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At first appearance, asking individuals from and connected to Nunavut, an eastern Arctic jurisdiction of Canada, to contribute to a collection of polar history would seem to be a practical and straightforward request, both for the reader and for the contributors themselves. Yet, as is often the case, the reality of things is not as simple as it first appears.
As most readers are probably aware, many scholars and self-identified experts of polar history do not necessarily live in the polar regions. This is the case for Nunavut. While the contributors to this chapter are well-aware of the extensive expertise, knowledge, skills, generosity of spirit, and critical thinking that exists year-round in the communities that populate Nunavut, this knowledge has not yet found a home in the broader discipline of polar history.
We explored the nexus between the quality of human capital, productivity-enhancing factors, and the quality of institutions in nine Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries using canonical correlation and principal component analysis of country-level data for 2007–2017 from the World Bank, World Economic Forum, and Penn World Tables databases. We found that an unequal development of human capital in the ASEAN countries is clearly linked to their heterogeneous institutional conditions and that the quality of human capital drives technology absorption and innovation. The four transition economies in the region—Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar—are facing particularly difficult challenges in developing institutional environments that stimulate human capital development to reach higher levels of knowledge intensity of their economies and achieve the resulting competitive advantages.
The senses provide important everyday and symbolic media through which social order is routinely looked at. Throughout these multifold processes and in relation to exchange and imitation, we are able to discern a number of important issues that arise in the agenda to compose a sensory anthropology of Asia. First, senses serve as vehicles of knowledge across the whole array of everyday social domains in terms of how they organise human–nonhuman experience. Second, comparative approaches initiated herein are not only a response to either Western- or Asian-centric sensory analysis. They further advance the scope of sensory scholarship by prompting inter- and intra-cultural dialogue on the subject. Third, sensory transnationalism illustrates how sensory orders and practices work, and where established sensory norms are responded to by social actors adhering to different sensory scripts in cross-cultural exchanges. The broader intention is to spotlight how sensory cultures, sentient practices and encounters transpire as a way of comprehending Asia through sense perception as a newer perspective in social and cultural anthropology. In doing so, I inquire further both into the breadth and depth of how to articulate the social lives and textures of the senses toward crafting the future of sensory anthropology.
For decades, two sophisticated historiographies, postcolonialism and critical archival studies emphasized that knowledge is power and that archives are power. These two formulas have been subject to recent criticism from a small group of renowned researchers, who stress that knowledge and archives do not possess such a linear and direct relationship with domination. It remains for us, therefore, to explore how, and in which specific social contexts, knowledge and archives allow administrations to achieve more power. This chapter follows the Council of the Indies during its nomadic existence, from 1524 to 1561, in which ministers prioritized communication with vassals (along with a subsequent incoherence of imperial policies) over an assertive, coherent program. This chapter also explores the decision-making technologies of this nomadic council, especially how it applied limited textual hermeneutics to petitions. It also follows the extraordinary juntas: committees which occasionally convened to solve imperial crises and which applied more sophisticated knowledge-based decisions to Indies problems. Nonetheless, I argue, the Council’s members recognized the inefficacy of its theological approaches and its largely nonarchival hermeneutics, setting the stage for reform.
Identifying factors that may influence aflatoxin exposure in children under 5 years of age living in farming households in western Kenya.
We used a mixed methods design. The quantitative component entailed serial cross-sectional interviews in 250 farming households to examine crop processing and conservation practices, household food storage and consumption and local understandings of aflatoxins. Qualitative data collection included focus group discussions (N 7) and key informant interviews (N 13) to explore explanations of harvesting and post-harvesting techniques and perceptions of crop spoilage.
The study was carried out in Asembo, a rural community where high rates of child stunting exist.
A total of 250 female primary caregivers of children under 5 years of age and thirteen experts in farming and food management participated.
Study results showed that from a young age, children routinely ate maize-based dishes. Economic constraints and changing environmental patterns guided the application of sub-optimal crop practices involving early harvest, poor drying, mixing spoiled with good cereals and storing cereals in polypropylene bags in confined quarters occupied by humans and livestock and raising risks of aflatoxin contamination. Most (80 %) smallholder farmers were unaware of aflatoxins and their harmful economic and health consequences.
