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Platonic love has often been attacked – notably by Vlastos – as fundamentally selfish. The basis of this argument rests on the claim that love for Plato is little more than a form of utility in which the beloved is exploited to enable the philosopher’s ascent and is simply the object of love to the extent to which he exhibits desirable qualities and not as an individual. This reading ignores the elements of erotic reciprocity found in both the Symposium and Phaedrus, in which the beloved is not merely a passive object, but rather an active participant with the lover in a mutually beneficial project defined by shared values, with both parties attempting to become as godlike as possible. The erastes is shown to care genuinely for the eromenos in the course of the philosophical pedagogy which Plato advocates. In the Phaedrus, the tripartition of the soul seems to be a further move towards non-individuality and the significance of the beloved’s individuality is regularly downplayed. Yet the abstraction inherent in Platonic love is revealed to be both beneficial as a mechanism for avoiding the negative aspects of interpersonal love, as well as a natural feature of the human condition: the striving after Beauty.
If interRAI home care information were shared with primary care providers, care provision and integration could be enhanced. The objective of this study was to co-develop an interRAI-based clinical information sharing tool (i.e., the Patient Falls Risk Report) with a sample of primary care providers. This mixed-methods study employed semi-structured interviews to inform the development of the Patient Falls Risk Report and online surveys based on the System Usability Scale instrument to test its usability. Most of the interview sample (n = 9) believed that the report could support patient care by sharing relevant and actionable falls-related information. However, criticisms were identified, including insufficient detail, clarity, and support for shared care planning. After incorporating suggestions for improvement, the survey sample (n = 27) determined that the report had excellent usability with an overall usability score of 83.4 (95% CI = 78.7–88.2). By prioritizing the needs of end-users, sustainable interRAI interventions can be developed to support primary care.
The paper provides a neurophilosophical assessment of a controversy between two neuroeconomic models that compete to identify the putative object of neural utility: goods or actions. We raise two objections to the common view that sees the ‘good-based’ model prevailing over the ‘action-based’ model. First, we suggest extending neuroeconomic model discrimination to all of the models’ neurophilosophical assumptions, showing that action-based assumptions are necessary to explain real-world value-based decisions. Second, we show that the good-based model’s presumption of introducing a normative neural definition of economic choice would arbitrarily restrict the domain of economic choice and consequently of economics.
This paper examines the value-at-risk (VaR) implications of mean-variance hedging. We derive an equivalence between the VaR-based hedge and the mean-variance hedging. This method transfers the investor's subjective risk-aversion coefficient into the estimated VaR measure. As a result, we characterize the collapse probability bounds under which the VaR-based hedge could be insignificantly different from the minimum-variance hedge in the presence of estimation risk. The results indicate that the squared information ratio of futures returns is the primary factor determining the difference between the minimum-variance and VaR-based hedges.
This first comprehensive account of the utilitarians' historical thought intellectually resituates their conceptions of philosophy and politics, at a time when the past acquired new significances as both a means and object of study. Drawing on published and unpublished writings - and set against the intellectual backdrops of Scottish philosophical history, German and French historicism, romanticism, positivism, and the rise of social science and scientific history - Callum Barrell recovers the depth with which Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, George Grote, and John Stuart Mill thought about history as a site of philosophy and politics. He argues that the utilitarians, contrary to their reputations as ahistorical and even antihistorical thinkers, developed complex frameworks in which to learn from and negotiate the past, inviting us to rethink the foundations of their ideas, as well as their place in - and relationship to - nineteenth-century philosophy and political thought.
This chapter presents Grotius’ ars politica that deals with what is useful in practice, different from the ars iuris that deals with issues of justice. Philosophically eclectic, descriptive and non-perfectionist, Grotius’ ars politica is directed at understanding and guiding the organisation of power (potestas) and interest (utile) in human live, on two levels: a. the metalevel of theoretical discussion comparing and integrating different approaches to the topic, and b. the practical level of providing answers to political challenges. As agency is central, so is autonomy, and sovereignty.
