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In communities plagued by conflict along ethnic, racial, and religious lines, how does the representation of previously-marginalized groups in the police affect crime and security? Drawing on new evidence from policing in Iraq and Israel, Policing for Peace shows that an inclusive police force provides better services and reduces conflict, but not in the ways we might assume. Including members of marginalized groups in the police improves civilians' expectations of how the police and government will treat them, both now and in the future. These expectations are enhanced when officers are organized into mixed rather than homogeneous patrols. Iraqis indicate feeling most secure when policed by mixed officers, even more secure than they feel when policed by members of their own group. In Israel, increases in police officer diversity are associated with lower crime victimization for both Arab and Jewish citizens. In many cases, inclusive policing benefits all citizens, not just those from marginalized groups.
This chapter explores the tensions between resilience models of recovery, adaptive peacebuilding and transitional justice by examining the 1994 genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda, its aftermath and the country’s recovery processes. Rwanda has been lauded as a success story for post-genocide recovery, peacebuilding and transitional justice. Yet, a closer look demonstrates that its recovery and peacebuilding reinforced a centralised state and the ruling party’s dominance. These processes produced the appearance of stability and resilience while hiding new hierarchies and social divides that risk generating conflict in the future. Adaptive peacebuilding efforts led by local non-governmental organisations, on the other hand, responded directly to ordinary people’s immediate needs without promoting political agendas. Government-led transitional justice efforts often disrupted these local successes and ultimately benefitted the nation-state at the expense of community healing. The lessons learned from the Rwanda case point to the importance of tending to local-level concerns in recovery processes and of employing peacebuilding approaches that focus on broad notions of positive peace instead of only state-building. In addition, resilience models of recovery must consider micro- and macro-level concerns and pay attention to the impact of political power on outcomes.
In all but the rarest circumstances, the world's deadly conflicts are ended not through outright victory, but through a series of negotiations. Not all of these negotiations, however, yield a durable peace. To successfully mitigate conflict drivers, the parties in conflict must address a number of puzzles, such as whether and how to share and/or re-establish a state's monopoly of force, reallocate the ownership and management of natural resources, modify the state structure, or provide for a path toward external self-determination. Successfully resolving these puzzles requires the parties to navigate a number of conundrums and make choices and design mechanisms that are appropriate to the particular context of the conflict, and which are most likely to lead to a durable peace. Lawyering Peace aims to help future negotiators build better and more durable peace agreements through a rigorous examination of how other parties have resolved these puzzles and associated conundrums.
The final chapter brings together the main findings and arguments of the book, identifies its broader implications, and formulates some ideas for future research. Building upon insights from political ecology, it suggests that a useful way forward is through reframing questions away from assuming fatalistic relationships between nature and conflict, and starting to ask questions that illuminate the broader social/political/economic dynamics involved. By considering how different environmental injustices play a role in shaping contemporary conflicts, international law scholarship may also expose and challenge the utilitarian/instrumental view of nature that underpins the field. If environmental ‘scarcity’ and ‘abundance’ are not external factors leading to conflict, but the outcomes of socio-economic processes, often linked to historical grievances and unequal power relations, entirely different notions of justice, peace, and security are needed.
None of the rulers from the time of Abdur Rahman’s death until the communists seized power in 1978 had his reputation for violence, and the country enjoyed a long peace from the 1930s through the early 1970s. Our theory can explain why despite substantial political order, property rights did not develop much: the rulers who made minor progress in establishing legal property rights had very little state capacity and could not maintain political control, and there was never much progress in establishing political constraints. The communist governments faced even fewer constraints and were largely insulated from local institutions, which contributed to a massively unsuccessful effort to redistribute land, while the Taliban, despite providing some semblance of order and recognizing the importance of customary and traditional institutions, were largely unconstrained and without much administrative capacity to implement any sort of reform. Together, these developments illustrate a key implication of the theory: meaningful progress in establishing property rights requires a monopoly on coercion, high state capacity, strong political constraints on rulers, and inclusive political and legal institutions. Weakness of any of these elements can prevent the emergence of private property rights.
