The almost shamed hush that fell in the Senate at noon on March 4 was more fitting than the jubilation in the House. Certainly there was no ground for congratulations in any corner of the Capitol, and least of all among the group in the President's room.

Membership and Organization. When the session began, the Republicans in the House numbered 266, the Democrats 165, with one Farmer Labor member and three vacancies. The two party shifts involved in the seating of thirteen new members reflected Democratic victories in by-elections in the 6th Wisconsin and 24th Illinois districts. In the Senate, inter-sessional gains on the minority side were more pronounced; there were 42 Democrats instead of 39, leaving 53 Republicans and 1 Farmer Labor member.

The uncertainty that attends the regulation of campaign expenditures by exclusion was illustrated in the seating of James J. Davis, lately Secretary of Labor, as junior senator from Pennsylvania. Mr. Davis stood aside at the opening of the session, in order to permit the chairman of the special committee investigating senatorial campaign expenditures, Gerald Nye, to offer a resolution by which his right to a seat was referred to the select committee. The resolution was rejected on December 2 by a vote of 27 (9 Republicans, 17 Democrats, 1 Farmer Labor) to 58 (39 Republicans, 19 Democrats). The committee on privileges and elections, acting through subcommittees, took up the dusty task of recounts in Alabama and North Carolina.

The uncertainties of party control in the next Congress cast a sharp but wavering shadow over the proceedings of the session.

The Supreme Court continues its century-long task of drawing the line that separates commerce which is interstate or foreign from that which is local. The realistic nature of the test which it uses is made clear in two cases decided during the present term. In Superior Oil Company v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, the plaintiffs, by a cleverly devised arrangement of technicalities, sought to make it appear that they were selling gasolene in interstate commerce. They hoped thus to escape the payment of the tax of three, and later four, cents a gallon imposed by Mississippi law upon the sale of gasolene within the state. The device used was as follows: The plaintiffs sold oil and gasolene to fish packers in Mississippi and delivered it to them at their wharves. The packers loaded this onto their own boats and sent it to a point in Louisiana where they in turn delivered it to shrimp fishermen who used it in fishing. The fishermen brought back their catch and sold it to the packers and were charged for the oil and gasolene. In each case the oil company gave the packers a bill of lading stipulating that the gasolene remained the company's property until delivered to the consignee's agent at the point of destination. In other words, a Mississippi seller deliberately takes gasolene outside the state of Mississippi in order to deliver it to a Mississippi buyer in the expectation that the transaction will have the appearance of interstate commerce and escape local taxation as such.

In public discussions of the proposed Norris “lame duck” amendment, and in demands by members of Congress for special sessions to meet temporary emergencies, the fact is often overlooked that Congress itself has the power to regulate the time of its meeting. The fourth section of Article IV of the Constitution provides: “The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.” Under this provision, the much-criticized rush of bills in the short session could easily be averted by an act convening Congress at an earlier date than the first Monday in December. So, too, a Congress whose final session was coming to a close could provide that its successor should meet immediately, instead of waiting until the following December. A Congress desirous of a special session on a problem like unemployment could call such a session irrespective of lack of action by the President, provided it could command a majority sufficient to over-ride a possible presidential veto. Of course such action could be taken only while Congress was in session, because, under the provisions of the Constitution, the President is the only person who, between sessions, is empowered to call special sessions.

These statements are not the result of theoretical speculation, but rest firmly on the facts of our legislative history. Prior to 1821, no fewer than eighteen acts were passed by Congress appointing a different day for its meetings from that stipulated in the Constitution. Before referring to these acts more in detail, it would perhaps clarify matters somewhat to recall to mind how March 4 was decided upon as a limit of presidential and congressional terms. Article VII of the Constitution provided that the instrument should go into effect when ratified by nine states. This was accomplished on June 21, 1788.

The most significant case in the field of state constitutional law decided during the past year is that of State ex rel. Miller v. Hinkle, decided by the supreme court of Washington in 1930. This case held that an apportionment act is a “law,” and can be popularly initiated under the initiative and referendum provisions of the constitution of the state of Washington. The court granted a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of state to accept a petition submitting to popular referendum a proposal to redistrict the state for purposes of representation in the legislature. The legislature had failed for many years to perform its constitutional duty to reapportion the state, and this case illustrates the most conclusive argument in favor of the use of the initiative and referendum for purposes of ordinary legislation, even though the only legislation to which it be applied be that of reapportionment. Many states are faced with a serious problem in connection with over-representation of rural districts in the legislature and under-representation of urban districts. The initiative and referendum seem to offer about the only way out of the difficulty if state legislatures refuse to correct the inequality. The only alternative is that we change our ideas as to the necessity of majority rule in the selection and composition of legislative bodies, a change which the rural districts appear already to have made.

Introduction. The apportionment for this decade has now been made by Congress, and a bill has been passed which will automatically provide for reapportionment in all subsequent decades. Under this law, the size of the House will remain 435, and the method of computation will remain the method of major fractions as used in 1911 unless Congress takes the initiative in making a change. It may, however, be a matter of interest to put on record a brief description of the principal “methods” which were under discussion in the recent congressional debates. No knowledge of mathematics is required in order to understand the purpose and result of each of these methods.

