraints, peasant households tended to deliver non-agricultural employment opportunities to their members, forming a kind of barrier against mobilizing family workers outside the household. These barriers were supported by region-based industrial development such as a weaving industry adopting the putting-out system most suitable to the requirements of peasant households. Rural-based capital accumulation together with the workings of the regional financial markets contributed to maintaining particular peasant household behaviours by supporting region-based industrial development, which featured in Japan's path of economic and social development from the early modern to the modern period.