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A language of episodic thought?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 September 2023
Abstract
We propose that episodic thought (i.e., episodic memory and imagination) is a domain where the language-of-thought hypothesis (LoTH) could be fruitfully applied. On the one hand, LoTH could explain the structure of what is encoded into and retrieved from long-term memory. On the other, LoTH can help make sense of how episodic contents come to play such a large variety of different cognitive roles after they have been retrieved.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Author response
The language-of-thought hypothesis as a working hypothesis in cognitive science