Throughout this book I have presented a number of traditional moral theories and evaluated their suitability as a means of selectively prohibiting video game content. I have concluded that each, in turn, is unable to explain the current state of play regarding what is permitted and what is not (at least within the UK), either because there is a paucity of evidence from which to draw any firm empirical conclusions or, a priori, the theory is unable to justify the selective prohibition of video game content. Moreover, because of the playful element intrinsic to video games, and the altered contingencies characteristic of each gamespace, it is my contention that any moral scrutiny based on a moral system imported from our actual (non-gaming) world is difficult to defend in principle. Consequently, not only is it the case that no single moral approach seems suitable – at least based on evidence accumulated so far – but, more generally, the idea of there being any coherent moral system for implementing the selective prohibition of video game content borne outside gamespace seems doomed from the outset.

It is, therefore, my contention that if selective prohibition is to occur then it should be informed by psychology – based on what gamers can cope with, psychologically – rather than stemming from notions of what is morally good or bad about virtual interactions.