We explored the nexus between the quality of human capital, productivity-enhancing factors, and the quality of institutions in nine Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries using canonical correlation and principal component analysis of country-level data for 2007–2017 from the World Bank, World Economic Forum, and Penn World Tables databases. We found that an unequal development of human capital in the ASEAN countries is clearly linked to their heterogeneous institutional conditions and that the quality of human capital drives technology absorption and innovation. The four transition economies in the region—Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar—are facing particularly difficult challenges in developing institutional environments that stimulate human capital development to reach higher levels of knowledge intensity of their economies and achieve the resulting competitive advantages.

I will discuss a variety of cases such that the subject's believing truly is somewhat of an accident, but less so than in a Gettier case. In each case, this is because her reasons are not ultimately undefeated full stop, but they are ultimately undefeated with certain qualifications. For example, the subject's reasons might be ultimately defeated considered in themselves but ultimately undefeated considered as a proper part of an inference to the best explanation that is undefeated without qualification. In each section of the paper, I consider different qualifications and show how in each case we get an epistemic standing I call “coach-class knowledge”. First-class knowledge requires justifying reasons that are undefeated without qualification. Coach-class knowledge only requires qualified lack of defeat. I will use this distinction to bring debates over knowledge from falsehood and fake barns to an ecumenical resolution. In both cases, the subject enjoys coach-class rather than first-class knowledge. I will also show that the defeasible reasoning tradition can better account for graded accidental truth than safety theories.

Vitamin D deficiency is common in Irish adults, though there is limited research on its determinants, knowledge of vitamin D or indications for testing. We aimed to explore the determinants of vitamin D status in adults and examine knowledge and reasons for testing. The study population comprised adults who had serum 25-hydroxyvitamin D tested by general practitioners request at a Dublin Hospital in 2020. Questionnaires detailing dietary intake, sun exposure, ethnicity, biophysical factors and vitamin D knowledge were sent to a sample stratified by age, sex and vitamin D status. In total, there were 383 participants, mean age 56·0 (sd 16·6) years. Wintertime deficiency disproportionally affected non-white v. white (60 % v. 24 %, P < 0·001). The greatest predictors of deficiency were low vitamin D intake (< 10 μg/d) (P < 0·001) and non-white ethnicity (P = 0·006), followed by sun avoidance (P = 0·022). It was also more prevalent in those with lower body exposure when outdoors. The majority (86 %) identified vitamin D as important for bone health. However, 40 % were tested for non-clinical indications and half were not aware of the recommended daily allowance (RDA). Low vitamin D intake was the most important determinant of deficiency, but ethnicity and sun exposure habits were also significant predictors. The majority had no clear indication for testing and were not aware of the RDA. Public health policies to improve knowledge and vitamin D intake, especially for those of non-white ethnicity and with reduced sun exposure, should be considered.

Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a complex mental health condition often associated with previous childhood adversity including maladaptive parenting. When becoming a parent themselves, mothers with BPD have difficulties with various parenting cognitions and practices, but unknown is whether they have appropriate knowledge of sensitive parenting. This study explored whether differences in parenting knowledge or self-efficacy are specific to BPD or also found in mothers with depression, and whether symptom severity or specific diagnosis better explain parenting perceptions. Mothers with BPD (n = 26), depression (n = 25) or HCs (n = 25) completed a Q-sort parenting knowledge task and a parenting self-efficacy questionnaire. Results showed mothers with BPD had the same knowledge of sensitive parenting behaviors as mothers with depression and healthy mothers. Self-reported parenting self-efficacy was lower in mothers with BPD and depression compared with healthy mothers, with symptom severity most strongly associated. A significant but low correlation was found between parenting self-efficacy and knowledge. Findings suggest that mothers with BPD and depression know what good parenting is but think they are not parenting well. Mental health difficulties are not associated with parenting knowledge, but symptom severity appears to be a common pathway to lower parenting self-efficacy. Future interventions should test whether reduction of symptom severity or positive parenting feedback could improve parenting self-efficacy.

Individual vertebrates are able to detect spatial and temporal (causal) order in their environment and deal with this knowledge emotionally. It is argued that this latter aspect is connected with the flexible or reversible way vertebrates may interact with their environment Because of this flexibility, uncertainty and changes therein can be experienced and shown by means of emotional expressions. It is this brain-behaviour organization that gives meaning to questions about welfare of individual vertebrates.