The constitutional requirement. The constitutional requirement reads as follows: “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed; …. but each state shall have at least one representative.” Hence, in a theoretically perfect apportionment, the ratio of representation in any state would be exactly equal to the ratio of representation in every other state. In practice, however, perfect equality cannot be secured, on account of fractions. Hence, in the practical problem of apportioning any given number of representatives among the several states, the only way in which the constitutional requirement can be met is by making the unavoidable inequalities between the states as small as possible.

The year which has passed since the preparation of the last “Notes on Municipal Affairs” (June 1, 1930) has been even more eventful than the preceding period.

Developments in Particular Cities. New York City. The belief which had been growing for many years that the Tammany tiger was, after all, a self-restrained, self-muzzled beast has suffered a rude shock in the exposures of flagrant corruption in the sale of judicial office, the handling of vice, the purchase of land for school purposes, and in many other directions. The district attorney's office has been exposed to the searchlight of investigator Seabury. Charges were preferred against Mayor Walker by John Haynes Holmes and Rabbi Wise in the name of a citizens' committee. Governor Roosevelt dismissed these charges with scant consideration. In the meantime, however, the legislature ordered a most searching investigation of the whole governmental situation in New York—an investigation which bids fair to rival, in extent and dramatic interest, that of the celebrated Lexow committee.

Chicago. In Chicago, Mayor Thompson's political career has suffered, if not extinction, at least a total eclipse. Though victorious against a broken field in the Republican primary, he was defeated by Anton J. Cermak in the election of April 7 by a vote of 476,932 to 671,189. It is probable that the people of Chicago were more anti-Thompson than pro-Cermak, but the new mayor is a vigorous and striking figure. For one thing, he is boss in his own right of the Democratic organization in Cook county.

The first constitution of Ohio was framed in 1802, and was not submitted to popular vote for approval. Fashioned by followers of Thomas Jefferson, the new government had as its cardinal principle the doctrine of legislative supremacy. With no power over patronage, and with the veto power denied to him as well, the governor was but a “shadow executive.” Since the judges were appointed by the legislature for the limited term of seven years, the judiciary also played a subordinate rôle.

Although the fundamental character of the constitution was conceded, it was a question in the mind of many as to who should determine the nature and scope of that instrument. To ardent Jeffersonians, this matter presented little difficulty; in their judgment, the legislature was fully competent to settle any question that might arise as to the nature of the constitution.

The last election to the Reichstag brought the unexpected and rather extraordinary rise of the National Socialist German Labor party from twelve to 107 seats. It is the party of the extreme right. In nationalistic radicalism, it compares with the German National People's party, led by Hugenberg, much as in social radicalism the Communist party compares with the Social Democrats. Until recently, the National Socialists could be passed over as a negligible group of fanatics. But the party's present importance as the second strongest in the Reichstag, and the contradictory and confused ideas that are current about it, make worth while some inquiry into its nature and the causes of its rapid advance.

To start with, the party differs from its rivals in that personal leadership and military discipline are at its foundations. Besides having contributed more than any other single man to the building up of the party, Adolf Hitler is also its leader in the strictest sense of the word. A few facts about his life may show how it was that he could become the exponent of so large a number of German people.

Hitler was born in Austria in 1889 and until his fifteenth year lived in modest bourgeois surroundings, his father being a lower state official. This explains why he always has been, and still is, at heart a man of the middle classes. After the death of his parents, he was forced to earn his living as an unskilled laborer, and for some five years he lived the life of a proletarian among proletarians, completely cut off from his former middle-class environment.

It is common observation that progress in social sciences has not kept pace with mastery of natural sciences; that ability to deal effectively with modern industrial life offers a very poor parallel to the expertness with which scientific questions are considered. There are perhaps two explanations.

First, research in mechanical, chemical, and electrical science has yielded, as by-products, a vast crop of new problems in human affairs. While invention and discovery created the possibility of releasing men and women from the thralldom of drudgery, new dangers to liberty appeared with the introduction of the factory system and the development of the business corporation. Large publicly owned corporations replaced small privately owned concerns; ownership of the instruments of production passed from the workman to the employer; personal relations between the proprietor and his help ceased. The individual contract of service lost its character because of inequality between employer and employee. Group relation of employee to employer, with collective bargaining, became common; indeed it was, in the opinion of some, absolutely essential to the worker's protection. These changes, in turn, called for ever-increasing governmental regulation. One result has been to emphasize anew the essential unity of economics, politics, and law.