The utility of a norm is central to its adoption and this utility is generative of a norm’s adherents: the ‘norm circle’. Regional organisations provide excellent arenas to witness normative contestation between norm circles, as well as to understand how a ‘successful’ norm is selected. Within a regional organisation, specific domain rules apply, and these provide the criteria for the successful passage of a normative proposal. The three broad criteria suggested are the control of the initiative, the mastery of existing shared norms, and ‘metis’, the ability to identify opportunities for influence and expand the norm circle. The chapter ends with a review of suitable cases in the OAU/AU and ASEAN.
This chapter reviews the model set out in the theoretical framework to examine the degree of congruence the six cases had with the relevant factors of controlling the initiative, the mastery of shared norms, and opportunities for influence, particularly the ability to bring other states into the favoured norm circle. It also examines the model’s inferences against the observed outcomes to examine the degree of significance each factor had in the respective regional organisation.
As unusually strong Santa Ana winds whipped through California in fall 2019, the state’s utilities faced a bind: cut power for millions, or risk their transmission infrastructure sparking another devastating and deadly fire? In the end, both occurred, and California was alternately ablaze and in the dark throughout the fall. This impossible predicament was, many said, a harbinger of things to come: climate change exposing the precarity of seemingly advanced economies, as centuries of fossil fuel emissions reveal their bite.
My task in this book is to develop a theory of property premised on a conception of autonomy as self-determination or self-authorship, terms that I use interchangeably. In this account, property empowers self-determining individuals to pursue their conception of the good, and this autonomy-enhancing telos legitimizes property and shapes its legal contours. I am not claiming that propertyless individuals cannot be self-determining, but rather that property tends to make an important contribution to personal self-authorship.
John Hicks played a crucial role at birth of the “new” welfare economics founded on the informational basis of interpersonally non-comparable and ordinal utilities. Toward the end of the 1950s, however, Hicks took a bold step by declaring his farewell to the welfarist informational basis of normative economics altogether. The purpose of this paper is to gauge the depth and reach of Hicks’s farewell to the welfaristic approach to normative economics.
In most industrialised countries, one of the major societal challenges is the demographic change coming along with the ageing of the population. The increasing life expectancy observed over the last decades underlines the importance to find ways to appropriately cover the financial needs of the elderly. A particular issue arises in the area of health, where sufficient care must be provided to a growing number of dependent elderly in need of long-term care (LTC) services. In many markets, the offering of life insurance products incorporating care options and LTC insurance products is generally scarce. In our research, we therefore examine a life annuity product with an embedded care option potentially providing additional financial support to dependent persons. To evaluate the care option, we determine the minimum price that the annuity provider requires and the policyholder’s willingness to pay for the care option. For the latter, we employ individual utility functions taking account of the policyholder’s condition. We base our numerical study on recently developed transition probability data from Switzerland. Our findings give new and realistic insights into the nature and the utility of life annuity products proposing an embedded care option for tackling the financing of LTC needs.
Hume considered his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals to be one of his best works. In it he offers his most elegant and approachable account of the origins and scope of morality. With the hope of reaching a broad audience, he argues that morality is neither rigid nor austere, but is rather a product of sentiments that all human beings share, and which they are naturally inclined to recognize and act upon. In this Critical Guide, a team of distinguished scholars discuss each section of the Enquiry, its place in Hume's philosophy as a whole, and its historical context; their topics include the nature of morals, talents and moral virtues, benevolence, sympathy, and the sources of moral disagreement. The volume will be valuable for scholars and advanced students working on Hume.
Hume’s signature contribution to the theory of justice has long been taken to consist in the Treatise’s argument for justice as an artificial virtue. Yet Hume’s re-presentation of his theory of justice in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals makes no reference whatsoever to justice as an artificial virtue. Given this fundamental difference, interpreters are compelled to explain what exactly changed in Hume’s shift from one sort of account to another, as well as what, if anything, is significant in Hume’s mature theory of justice once the idea of justice’s artificiality has been taken off the table. The present essay focuses on two key sections of the second Enquiry – “Of Justice” and “Some Farther Considerations with Regard to Justice” – to argue for two claims. First, in shifting away from the debate over whether justice is natural or artificial, the second Enquiry focuses instead on how political actors and political orders enable natural justice to be operationalized in practical life. Second, Hume’s account of justice in the second Enquiry reveals a crucial albeit underemphasized aspect of his moral epistemology, namely the crucial role played by reason in moral motivation and evaluation.