There's a certain pleasure in fantasizing about possessing knowledge, especially possessing secret knowledge to which outsiders don't have access. Such fantasies are typically a source of innocent entertainment. However, under the right conditions, fantasies of knowledge can become epistemically dangerous, because they can generate illusions of genuine knowledge. I argue that this phenomenon helps to explain why some people join and eventually adopt the beliefs of epistemic communities who endorse seemingly bizarre, outlandish claims, such as extreme cults and online conspiracy theory groups. It can be difficult to grasp how members of such groups come to believe the theories they endorse. I argue that one route to such beliefs is via deep absorption in fantasies of knowledge, which can lead entire groups to become collectively detached from reality.

Around the world, people who care for animals as stock-keepers, stockmen, farmers, producers are placed in a position where they can greatly influence the quality of life of the animals they manage. A stock-keeper's viewpoint on animal welfare and animal care will be enormously influenced by their cultural frame, how animals are viewed in the society where they live, and how much ‘permission to care’ the individual stockman sees as being granted to them in the place where they work. Sometimes the capacity to care is subsumed by commercial production pressures, lack of time, lack of motivation, perceived lack of resources, perceived lack of ‘value’ for individual animals, lack of perception of animal issues, or sometimes through a lack of knowledge or exposure to concepts of animal care and welfare. The extent and focus of animal welfare training is moulded by the needs of the audience, the company, the retailer or the legislator. For these reasons ‘one size fits all’ training is not usually appropriate, although there may be some general rules which can be applied to nearly all welfare training. These general rules include: do not start by importing values and technology/procedures which those trained cannot use; understand why the people you train do what they do; the initial training should be sympathetic to local knowledge and resources; engage with the industry and its affiliates and if at all possible, obtain government, professional and academic support and involvement; and beware that in the absence of knowledge and training, new technologies and new procedures can create new welfare problems.

Science often advances through disagreement among scientists and the studies they produce. For members of the public, however, conflicting results from scientific studies may trigger a sense of uncertainty that in turn leads to a feeling that nothing new has been learned from those studies. In several scenario studies, participants read about pairs of highly similar scientific studies with results that either agreed or disagreed, and were asked, “When we take the results of these two studies together, do we now know more, less, or the same as we did before about (the study topic)?” We find that over half of participants do not feel that “we know more” as the result of the two new studies when the second study fails to replicate the first. When the two study results strongly conflict (e.g., one finds a positive and the other a negative association between two variables), a non-trivial proportion of participants actually say that “we know less” than we did before. Such a sentiment arguably violates normative principles of statistical and scientific inference positing that new study findings can never reduce our level of knowledge (and that only completely uninformative studies can leave our level of knowledge unchanged). Drawing attention to possible moderating variables, or to sample size considerations, did not influence people’s perceptions of knowledge advancement. Scientist members of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, when presented with the same scenarios, were less inclined to say that nothing new is learned from conflicting study results.

Can numerical anchors influence people’s judgments of their own recent behavior? We investigate this question in a series of six studies. In Study 1, subjects’ judgments of how many anagrams they were given assimilated to numerical anchors. Subjects’ judgments of how many math problems they correctly solved and how many stairs they had just walked up were also influenced by numerical anchors (Studies 2A and 3A), and this occurred even when the anchors were extreme and nonsensical (Studies 2B and 3B). Thus, our first five studies showed that anchors can affect people’s judgments of their own recent behavior. Finally, in Study 4, we tested the hypothesis that self-knowledge, despite not eliminating anchoring effects, does still attenuate anchoring. However, we found no evidence that self-knowledge reduced anchoring: subjects’ judgments of their own recent behavior and subjects’ judgments of other people’s recent behavior were equally influenced by anchors. We discuss implications of these findings for research on domain knowledge and anchoring, as well as for research on the malleability of memory.

This paper contributes to the recent explosion of literature on the epistemological role of emotions and other affective states by defending two claims. First, affective states might do more than position us to receive evidence or function as evidence. Affective states might be thought to appraise evidence, in the sense that affective states influence what doxastic state is rational for someone given a body of evidence. The second claim is that affective evidentialism, the view that affective states function rationally in this way, is not just possible but plausible and fruitful. We offer two arguments in favor of affective evidentialism.