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Chapter 13 - Corporate Malfeasance as a Social Problem

from Part II - Problems Related to Crime and Violence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 March 2018

By
Melissa Rorie
Edited by
A. Javier Treviño
A. Javier Treviño
Affiliation:
Wheaton College, Massachusetts
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Summary

Single cases of corporate malfeasance often cause more financial and physical damage than an entire year's worth of “conventional” crimes, yet systematic data collection on these behaviors is wanting. A cohesive body of knowledge is imperative to stimulate theory and policy making that will allow for the prevention of harm caused by powerful corporations. This chapter reviews what is known about corporate malfeasance from a criminological perspective. Specifically, we describe current issues in defining corporate behaviors as crime, explore four types of harm and the scope of harm caused by corporate crime, provide theoretical explanations for crime, and appraise current strategies used to prevent and intervene in cases of corporate malfeasance. We conclude with suggestions for improving research endeavors in this field and the importance of such research for policymaking efforts.

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The Cambridge Handbook of Social Problems , pp. 215 - 236
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2018

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