Young children living in subsistence farming households may be at risk of exposure to aflatoxins and consequent ill health and stunting. Sustained efforts to increase awareness of the risks of aflatoxins and control measures among subsistence farmers could help to mitigate practices that raise exposure.
I will discuss a variety of cases such that the subject's believing truly is somewhat of an accident, but less so than in a Gettier case. In each case, this is because her reasons are not ultimately undefeated full stop, but they are ultimately undefeated with certain qualifications. For example, the subject's reasons might be ultimately defeated considered in themselves but ultimately undefeated considered as a proper part of an inference to the best explanation that is undefeated without qualification. In each section of the paper, I consider different qualifications and show how in each case we get an epistemic standing I call “coach-class knowledge”. First-class knowledge requires justifying reasons that are undefeated without qualification. Coach-class knowledge only requires qualified lack of defeat. I will use this distinction to bring debates over knowledge from falsehood and fake barns to an ecumenical resolution. In both cases, the subject enjoys coach-class rather than first-class knowledge. I will also show that the defeasible reasoning tradition can better account for graded accidental truth than safety theories.
This chapter takes stock of the current situation confronting political theory. I introduce the concept of “digital lifeworlds” and explain its relevance in the narrative of humanity. I use Max Tegmark’s distinctions between Life 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0, respectively, for guidance in locating digital lifeworlds in history. We do not know if Life 3.0 (the kind of life that designs both its culture and physical shape, the physical shape of individuals) will ever arise. But if it does, it will be from within digital lifeworlds – lifeworlds that already fundamentally change our lives and thus require intense scrutiny even if there will never be a Life 3.0. To understand these lifeworlds, we need appropriate notions of “data,” “information,” and “knowledge” and characterize the connections among them. To that end, we enlist Fred Dretske’s understanding of knowledge in terms of flow of information. Such a notion of knowledge allows for a broader range of knowers than humans (to whom classical analyses were limited): It includes both animals and artificially intelligent beings as knowers. I also draw on Luciano Floridi’s work on the philosophy of information for a related look at digital lifeworlds from a more detached standpoint (“infospheres populated by inforgs”).
Vitamin D deficiency is common in Irish adults, though there is limited research on its determinants, knowledge of vitamin D or indications for testing. We aimed to explore the determinants of vitamin D status in adults and examine knowledge and reasons for testing. The study population comprised adults who had serum 25-hydroxyvitamin D tested by general practitioners request at a Dublin Hospital in 2020. Questionnaires detailing dietary intake, sun exposure, ethnicity, biophysical factors and vitamin D knowledge were sent to a sample stratified by age, sex and vitamin D status. In total, there were 383 participants, mean age 56·0 (sd 16·6) years. Wintertime deficiency disproportionally affected non-white v. white (60 % v. 24 %, P < 0·001). The greatest predictors of deficiency were low vitamin D intake (< 10 μg/d) (P < 0·001) and non-white ethnicity (P = 0·006), followed by sun avoidance (P = 0·022). It was also more prevalent in those with lower body exposure when outdoors. The majority (86 %) identified vitamin D as important for bone health. However, 40 % were tested for non-clinical indications and half were not aware of the recommended daily allowance (RDA). Low vitamin D intake was the most important determinant of deficiency, but ethnicity and sun exposure habits were also significant predictors. The majority had no clear indication for testing and were not aware of the RDA. Public health policies to improve knowledge and vitamin D intake, especially for those of non-white ethnicity and with reduced sun exposure, should be considered.
