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Further advancing fast-and-slow theorizing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Wim De Neys Open the ORCID record for Wim De Neys [Opens in a new window]
Wim De Neys*
Affiliation:
LaPsyDE, CNRS, Université Paris Cité, Paris, France wim.de-neys@u-paris.fr
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Abstract

The 34 commentaries on the target article span a broad range of interesting issues. I have organized my reply around five major themes that seemed to emerge: Remarks about the generalizability of the empirical findings, links with other models, necessary extensions, the utility of dual-process models, and more specific points. This allows me to clarify possible misconceptions and identify avenues for further advancement.

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Author's Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e146
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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