I describe and explain (1) evidence regarding a key role for autism spectrum cognition in human technology; (2) tradeoffs of autistic cognition with social skills; and (3) a model of how cumulative technological culture evolves. This model involves positive feedback whereby increased technical complexity selects for enhanced social learning of mechanistic concepts and skills, leading to further advances in technology.

Although we see much utility in Osiurak and Reynaud's in-depth discussion on the role of what they term technical reasoning in cumulative culture, we argue that they neglect the time and energy costs that individuals would have to face to acquire skills in the absence of specific socio-cognitive abilities.

The argument that cumulative technological culture originates in technical-reasoning skills is not the only alternative to social accounts; another possibility is that accumulation of both technical-reasoning skills and enhanced social skills stemmed from the onset of a more basic cognitive ability such as recursive representational redescription. The paper confuses individual learning of pre-existing information with creative generation of new information.

Osiurak and Reynaud do not explain the evolutionary emergence and development of the elephant in the room, that is, technical cognition. We first argue that there is a tight correlation between the evolution of cumulative technological culture (CTC) and the evolution of reasoning about abstract forces. Second, intentional teaching plays a greater role in CTC evolution than acknowledged in the target article.

The debate on cumulative technological culture (CTC) is dominated by social-learning discussions, at the expense of other cognitive processes, leading to flawed circular arguments. I welcome the authors' approach to decouple CTC from social-learning processes without minimizing their impact. Yet, this model will only be informative to understand the evolution of CTC if tested in other cultural species.

Osiurak and Reynaud offer a unified cognitive approach to cumulative technological culture, arguing that it begins with non-social cognitive skills that allow humans to learn and develop new technical information. Drawing on research focusing on how children acquire knowledge through interactions others, we argue that social learning is essential for humans to acquire technical information.

Osiurak and Reynaud's account of human tool cognition misses key element: human capacity for functional representations and teleological inferences. I argue that the teleofunctional approach accounts better for some features of human tool cognition and points to a viable candidate for the cognitive “difference-maker” behind human technological success.

We argue that Osirak's and Reynaud's technological-reasoning hypothesis raises conceptual and methodological challenges. Interrelations between technical potential and expertise leave it unclear exactly what the technical-reasoning hypothesis encompasses. We submit that it is compatible with a range of hypotheses that are difficult to differentiate empirically.

Tools are generated by defined steps, fulfill distinct uses, and elicit affordances or mental representations. When the latter are recombined, they are perceived as “technical reasoning,” resulting in novel tools when executed. They can be exchanged, varied, and selected between individuals in a cumulative social process. Tools are materialized, “petrified” memes forming a duality within the framework of active externalism.

In this commentary on Osiurak and Reynaud's target article, we argue that action is largely missing in their account of the ascendance of human technological culture. We propose that an action-based developmental account can help to bridge the cognitive-sociocultural divide in explanations of the discovery, production, and cultural transmission of human tool use.

What promised to be a refreshing addition to cumulative cultural evolution, by moving the focus from cultural transmission to technological innovation, falls flat through a lack of thoroughness, explanatory power, and data. A comprehensive theory of cumulative cultural change must carefully integrate all existing evidence in a cohesive multi-level account. We argue that the manuscript fails to do so convincingly.

Osiurak and Reynaud argue that cumulative technological culture is made possible by a “non-social cognitive structure” (sect. 1, para. 1) and they offer an account that aims “to escape from the social dimension” (sect. 1, para. 2) of human cognition. We challenge their position by arguing that human technical rationality is unintelligible outside of our species' uniquely social form of life, which is defined by shared intentionality (Kern & Moll 2017, Philosophical Psychology30(3):319–37; Tomasello 2019a, Becoming human: A theory of ontogeny. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press).

To support their claim for technical reasoning skills rather than imitation as the key for cumulative technological culture (CTC), Osiurak and Reynaud argue that chimpanzees can imitate mechanical actions, but do not have CTC. They also state that an increase in working memory in human evolution could not have been a key driver of CTC. We discuss why we disagree with these claims.

We agree that the emergence of cumulative technological culture was tied to nonsocial cognitive skills, namely, technical-reasoning skills, which allowed humans to constantly acquire and improve information. Our concern is with a reading of the history of cumulative technological culture that is based largely on modern experiments in simulated settings and less on phenomena crucial to the long-term dynamics of cultural evolution.

Innovation is fundamental to cumulative culture, allowing progressive modification of existing technology. The authors define innovation as an asocial process, uninfluenced by social information. We argue that innovation is inherently social – innovation is frequently the product of modifying others' outputs, and successful innovations are acquired by others. Research should target examination of the cognitive underpinnings of socially-mediated innovations.

Osiurak and Reynaud (O&R) claim that research into the origin of cumulative technological culture has been too focused on social cognition and has consequently neglected the importance of uniquely human reasoning capacities. This commentary raises two interrelated theoretical concerns about O&R's notion of technical-reasoning capacities, and suggests how these concerns might be met.

The New Caledonian crow may be the only non-primate species exhibiting cumulative technological culture. Its foraging tools show clear signs of diversification and progressive refinement, and it seems likely that at least some tool-related information is passed across generations via social learning. Here, we explain how these remarkable birds can help us uncover the basic biological processes driving technological progress.

New Caledonian (NC) crow populations have developed complex tools that show suggestive evidence of cumulative change. These tool designs, therefore, appear to be the product of cumulative technological culture (CTC). We suggest that tool-using NC crows offer highly useful data for current debates over the necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of CTC.

We consider the evolutionary plausibility of Osiurak and Reynaud's (O&R) arguments. We argue that technical reasoning is not quite the magic bullet that O&R assume, and instead propose a co-evolutionary account of the interplay between technical reasoning and social learning, with language emerging as a vital issue neglected in O&R's account.

Osiurak and Reynaud highlight a major omission of models of cumulative technological culture. I propose an additional problematic omission: pride. By taking this emotion into account, we can address the question of why humans seek to learn, teach, and innovate – three processes essential to cumulative technological culture (CTC). By fostering achievement, prestige, and social learning, pride provides a pivotal piece of the puzzle.