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Dual-process moral judgment beyond fast and slow

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Joshua D. Greene Open the ORCID record for Joshua D. Greene [Opens in a new window]
Joshua D. Greene*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Center for Brain Science, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA jgreene@wjh.harvard.edu https://www.joshua-greene.net
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Abstract

De Neys makes a compelling case that the sacrificial moral dilemmas do not elicit competing “fast and slow” processes. But are there even two processes? Or just two intuitions? There remains strong evidence, most notably from lesion studies, that sacrificial dilemmas engage distinct cognitive processes generating conflicting emotional and rational responses. The dual-process theory gets much right, but needs revision.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e123
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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