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a complex mental health condition often associated with previous childhood adversity including maladaptive parenting. When becoming a parent themselves, mothers with BPD have difficulties with various parenting cognitions and practices, but unknown is whether they have appropriate knowledge of sensitive parenting. This study explored whether differences in parenting knowledge or self-efficacy are specific to BPD or also found in mothers with depression, and whether symptom severity or specific diagnosis better explain parenting perceptions. Mothers with BPD (n = 26), depression (n = 25) or HCs (n = 25) completed a Q-sort parenting knowledge task and a parenting self-efficacy questionnaire. Results showed mothers with BPD had the same knowledge of sensitive parenting behaviors as mothers with depression and healthy mothers. Self-reported parenting self-efficacy was lower in mothers with BPD and depression compared with healthy mothers, with symptom severity most strongly associated. A significant but low correlation was found between parenting self-efficacy and knowledge. Findings suggest that mothers with BPD and depression know what good parenting is but think they are not parenting well. Mental health difficulties are not associated with parenting knowledge, but symptom severity appears to be a common pathway to lower parenting self-efficacy. Future interventions should test whether reduction of symptom severity or positive parenting feedback could improve parenting self-efficacy.
There are two ways to know something: by description and by acquaintance. What we know by description are things that we have read or heard about; what we know by acquaintance are things that we have experienced ourselves. Descriptions can only be made at a distance which acquaintance requires direct involvement. At first encounters between Europeans and non-Europeans, the parties often danced as a way to get to know each other. In Europe, kings and diplomats danced for the same reason. However, colonialism requires knowledge by description, and thereby an entirely different attitude to the world. A world described in books and in research reports is far easier to control and to exploit.
How do we strengthen our underlying character, so that we can practise law without fear? Aristotle insightfully insisted that character (virtue) does not suddenly appear; it does not just arrive one morning (in an email). We develop our character by applying ourselves to that task, usually over years. We can become ‘habituated’ to goodness by reflecting on the good and bad experiences we all have. Let us not forget that as lawyers we are guaranteed to be put under formidable pressure by clients, other lawyers and even police, to do the wrong thing. The key virtues for lawyers are wisdom and knowledge, courage and justice – they are a stable foundation for modern legal ethics. To those who say virtue ethics is too subjective, or paternal or fails to give adequate action guidance when it is needed (compared to Western duty-based frameworks), we say that virtue ethics looks first at the actor and then the act. If the actor is good, so also will be the act. Nevertheless, reflection on the connections between your virtues and various lawyer ‘types’ (the zealous advocate; the responsible lawyer; the moral activist; and the ‘relationship of care’), will strengthen your character further.
Individual vertebrates are able to detect spatial and temporal (causal) order in their environment and deal with this knowledge emotionally. It is argued that this latter aspect is connected with the flexible or reversible way vertebrates may interact with their environment Because of this flexibility, uncertainty and changes therein can be experienced and shown by means of emotional expressions. It is this brain-behaviour organization that gives meaning to questions about welfare of individual vertebrates.
There's a certain pleasure in fantasizing about possessing knowledge, especially possessing secret knowledge to which outsiders don't have access. Such fantasies are typically a source of innocent entertainment. However, under the right conditions, fantasies of knowledge can become epistemically dangerous, because they can generate illusions of genuine knowledge. I argue that this phenomenon helps to explain why some people join and eventually adopt the beliefs of epistemic communities who endorse seemingly bizarre, outlandish claims, such as extreme cults and online conspiracy theory groups. It can be difficult to grasp how members of such groups come to believe the theories they endorse. I argue that one route to such beliefs is via deep absorption in fantasies of knowledge, which can lead entire groups to become collectively detached from reality.
Around the world, people who care for animals as stock-keepers, stockmen, farmers, producers are placed in a position where they can greatly influence the quality of life of the animals they manage. A stock-keeper's viewpoint on animal welfare and animal care will be enormously influenced by their cultural frame, how animals are viewed in the society where they live, and how much ‘permission to care’ the individual stockman sees as being granted to them in the place where they work. Sometimes the capacity to care is subsumed by commercial production pressures, lack of time, lack of motivation, perceived lack of resources, perceived lack of ‘value’ for individual animals, lack of perception of animal issues, or sometimes through a lack of knowledge or exposure to concepts of animal care and welfare. The extent and focus of animal welfare training is moulded by the needs of the audience, the company, the retailer or the legislator. For these reasons ‘one size fits all’ training is not usually appropriate, although there may be some general rules which can be applied to nearly all welfare training. These general rules include: do not start by importing values and technology/procedures which those trained cannot use; understand why the people you train do what they do; the initial training should be sympathetic to local knowledge and resources; engage with the industry and its affiliates and if at all possible, obtain government, professional and academic support and involvement; and beware that in the absence of knowledge and training, new technologies and new procedures can create new welfare problems.
