Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-wzw2p Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-30T17:06:49.275Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Circumstances versus Policy Choices: Why Has the Economic Performance of the Soviet Successor States Been So Poor?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2011

Vladimir Popov
Affiliation:
Carleton University, Canada, and the New Economic School, Moscow, Russia
Michael McFaul
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Get access

Summary

INTRODUCTION

After the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991 and market reforms were initiated, the economic performance of the successor states was more than disappointing. By the end of the 1990s, output (GDP) fell by about 50 percent compared to the highest prerecession level of 1989 (see Fig. 1). Investment dropped even more, income inequalities rose greatly so that real incomes declined dramatically for the majority of the population, and death rates increased by about 50 percent with a concurrent decline in life expectancy. In Russia output fell by 45 percent in 1989–98; suicide rates, crime rates, and murder rates skyrocketed; and death rates increased from 1 percent in the 1980s to 1.5 percent in 1994 and remained at this higher level thereafter, which was equivalent to over 700,000 additional deaths annually (see Fig. 2). Over a period of several years, such population losses are comparable to the impact of World War II on Soviet society.

By way of comparison, during the Second World War national income in the USSR fell by only 20 percent in 1940–2, recovered to its 1940 level in 1944, fell again by 20 percent in 1944–6 during the conversion of the defense industry, but exceeded its 1940 level by nearly 20 percent by 1948. In some of the former Soviet states that were affected by military conflicts (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Tajikistan), GDP in 2000 was only 30 to 50 percent of its pretransition levels; in Ukraine, even without the military conflict GDP fell by nearly two-thirds (see Fig. 1).

Type
Chapter
Information
After the Collapse of Communism
Comparative Lessons of Transition
, pp. 96 - 129
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×