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10 - Government Bond Buying by the European Central Bank

Leadership versus Accountability

from Part II - The Monetary Dimension

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2023

By
Michele Chang
Edited by
Dariusz Adamski ,
Fabian Amtenbrink  and
Jakob de Haan
Dariusz Adamski
Affiliation:
University of Wroclaw
Fabian Amtenbrink
Affiliation:
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Jakob de Haan
Affiliation:
University of Groningen
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Summary

The ECB’s government bond-buying programmes have redistributive effects that potentially constituted economic policy-making, over which the Member States retain competence. Even when ostensibly pursued in the name of price stability, the political ramifications of monetary policy became clearer and fuelled political and legal backlash against central banks in general and the ECB in particular. While the ECB took pains to restrain its policies a decade ago, it has gradually allowed itself increasing discretion with little pushback from its political principals. The minimal accountability scheme should be updated to account for the ECB’s growing role.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of European Monetary, Economic and Financial Integration , pp. 175 - 196
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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