Science often advances through disagreement among scientists and the studies they produce. For members of the public, however, conflicting results from scientific studies may trigger a sense of uncertainty that in turn leads to a feeling that nothing new has been learned from those studies. In several scenario studies, participants read about pairs of highly similar scientific studies with results that either agreed or disagreed, and were asked, “When we take the results of these two studies together, do we now know more, less, or the same as we did before about (the study topic)?” We find that over half of participants do not feel that “we know more” as the result of the two new studies when the second study fails to replicate the first. When the two study results strongly conflict (e.g., one finds a positive and the other a negative association between two variables), a non-trivial proportion of participants actually say that “we know less” than we did before. Such a sentiment arguably violates normative principles of statistical and scientific inference positing that new study findings can never reduce our level of knowledge (and that only completely uninformative studies can leave our level of knowledge unchanged). Drawing attention to possible moderating variables, or to sample size considerations, did not influence people’s perceptions of knowledge advancement. Scientist members of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, when presented with the same scenarios, were less inclined to say that nothing new is learned from conflicting study results.
Can numerical anchors influence people’s judgments of their own recent behavior? We investigate this question in a series of six studies. In Study 1, subjects’ judgments of how many anagrams they were given assimilated to numerical anchors. Subjects’ judgments of how many math problems they correctly solved and how many stairs they had just walked up were also influenced by numerical anchors (Studies 2A and 3A), and this occurred even when the anchors were extreme and nonsensical (Studies 2B and 3B). Thus, our first five studies showed that anchors can affect people’s judgments of their own recent behavior. Finally, in Study 4, we tested the hypothesis that self-knowledge, despite not eliminating anchoring effects, does still attenuate anchoring. However, we found no evidence that self-knowledge reduced anchoring: subjects’ judgments of their own recent behavior and subjects’ judgments of other people’s recent behavior were equally influenced by anchors. We discuss implications of these findings for research on domain knowledge and anchoring, as well as for research on the malleability of memory.
This paper contributes to the recent explosion of literature on the epistemological role of emotions and other affective states by defending two claims. First, affective states might do more than position us to receive evidence or function as evidence. Affective states might be thought to appraise evidence, in the sense that affective states influence what doxastic state is rational for someone given a body of evidence. The second claim is that affective evidentialism, the view that affective states function rationally in this way, is not just possible but plausible and fruitful. We offer two arguments in favor of affective evidentialism.
This chapter introduces some of the broader ideas and themes of the book, especially the importance of the scientific method as a route to understanding the material universe. It contrasts the scientific perspective with the perspectives in other academic and non-academic disciplines (e.g. the historical, religious, and moral perspectives on human behavior). It gives examples of the value of the scientific perspective, especially the fact that it does not allow for a privileged position, and that it is a relatively democratic form of knowledge. It discusss some historical objections to science, and also reviews some misuse of science, but also the types of topics science cannot address (morality, aesthetics, etc.).
The breadth of psychology’s history underscores the importance of learning about the present from the past, and psychology’s past is certainly fascinating. Several approaches to the study of intellectual history, particularly for psychology, are presented, as are some of the major recurring themes that are addressed in the book. Finally, the study of the history of psychology as an area of specialization within the discipline focuses on the resources available for serious pursuit.
This Element examines the eighteenth-century novel's contributions to empirical knowledge. Realism has been the conventional framework for treating this subject within literary studies. This Element identifies the limitations of the realism framework for addressing the question of knowledge in the eighteenth-century novel. Moving beyond the familiar focus in the study of novelistic realism on problems of perception and representation, this Element focuses instead on how the eighteenth-century novel staged problems of inductive reasoning. It argues that we should understand the novel's contributions to empirical knowledge primarily in terms of what the novel offered as training ground for methods of reasoning, rather than what it offered in terms of formal innovations for representing knowledge. We learn from such a shift that the eighteenth-century novel was not a failed experiment in realism, or in representing things as they are, but a valuable system for reasoning and thought experiment.