This paper explores how Japanese officials and others conceptualized police power at particular junctures in imperial Japanese history (1868–1945). It does so by synthesizing prior scholarship on the Japanese police into a broader genealogy of the police idea in prewar Japan, beginning with the first translations and explanations of police in the Meiji period, the changing perceptions of the police in the 1910s, and the evolution from the “national police” idea in the 1920s to the “emperor's police” in the late 1930s. The essay proposes that the police idea in Japan (and elsewhere) can be read as a boundary concept in which the changing conceptions of police power demarcate the shifting relationship between state and society. Indeed, it is the elusiveness of this boundary that allows for police power – and by extension, state power – to function within society and transform in response to social conditions. Approached in this way, the essay argues that the different permutations of the police idea index the evolving modality of state power in prewar Japan, and thus allows us to reconsider some of the defining questions of imperial Japanese history.

From the signing of the Treaty of San Francisco to the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, Japan has always adopted a political and economic separation policy that maintains diplomacy with Taiwan and economic and cultural relations with China. Within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, to break the existing deadlock, Kenzo Matsumura of the Japanese House of Representatives and others formed a foreign policy group in 1959. This group spoke highly of China's importance to Japan's development on the grounds of national interests rather than ideology and national sentiments, played a bridging role in the political communication between China and Japan, and created a precedent for the nontraditional improvement of international relations in Japan.

The battles of the Pacific War formally ended between mid-August and early September, 1945. However, the declarations of peace and surrender ceremonies that occurred during this time did not end informal battles across the Asian continent. Renegade Japanese military personnel refused to lay down their arms and repatriate quietly to their country. Some combed the waters between Japan and Korea in search of returnees attempting to repatriate with financial and material means in excess of that which the United States military governments allowed. Others sought to disrupt the occupation process by patrolling the streets of Korean cities and engaging in illegal and often violent activities. Koreans also caused problems by joining the Japanese in their postwar adventures or by harassing Japanese preparing to return to Japan and the Korean sympathizers who attempted to help them. Reportage of such actions appeared in the G-2 Periodic Report, which kept a daily record of such actions. These documents today open windows into the chaotic situation that the postwar era brought to Japanese and Koreans. Primarily through these reports, this paper sees the postwar belligerence that continued beyond official declarations of cease fire and peace in 1945 as kindling that sparked the broader conflicts of the late 1940s, and evolved to all-out war from the summer of 1950.

Literary Critic and Sinologist, Takeuchi Yoshimi, provides post-colonial and decolonial studies a logic of resistance that seeks to destabilize the colonialist projects of Western modernity without repeating its structural logic. In this regard, Takeuchi's logic of resistance functions as a dialectical lens into the “emancipatory traps” of Western modernity that frame the victim–victimizer paradox by turning negativity into a method of generating heuristic possibilities. But in this pursuit to look for alternative sites for mining theoretical possibilities, Takeuchi returns to the origins of Chinese modernity for imagining a proper logic of Asian resistance, that which could be deployed as a resource for negating the imperial gestures of modernist thought while affirming the positive kernel of the Enlightenment with the hope of bringing forth a global world that is continuously transformed by the cultural particulars themselves. The goal of this article is to further elucidate Takeuchi's logic of Asian resistance and to discuss how this logic can be read as having the potential to correct Nishida Kitarō's and the Kyoto School's failed attempt to overcome modernity.

The mainstream studies of the East Asian tributary system have been exhibiting a stance that tends to stress the importance of Confucianism in forming and sustaining the tributary system throughout its long history. However, there are still several questions (especially those of a theoretical nature) that historians have yet to answer: How could Confucianism have contributed to the formation and sustenance of this tributary system? Why could this Confucian-based tributary system be recognized and employed in relations with non-Confucian frontier tribes? Why could this system have worked with both the nomadic tribes on the northern frontier and the South-East Asian countries that were neither Confucian nor nomadic? Drawing on the results of ritual studies in anthropology, Chinese historiography and Chinese philosophy, this author seeks a broader methodology that can be used to conceptualize the tributary ritual and its constitutive power structure, which forms the foundation of the central part of the East Asian world order. This paper is a theoretical attempt to find a non-Sinocentric way to interpret the formally Sinocentric tribute system in premodern East Asia.

By connecting seemingly scattered reforms and debates over the 1900s and 1910s, this paper outlines a longer process that eroded the institutional and ideological foundations of the imperial examination system (keju) that did not vanish immediately after the 1905 abolition. Under the title incentive program introduced in 1904, keju titles had been awarded to graduates of modern schools until the very end of the Qing dynasty. As the number of modern schools surged over the 1900s, the program led to an overexpansion of title holders, and ironically enhanced the scholar-official identity that was at odds with the discipline at the modern schools. To lobby for the abolition of the program, non-official reformers of education formulated a moralized critique against the keju titles, but no substantial reform had been undertaken before the 1911 Revolution ended the Qing dynasty. In the 1910s the same network of late Qing reformers launched an ideological war against traditional values that they saw as the ideological foundation of the keju. They constructed new concepts of education and vocation that spread through a powerful network connecting education, industry, and media. This “longer abolition” of the keju produced a prolonged effect on the visions of social order in twentieth century China.