Second, progress in dealing with social matters has not kept pace simply because few men of talent and ability have bent their efforts to this field. It would be difficult indeed to point to any contributions to social research that begin to compare with those made by Steinmetz, Michelson, Millikan, Pasteur, and many others in the scientific field. Even seemingly elementary questions are still calling for solution. Is machine production, which tends more and more to exceed the possibilities of reasonable consumption, and to flood the world with goods for which there is not sufficient demand, to be restricted ? If so, how ? Why is our economic and political machinery so clumsy and inefficient that men are permitted to go hungry in the cities while wheat is being fed to hogs in the West? Why are factories closed when so large a percentage of the human race is undernourished, underclothed, and clamoring for jobs? Should unemployment be left to the hard settlement of supply and demand, or are unemployment insurance and the dole to be recognized and established by law as necessary features of the new world economy? Why, in the midst of so many labor-saving devices, is there so little leisure for the workers? How, in short, can men be taught to think more about human welfare and less about property and vested interests? How can the economics of production and distribution be reorganized so that everybody will have more of the good things of life and less of poverty, misery, and distress? It is certainly an extraordinary and challenging fact that our parents, with comparatively few of the conveniences and labor-saving devices that are ours, were nevertheless more contented, peaceful, and secure.

The British Parliament has been passing through a period of pianissimo. Its praises should be sounded very softly, while its inadequacies and imperfections should be given wide attention. This does not imply a lack of veneration and respect for the Mother of Parliaments, but merely that a realistic approach should be made to the present-day value of this progenitor of the sturdy race of legislatures. No political institution is eternally successful, and even British institutions which have evolved so slowly, and in general so soundly, are no exceptions. The halo which surrounds Westminster is so great, however, that it almost blinds one to the imperfections which exist within those hallowed precincts. It seems almost sacrilegious, as a great British statesman recently observed, to attempt to meddle with “those great forms of procedure which have been handed down to us.” And yet when the Mother of Parliaments has so obviously deteriorated as to lose much of the respect and prestige which was formerly its possession, one seems justified in calling attention to its inadequacies.

The fact is that in the last thirty years Parliament has gradually become an inefficient legislative body which does not effectively control the government, and which the people can hardly be said to control. As early as 1908, President Lowell wrote that “the House of Commons is finding more and more difficulty in passing any effective vote, except a vote of censure.” In 1931, it is doubtful whether even this can be done in a satisfactory way.

The public character of the chambers of commerce in France and in Europe generally is a commonplace. Their intimate relationship with the government is taken as a matter of course. This very complacency is significant acceptance of the close rapprochement of the political and economic hierarchies. These organizations of entrepreneurs in France function as the legally recognized representatives of definite interests. It is regarded as no novel idea that business men as such have public duties and governmental responsibilities that must be conducted in coöperation with the state. The chambre de commerce is the usual agency for carrying on these contacts; it is classified as a “personne civile” and an “établissement public.” It is provided for by statute, given specific powers, and entrusted with definite functions. It is representative of local business men holding a mandate from the Republic authorizing them to perform specified tasks of government and requiring them to offer advice upon commercial and industrial problems.

Regarded merely as agencies through which the government may secure a degree of perfunctory agreement from a selected number of employers and capitalists, the chambres de commerce would have little to offer. They are significant, rather, because of the fact that they provide a recognized means whereby discussion may be held upon questions by those who are directly affected by the outcome. Through such a consideration, the opportunity is offered to secure not only acquiescence but also understanding. The winning of consent is but one step in legislation.

From the election of the National Assembly in February, 1871, to the fall of the Briand cabinet in October, 1929, France had eighty-two cabinets and 349 cabinet ministers, under-secretaries excluded. Although French ministers ordinarily neither wield the power of English ministers nor leave behind them a deep impression upon governmental policy, they nevertheless constitute, ensemble, the governing class of the nation. Every deputy and senator looks forward to the day when he can inscribe the words ancien ministre after his name. Of the 349 who have held a portefeuille, 110 are still living. They constitute a large field for selection whenever a new cabinet is formed, and it is seldom necessary—or even advisable—for an incoming premier to go far outside their ranks in making up a new list for the approval of the president of the Republic.

What type of Frenchman has risen to the ministry under the Third Republic? Whence does he come? What has been his education, his occupation, his previous political experience? If there has been a “type,” has it changed as the Third Republic has come to be more and more firmly established? Do the heads of certain ministries depart from the general type? Are there personalities that demand special attention and study? These are some of the questions that arise concerning the political personnel, not only of French, but of other modern national governments.

Recent crime surveys have shown that the majority of contested felony cases are never tried in open court, being settled instead by the striking of a “bargain” between the defendant and the prosecuting officer. Administrative discretion has thus largely supplanted judge and jury alike. The practice has been severely criticized by Professor Moley, who characterizes it as “ psychologically more akin to a game of poker than to a process of justice,” being “an attempt to get as much as possible from an unwilling giver” rather than “a search for truth.” In view of the technicalities and delay that were permitted to develop in connection with jury trials, the utilization of some such avenue of escape would seem to have been inevitable. The practice may be expected to develop still further unless judicial procedure is improved to a point where a trial becomes an efficient means of disposing of contested criminal cases.

In most jurisdictions, the only alternative to such a compromise agreement has been a jury trial. Trial by a judge alone, the right to a jury being waived, has been regarded as of doubtful constitutionality. Recent decisions of the federal Supreme Court and of the supreme court of Illinois, sustaining such non-jury trials even in the absence of statutory authorization, have gone far toward dispelling this doubt, and warrant an examination of the practical working of the waiver plan in those jurisdictions where it has been given a trial.