The Conclusion reiterates the book’s purpose—to more clearly and faithfully reveal war’s truths to help prevent wars, reduce their damaging effects, and win when there is no other choice. War encompasses humanity, politics, and combat, and its dialectic nature reflects humanity’s duality—peaceful and warlike, good and evil. War theory and strategy are most effective when we value both sides of war’s dialectics, and genius often lies in understanding how and when to move from one extreme to another. War has many forms, but all are related in a continuum where assessments of relative capacity influence force viscosity and posture (attack and defense). Predicting war’s future character is critical to strategy, and this is best done by studying history, trends, current circumstances, and theory. Finally, while thorough, objective analysis confirms the impracticality of permanent peace, the potential for peace increases with the full, truthful knowledge of war and its relationship to humanity provided by sound war theory.
The Introduction argues that war’s danger, nuances, complexity, and impact on humanity demand further study, despite our seeming reluctance to do so. It contends that war is rife with contradictions which call out for further examination. For example, war evokes humanity’s worst traits, including vengeance, treachery, and hatred, and it has claimed millions of lives, spawned atrocities, and caused massive destruction. Yet, war has also inspired courage, honor, sacrifice, and loyalty, deposed tyrants, led to larger, more peaceful civilizations, and produced remarkable innovations that protect and preserve life. The introduction concludes by recommending that war’s repulsiveness and complexity should inspire, not deter, scholarly attention, for as with any dangerous phenomenon, understanding war’s nature is the best way to gain enough control over it to prevent wars and to diminish their hazards and prevalence.
Chapter 3 examines how aid creates conflicts and entrenches existing racialised inequalities within the civil society sector. I show that funding injections shake Moroccan civil society by producing three kinds of organisational subjectivities. The first group are the newcomers, which decide to accept donors’ funding, while enacting sense-making strategies to justify their work as not explicitly in support of border security policies. The second group are the radicals: organisations which consider aid money as an instrument of border externalisation, and therefore decide to reject it or distance themselves from it. The last group of civil society organisations are those remaining on the doorstep. Mainly migrant-led organisations, these actors aspire to be part of the aid industry but are unable to bid for aid-funded projects and are confined to play a subordinate role in the migration market. Funding injections therefore alter relations between civil society organisations by favouring phenomena of co-optation, conflict, and subordination. This leads to the emergence of conflict among civil society actors, who do not manage to take a unified stance in favour or against the border regime.
Although today's richest countries tend to have long histories of secure private property rights, legal-titling projects do little to improve the economic and political well-being of those in the developing world. This book employs a historical narrative based on secondary literature, fieldwork across thirty villages, and a nationally representative survey to explore how private property institutions develop, how they are maintained, and their relationship to the state and state-building within the context of Afghanistan. In this predominantly rural society, citizens cannot rely on the state to enforce their claims to ownership. Instead, they rely on community-based land registration, which has a long and stable history and is often more effective at protecting private property rights than state registration. In addition to contributing significantly to the literature on Afghanistan, this book makes a valuable contribution to the literature on property rights and state governance from the new institutional economics perspective.
Most research on financial inter vivos transfers from older parents to their family members is focused on the giver–receiver dyad, usually between an older parent and an adult child. This study aimed to investigate older adults' financial support beyond this level of intergenerational dyads using an egocentric network perspective (i.e., the configurational approach). Data were from a sample of 2,991 older adults (aged 65 and older) from the Vivre/Leben/Vivere study, a large survey addressing family life and health conditions of older people in Switzerland. We used Wald tests and regression analyses to identify how financial transfers are related to family network properties in later life. Findings showed that older parents' propensity to provide financial support is associated with the density of practical help exchanges within the family (mainly for men) and with the position (mainly for women) and the role they play within their family configuration.
I model the dynamic between ruler and successor. The ruler cultivates a successor for a smooth power transition but fears being ousted by him, while the successor fears being removed by the ruler. The successor accumulates power while not threatening the ruler, and he prolongs their relationship by maintaining a low profile. The ruler gradually becomes more intolerant of the successor's growing power but, as his life nears its end, has less incentive to replace the successor. Thus conflict is most probable in the middle of their relationship; moreover, a predetermined succession order could increase its likelihood by restricting the ruler's choice. In the multi-candidate case, the strong candidate has some advantage but conflict is more likely to occur.
Chapter 6 explains the uneasy integration of the Copperbelt region into the two nation-states of DRC and Zambia. It explores how the Copperbelt border was given new political and moral meanings in official attempts to impose national identities on the region’s mobile communities. It shows how the centrality of Copperbelt mining wealth to projects of national development necessitated political control from distant capitals, generating conflict (in Zambia) with labour unions and fuelling political opposition, while (in Haut-Katanga) the secession was followed by military occupation and political rule by decree. The chapter explains the nationalisation of copper mining companies and the ways that ruling elites sought effective national control over mineral wealth and Copperbelt societies, but also the limits to this control. It also investigates the nationalisation/Africanisation of knowledge production about the Copperbelt in the region’s universities and among leading Zairian and Zambian intellectuals.