This paper explains how the possession of linguistic and cultural capital, real and imagined, works to “make” people Japanese and reify the boundary of Japanese identity. Drawing on case studies of celebrities with multiple heritage and ethnographic data, this paper shows how discursive associations with possessing cultural capital (re)create boundaries of Japanese identity, incorporating potential out-group members and excluding ostensible in-group members. The paper argues that the possession of native-level cultural capital will become an important way of differentiating “Japanese” from Others henceforth. These discursive processes apply old hegemonic ideologies in novel ways, allowing for the perpetuation of extant identity discourses and cultural institutions to be reproduced with new faces. It also argues that cultural capital is a more practical way of categorizing Japanese people from Others than identity constructions such as race and ethnicity. In doing so, it also demonstrates how Japanese people possess multiple understandings of Japanese authenticity, which both facilitates and hinders the absorption of potential Others into the collective.

Universalism, as a historical category, played an important ideological role in forging political solidarities beyond national boundaries in the modern period. The paper traces this idea in modern Asia through the sartorial styles of two intellectuals, Okakura Kakuzō and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Clothing as a medium of inquiry offers a unique scholarly perspective to articulate the role of universalism vis-à-vis nationalism in colonial India and modern Japan. Since dress politics existed in Eastern and Western societies, it allows us to study lived experiences through a transregional dialog. Both men recognized clothing as an effective political lexicon to fashion the self and creatively include others within the ideological space. Due to their early exposure to various cultures, the clothing style adopted by Okakura and Gandhi was founded on notions of plurality and belonging to multiple places and people. Their positionality enabled them to establish a dialog with both national and imperial politics and dress in a style that was self-made and world-aware. The paper uses their photographs and writings from a period that engendered the practice of universalism and challenged the narratives of nationalism.

This article uses local history approaches to reconstruct the early lives of the Soong sisters at Wesleyan Female College in Macon, Georgia at the beginning of the twentieth century. The sisters' experiences as Chinese overseas students were situated in the histories of American South and of Asian Americans. By examining the sisters' transition to Wesleyan, their everyday lives on campus, and their occasional off-campus encounters with Maconites, the article argues that the “Southernness” of Wesleyan and Macon distinguished the sisters' experiences from other Chinese overseas students that are more familiar to Chinese historians. Because of the relative absence of Chinese residents in this small Southern town, the girls were rarely categorized with Chinese laborers and hardly felt the strong anti-Chinese sentiments that were experienced by students who went to Western states and large cities. Similarly, the slow adoption of new utilitarian courses at this elite Southern female college also meant the sisters were neither trained as qualified homemakers nor as career women like many other American-educated Chinese women in their generation. They were taught to become housewives that played important, unpaid social roles – a path that they would later follow.

This article aims to strengthen the link between history and theory by contributing to the scholarly conversation on “an integrated historical social science.” By examining the case of Qing China, it introduces a historically oriented and theoretically informed research agenda and toolkit for studying state making through the interactive lens of political sustainability and critical crisis. Using two historical upheavals as a prism, this article shows how destructive crises can have the unintended consequence of facilitating empire building and fostering political sustainability. Furthermore, it draws on theoretical insights from political science and sociology to construct a general framework for measuring the sustainability of political development and explaining the complex role of great crisis. This interdisciplinary model not only sheds new lights on the causative role of event, conjuncture, and structure but also enriches existing approaches to comparative historical analysis in general and state making in particular.

This article examines the extent to which overseas Chinese educators at Confucius Institutes (CIs) in Thailand act as representatives and practitioners of Chinese national identity. Though working for the state, CI teachers promote Chinese language and culture according to their own perceptions. In this paper, participatory observation and in-depth interviews were employed to assess how CI teachers in Thailand articulate their Chineseness and national identity. The findings show that (1) banal national sentiment was an important expression of the CI teachers' national identity, in terms of psychological attachment and ingrained behaviors; (2) pragmatic identity politics are used to distinguish various contributors to the CI; (3) the materialization of Chinese national identity recontextualizes the country via national symbols and cultural activities. The intricacy of the everyday activities of CI teachers illuminates the trans-nationalization and localization of Chinese national identity, which constitute the “doing” of the nation that the imaginary Chinese community in Thailand represents not just a government-endorsed national identity but also the CI teachers' creation of tradition.

The financial burden of the Boxer Indemnity forced the Chinese government to change its behaviours since 1901. This article re-examines the position that the decision to honour indeminity obligations enabled the Chinese state to maintain peaceful relations with western powers during the first quarter of the twentiety century. The 1901 edict affirming that China would re-examine its capacity to satisfy its international commitments. Before this edict, China had selectively followed its Sino-foreign treaties, but thereafter, China completely assumed all of her financial obligations to foreign creditors. These changes in behaviour helped China restore its deteriorated foreign relations and were followed by Provisional Executive Duan Qirui until 1925. These changes can be illustrated by three cases, namely the depreciation of tael, the Austrian loans, and the gold franc. The cases were highly international as the first concerned eleven foreign creditors, the second concerned two, and the third concerned three. From 1901–1925, foreign powers also provided China with reciprocal favours in exchange for China's responsible behaviours. Eventually, China retrieved its tariff autonomy in 1930.

This article examines images of revolution in Chinese artworks within a global context. It argues that the theme of revolution in Chinese art can be divided into three movements: (1) Art of Scars, (2) New Wave ’85, from which political pop art and cynical realism took their roots, and (3) the modern twenty-first century trend of Mao and the Cultural Revolution. An analysis of political pop art identified a synthesis of academic and iconographic features and Western philosophical concepts, which can be found in the semiotic elements of the painting Maozedong: AO. Its cynical realism is similar to the satire of the American painter in his Daughters of Revolution. Both artworks depict images of the "citizen" in an era of historical change. This analysis of the painting in the style of Mao and the Cultural Revolution offers a rethinking of traditional Chinese canons as a response to the Western religious traditions influenced by a multicultural environment. The data can be used as an additional source to examine symbolism and semiotics in the artistic language of Chinese artists representing the culture of revolution.