In the previous chapter I discussed the role of sentiment within morality, and the extent to which it can be used to selectively prohibit STAs. In this chapter, I consider an opposing view presented by Immanuel Kant: that there is no place for sentiment within moral theorizing, and in fact what one ought to do, at least in a moral sense, should be driven by duty. Kant, therefore, hoped for a society in which persons not only do the right thing, but do the right thing for the right reasons, and so treat each other with respect as autonomous, rational beings (De Marneffe 2001). Having said that, Kant does not confine his moral theory to an ethic of pure intentionality, in which one should be indifferent to the accomplishment of what one intended; nevertheless, he does hold that any consideration, on the part of the subject, as to whether the outcome of one's intention is worthy of the moral effort succeeds only in revealing the subject's immortality (Verweyen 1996).

In this chapter I discuss the work of Kant and those more recent (twenty-first-century) theorists who have sought to apply his moral philosophy to formulations of Kant's categorical imperative can provide the basis for the selective prohibition of video game content.