This chapter examines the works of theorists of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries to understand how their ideas influenced the development of the modern theory and practice of victory in war. In a practical sense, the theorists in this chapter have the closest connection to the modern concept of victory.

TOTAL WAR AND VICTORY

Systematic thinking about war, particularly total war, early in the twentieth century was shaped by two broad influences. The first was the relationship between the state's military organization and the sources of economic power. The second was the ability of the state to conduct warfare on a devastating scale given the development of air power, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles. Despite the expansion of the economic foundations and technological instruments of war, the prevailing dogma held that conflict was the natural condition among states. With the development of these ideas, military strategists argued that the state's ability to mobilize its human, economic, and technological resources for total war was critical to victory. Some prominent military leaders dismissed economics as a lesser aspect of war. Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (nephew to Graf von Moltke and chief of the General Staff early in World War I) was quoted as saying, “Don't bother me with economics, I am busy conducting the war.” But by the next world war, Winston Churchill was commenting that “modern war is total” – that is, victory demands the ability to mobilize the total resources of the state to fight.