Many of war's lethal failures are attributable to ignorance caused by a dearth of contemporary, accessible theory to inform warfighting, strategy, and policy. To remedy this problem, Colonel Geoffrey F. Weiss offers an ambitious new survey of war's nature, character, and future in the tradition of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. He begins by melding philosophical and military concepts to reveal war's origins and to analyze war theory's foundational ideas. Then, leveraging science, philosophy, and the wisdom of war's master theorists, Colonel Weiss presents a genuinely original framework and lexicon that characterizes and clarifies the relationships between humanity, politics, strategy, and combat; explains how and why war changes form; offers a methodology for forecasting future war; and ponders the permanence of war as a human activity. The New Art of War is an indispensable guide for understanding human conflict that will change how we think and communicate about war.
Chapter 8 focusses on the region’s recent history of sustained economic decline and political change and conflict. It explains the reasons for this crisis and the role of indebtedness, political corruption and the imposition of austerity and market-oriented policies in reducing living standards and necessitating the ‘reform’ of the mining industry and Copperbelt societies. The chapter explores the rising local opposition to both these policies and to political repression and the contrasting experiences of political change in the early 1990s, with Zambia transitioning to multi-party democracy while Congo was mired in profound social crisis and military conflict. It then explores the liberalisation of both economies and the privatisation of the mining industry, associated in the Copperbelt with the loss of formal-sector jobs, falling living standards and the loss of company social provision. The chapter uses interviews to explore local understandings of this period of decline and political change and how social scientists have explained this extended period of decline.
The city's 'Americanness' has been disputed throughout US history. Pronounced dead in the late twentieth century, cities have enjoyed a renaissance in the twenty-first. Engaging the history of urban promise and struggle as represented in literature, film, and visual arts, and drawing on work in the social sciences, The City in American Literature and Culture examines the large and local forces that shape urban space and city life and the street-level activity that remakes culture and identities as it contests injustice and separation. The first two sections examine a range of city spaces and lives; the final section brings the city into conversation with Marxist geography, critical race studies, trauma theory, slow/systemic violence, security theory, posthumanism, and critical regionalism, with a coda on city literature and democracy.
This chapter is concerned with the concepts of compromise and deliberative democracy. When compromise takes place between two or more parties, reciprocity must be present; that is, the concessions are mutual. It is argued that compromise and deliberative democracy are important in facilitating a healthy discourse between the majority and minorities about group rights and the extent of state interference in minority affairs. With proponents of discourse ethics, public reason and deliberative democracy, such as Jürgen Habermas, Joshua Cohen, Seyla Benhabib, John Dryzek, Amy Gutmann and Dennis F. Thompson, it is argued that this is a desirable approach to negotiating and resolving conflicts. The chapter agrees with Monique Deveaux that deliberative democracy is an invaluable resource for thinking about how liberal democracies and minority cultural groups might mediate conflicts of culture.
The conclusion shows how persistent colonial chaos has been in the southern Red Sea. Local diplomacy retains a distinctly competitive and militaristic flavour to this day. International competition and realpolitik in the southern Red Sea has, if anything, intensified in the post-Cold War era. Looking at Puntland, south-west Yemen and Djibouti today, we see the Djiboutian government depends on money and recognition from renting space to foreign navies, while in Somalia and Yemen, rival power brokers seek to translate acts of maritime aggression into international negotiations for military and civil assistance. Opportunities to rekindle a regional culture of international cooperation exist, but are deeply submerged beneath the depths of colonial history.
The colonial history of the southern Red Sea region is strewn with the bodies of victims of maritime violence. The chapter introduces the three case studies explored in this study: Majerteenia in north-eastern Somalia, the Zaraniq from Tihamat Yemen in the south-western Arabian Peninsula, and Henry de Monfreid in French Somaliland. The chapter further examines the backstory to a more competitive, adversarial approach to international relations and maritime law, observing that the European culture of international law and international relations prioritised private property rights over international cooperation. Strong ideas about private property rights and competition for influence set the stage for conflict with the southern Red Sea’s more cooperative approach to maritime space and international relations.