In the annals of military strategy, policy, and diplomacy, there have been innumerable tomes written about the critical strategists and theorists of various eras. These books have dissected their every thought, the historical and political context within which they crafted their ideas, and, most important, their impact on how subsequent generations have contemplated and conducted war and diplomacy. Even a partial list of these individuals, which could easily number in the hundreds, does not do justice to the magnitude of their efforts or the span of history, quite literally thousands of years, that their thinking covered. Suffice it to say that countless individuals have labored to understand the central questions: why states fight wars, what it takes for them to win, and, paramount for the purpose of this study, what it means to win. Expressed differently, these are the fields of inquiry that govern theories of politics and war, military strategy, and victory, respectively.

This chapter treats some of the most important strategists and theorists of war, focusing specifically on how they have used the concept “victory” and how their ideas have contributed to the treatment and meaning of the word. Beginning with two of the greatest ancient strategic theorists, Sun Tzu and Thucydides, it proceeds to address the works of the major theorists of strategy and war through the late nineteenth century. (Chapter 3 continues the discussion through those of the late twentieth century.) While this survey is extensive, it is by no means all-inclusive. There are others whose works, while undoubtedly of historical significance, are not addressed in this study as a matter of economy and intellectual parsimony.