In this chapter, I analyze the connections that Hume draws between utility as a source of merit, the principle of humanity as that which elicits our approval of useful mental qualities and blame for pernicious ones, and the role of reason, both in determining usefulness and in reaching just evaluations of merit or demerit. I contrast this set of connections with another set of moral sentiments that have as their object the immediately agreeable or disagreeable qualities. I reconstruct the argument meant to establish the principle of humanity as the foundation of morality, in part with the aim of showing that the sentiment of humanity gains force through our collective participation in the common point of view from which we form a general standard of virtue.
Section 5 of Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, “Why Utility Pleases,” is a remarkable text for a variety of reasons. First, there is no directly analogous section in the Treatise, so it raises questions about whether Hume engaged in substantial revision of his previous thought. Second, it offers evidence of a normative moral theory. Third, because Hume discusses the role of utility so favorably, it may suggest a nascent form of utilitarianism. Finally, “Why Utility Pleases” advances some of the few positions that draw criticism from Adam Smith. This chapter addresses each of these features. In response to the first, I argue that there are important differences between the Treatise and Section 5, but none that involve a rejection of the claims of the earlier work. In response to the second, I argue that “Why Utility Pleases” is best interpreted as falling squarely within Hume’s descriptive moral psychology. In response to the third, I argue that the notion of Hume as a utilitarian is dubious. Finally, in response to the fourth, I suggest that the disagreement between Smith and Hume, though nuanced and interesting, is not deep.
Social choice is concerned with the selection of an ideal (or social) option, which can be a so-called ‘social state’, or a social ‘utility’, or a social ‘preference’, or a social choice ‘set’, on the basis of individual utilities, or individual utility functions, or individual preferences, or individual choice sets, or individual choice functions. A number of scholars have outlined the limited aspect of the notion of utility, including, notably and pre-eminently, Amartya Sen and Martha C. Nussbaum. Although they did not put it in such a strong phrase, the basic idea is to replace the notion of utility by the notion of capability (leaving aside ‘happiness’, a notion which for many is hardly distinguishable from utility). As has been remarked by Mozaffar Qizilbash, the development of the capability approach has been focused on the capability of an individual; and the idea of amalgamating or aggregating individual data is consubstantial with social choice. The purpose of this text is to propose some preliminary ideas regarding the aggregation of individual capabilities.
When Amartya Sen defends his capability approach to well-being, he contrasts it with the utility theory advocated by the classical utilitarians, including John Stuart Mill. Yet a closer examination of the two views reveals that they are much more similar than they appear. Each can be interpreted in either a subjective or an objective way. When both are interpreted subjectively the differences between them are slight, and likewise for the objective interpretations. Finally, whatever differences may remain are less important than they might seem, since the two theories are developed by Sen and Mill for different purposes and, in that sense, are not genuine alternatives.
There are several techniques for estimating health state utility values, each of which presents pros and cons in the context of rare diseases (RDs). Direct approaches (e.g. standard gamble and time trade-off) may be too demanding for patients with RDs, since most of them affect young children or cause cognitive impairment. The alternatives are using “vignettes” that describe hypothetical health states for the general public, which may not reflect the heterogeneous manifestations of RDs, or multi-attribute utility instruments (i.e. indirect techniques), such as EQ-5D, which may be less sensitive in capturing the specificities of RDs. The “rule of rescue” approach is a promising alternative in RDs, since it prioritizes identifiable patients with life-threatening or disabling conditions. However, it raises measurement challenges and ethical issues. Furthermore, the literature reports on relevant implications of choosing a technique over others for health technology assessment, which should be considered in relation to individual RDs.