The chapter examines the nature and the main characteristics of arbitral institutions and describes the main features of institutional arbitration. It then illustrates several categories of institutions, distinguishing them on the basis of various criteria. The chapter further describes the functions performed by arbitral institutions with respect to the specific cases submitted to them, their contribution to the making of arbitration law and their role in promoting the knowledge and culture of arbitration. The chapter further examines the notion of "mandatory institutional rules", i.e. rules that institutions do not accept derogations from, and illustrates the conditions for institutions' liability vis à vis the parties and the scope of their immunity in relation to acts and omissions in the performance of their functions under the rules The author concludes that, despite the importance of the functions carried out by institutions, their role does not entail any involvement in adjudicating disputes. The impact of institutions’ decisions on the outcome of cases is indirect, limited to procedural issues or limited to recommendations to arbitrators.

The multi-faceted role of arbitrators is complex and protean. While there is consensus on the fact that the nature of the international arbitrator’s role entails according the arbitrator wide-ranging powers and that the arbitrator also undertakes a panoply of obligations, the scope of these powers and duties is not always well defined. Views about the nature and scope of these powers and duties might diverge depending on whether arbitrators are seen as service providers, justice purveyors, or both. Following a brief overview of this core question, the contribution proceeds to identify the sources of an arbitrator’s powers. Next, the most important duties of international arbitrators, including those pertaining to ethical obligations, the need to ensure due process, the necessity to apply the proper law, the duty to provide a reasoned award, and several others are explored. This contribution also highlights the most important rights of international arbitrators, such as the right to receive good faith cooperation from the parties, as well as the rights to remuneration and immunity, amongst others. Finally, we make some observations on ways in which the rights and duties entailed by the complex mandate of arbitrators can be reconciled in the event of conflict.

This chapter deals with Germany’s position on State jurisdiction and immunities. The first part, Jurisdiction of the State, addresses Germany releasing an Iranian citizen in a prisoner swap, as well as Germany considering further US sanctions on Nord Stream 2, a pipeline project delivering gas from Russia to Germany, an encroachment on its sovereignty as it understands them to be extraterritorial in nature. The second part, State immunity, deals with the Federal Constitutional Court classifying Greek debt restructuring measures as acta iure imperii. While the chapter agrees with the decision, it criticizes the Federal Constitutional Court for missing the opportunity to advance the discussion of a contentious matter of public international law. Another article assesses Germany’s (non)participation in US court proceedings for alleged colonial genocide and enslavement of the Ovaherero and Nama in what was formerly known as South West Africa and is now Namibia. The chapter argues that Germany is not answerable and that Namibia’s position in its negotiations with the German government over a political declaration concerning atrocities committed during colonial rule was weakened.

The chapter provides an analysis of the concept of rights. It clarifies the precise object of inquiry of the book. A particular focus is repesented by claim rights or subjective rights. Mayor elements of the analysis of subjective rights are recalled, including historical contributions from Natural Law thinkers, comments by legal positivists, the Hohfeldian framework and the rules and principles approach. The question as to whether it is conceptually impossible to regard social rights as proper rights is addressed. Central elements of a concept of rights are discussed, including the addressees of rights, the holders of rights and the problem of group rights. The relation of legal and moral rights is a further object of inquiry, as are the basic contents of human rights, the copossibility and limitations of rights, the nature of obligations, the peremptory nature of rights and questions of the interpretation of rights.

What role do international organizations play in international law? Similar to states, they have international legal personality, responsibilities, and immunities.  This chapter focuses on the preeminent global intergovernmental organization, the United Nations, and details the functions and limits of its principal organs.  Special attention is given to the General Assembly, Security Council, and International Court of Justice. The European Union is the leading example of a regional, supranational organization, and its authority and institutions are discussed in detail as well. The chapter concludes with brief considerations of other major international organizations, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of American States, the African Union, and the World Health Organization.

How do we define the state in international law, and what is its relationship to individuals? We begin by outlining the state as a legal concept and differentiating it from similar concepts. We then explore the legal personality of the state under international law, including the elements of statehood, absolute and restrictive immunity, and state responsibility. The problems of state recognition (or non-recognition) of other states and governments is a key to understanding how states interact, as are changes in state status (e.g., secession or other consequential changes).  The last half of the chapter is devoted to the reciprocal responsibilities state and individuals have toward one another, focusing on nationality, citizenship, refugees, statelessness, and the state’s treatment of foreign nationals.

Chapter 4 discusses various cultural constructions of physical difference: racialised phenotype, supposed medical predisposition or resistance to specific diseases and climes, and concepts of filthiness and hygiene. The eighteenth-century Navy was embedded into the structural racism of the Atlantic world and British empire, and many seamen suffered from this. Yet, unlike other institutions, it still rarely used ‘race’ as a systematic label to recruit, classify, or sift its workforce. Seamen were occasionally deployed according to climatic theories of national character and racialised constructions of disease and immunity. However, many naval surgeons still saw immunity as acquired rather than innate, and thus modifiable and dependent on a man’s most recent deployment, rather than intrinsic to ‘race’. Similarly, prejudice surrounding the cleanliness and attitudes of some groups of ‘foreigners’ was linked more to the administrative structures of foreign countries and navies than to essentialist understandings of the individuals themselves. Therefore, in the eyes of many officers, virtually any able man could be absorbed, reformed, and put to use by British naval discipline. This did not mitigate the violence and discrimination of everyday racism, but it highlights the somewhat levelling attitude of an administration bent on maximising its efficient exploitation of manpower.

