Riker and Brams have demonstrated the paradox of vote trading (“… that rational trades by all members [may] make everyone worse off”). In so doing the authors indicate the existence of an apparent disequilibrium when vote trading occurs. I extend this latter point and prove that the preference conditions required for vote trading are the same as those which produce the cyclical majority; the conditions for vote trading and the cyclical majority are logically equivalent. The conclusion briefly indicates the impact of this finding with respect to the work of a number of other authors and gives some idea of the restrictions which would be required to eliminate vote trading among rational legislators.

Since 1954, the Committee on Comparative Politics has provided leadership in the comparative field, and one of its central objectives has been to construct a theory of political development. The books in the series that were published in the 1960s lacked rigorous design, although they did provide data and low-level generalizations which could be used in the theory-building task. This essay focuses primarily on Crises and Sequences in Political Development, which is authored solely by Committee members and reports on the results of their theoretical work thus far. The Committee takes the “intuitive empirical generalization” approach to theory development—in contrast with systematic empirical generalization and the analytic-deductive procedure. It is unlikely, however, that the Committee's approach will lead to the formulation of a coherent set of interrelated propositions within which empirical phenomena can be explained. But the Committee's work is not atypical of the theoretical literature in political science, which reflects the reward structure of the discipline. The building of powerful theories will be facilitated when emphasis is placed on the development of clearly falsifiable propositions rather than on the development of loose conceptual frameworks.