The chapter reports that the leniency programme in Hong Kong was promulgated at the same time that the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance went into full effect in 2015. This leniency programme has been successfully used once. The Hong Kong Competition Commission (HKCC) reached a leniency agreement in 2020, despite the strong focus of the HKCC on tackling cartels. Six out of the seven cases the HKCC has brought to the Hong Kong Competition Tribunal are cartel related. These enforcement successes are attributable to market studies of the HKCC itself. However, this situation should not be misinterpreted. With the arrival of Brent Snyder as the Chief Executive Officer of the HKCC, the leniency programme was revised. Lenient treatment remained limited to immunity, but also became available once an investigation has started. Two new schemes were introduced: leniency for individuals and leniency plus. A leniency applicant has also been given immunity from damages claims. Further, reduction was made possible through the introduction of a cooperation policy. These recent changes should contribute to enforcement and supplement the successfully concluded ex officio investigations.

The authors of this chapter argue that the Chinese legislator has infused a dose of trust and predictability into its leniency programme. The trust was necessary because not all enforcement agencies in China, of which the National Development and Reform Commission is most often singled out, applied due process during their investigation. Furthermore, predictability was required because the existing leniency programmes, one for price-related cartels and one for non-price-related cartels, gave too much discretion to the enforcement agencies. As a result of the lack of due process or predictability, the outcomes of investigations were uncertain. This chapter will show that, by reconfiguring the enforcement structure, both elements are addressed. There is one condition for the new leniency programme to be more effective. The new enforcement agency, the State Administration for Market Regulation, which has elaborated the new leniency programme, should ensure transparency in its decision making.

This chapter sheds light on the international organisations that have been active in proliferating leniency programmes. This contribution includes the efforts of the OECD, ICN, UNCTAD and ASEAN. For each of these organisations, the chapter argues that they have a tendency to look for the common elements among existing leniency programmes and present them as an international guideline or best practice. When the existing leniency programmes diverge, the international guideline or best practice is to offer options. By not further clarifying these options, the chapter holds, the international organisations do no more than summarise local practices and pull them outside of their context. Due to this practice, convergence is unlikely to happen because, when the international guidelines or best practices are consulted, there will be an automatic reflex to also consult existing local practices and the existing literature regarding those practices.

Directive 2014/104/EU introduced special rules on joint and several for those engaged in consensual dispute resolution, immunity recipients and small and medium enterprises. The aim of this Chapter is to outline the liability regime for these entities. The assessment starts with the analysis of policy arguments and the search for the logic behind the special rules on joint and several liability. It is asked whether the special treatment of privileged groups is justified and whether the rules provided by Directive 2014/104/EU meet the envisioned aims. Subsequently, the assessment takes a pragmatic angle and it is asked how the special regimes of joint and several liability operate in practice and how they can be improved. The analysis shows that Directive 2014/104/EU insufficiently shields immunity recipients from an extensive private law liability and the rules on joint and several liability call the effectiveness of leniency programmes into question. The Directive’s rules on consensual dispute resolution are also flawed. Given that there is no clear legal benchmark for dividing antitrust liability, the settling parties are virtually unable to determine which settlement offer to make and they can end up overcompensating or being undercompensated.

This chapter on the Singaporean leniency programme holds that various elements point to its effectiveness. The leniency programme guarantees immunity for a leniency applicant prior to an investigation, immunity could be obtained by the first leniency applicant once an investigation has started, and granting leniency to subsequent leniency applicants is at the discretion of the Singaporean enforcement agency, the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCCS). Furthermore, leniency plus, whereby extra reduction can be obtained for revealing participation in another cartel, and the fast-track procedure, whereby extra reduction can be obtained for admitting to the fact, have been introduced as well. It is now also possible for a cartel to be exposed through a reward or whistle-blowing scheme, though this scheme is not available for persons active in the infringement. Because of these elements, the leniency programme has contributed to eight of the fifteen cartel infringement decisions. Some of these cases have led to record high fines. Another element worth mentioning is that some of the leniency applications were only submitted after active solicitation by the CCCS.

The concluding chapter argues that the Asian leniency programmes only converge on the core elements of a leniency programme. The core elements are the building blocks of a leniency programme. However, the composition of these blocks is often different. Some of the differences are subtle. Other differences make the respective leniency programme distinct from the others. Some of the distinctive elements are not necessarily part of the building blocks any more and thus give a unique character to the respective leniency programme. This chapter further claims that these differences can be explained by either the political economy of a country, experimentation due to prior negative enforcement results and a desire to achieve better enforcement results, or foreign influence. Since the result of experimentation cannot always be predicted, the authors estimate that further amendments will be made to the Asian leniency programmes.