A rising protectionist tide is threatening to undermine the domestic political foundation necessary to sustain America's liberal trade posture through the 1980s. U.S. trade officials and recent administrations remain committed to a liberal trade order, but severe crises in key economic sectors of the economy, regionally concentrated in the traditional industrial region of the country, are cutting the ground from beneath them internationally and domestically.

At the recent GATT ministerial meeting in Geneva, for example, the United States pressed hard for expanding international trade liberalization in agriculture, services, and high technology industries—all areas of economic activity in which the United States enjoys a strong competitiye position and trade surpluses. American trade officials in Geneva had the burden of advancing their arguments for further trade liberalization against the backdrop of recent U.S. actions, taken in response to domestic pressures, which imposed import quotas on European steel and Japanese automobiles and which adopted a more restrictive trade regime for textiles and apparel in the renewal of the Multi-Fiber Agreement. While the GATT meeting was in progress, the U.S. Congress was considering a domestic content bill that would require auto-makers selling over 900,000 vehicles in the American market to use 90 percent U.S. labor and parts by 1985. U.S. trade representative William Brock III called this “the worst piece of economic legislation since the 1930s.” The House passed the bill with 215 votes, but it died in the Senate. The bill will certainly be re-introduced in the more protectionist 98th Congress.

The Democratic party's quadrennial exercises in reform of the delegate selection process have caused political scientists and journalists to focus their attention on the Democratic party and to ignore the character and impact of the Republican rules. While the Democrats have been going through major revisions of their rules every four years since the disastrous 1968 convention, the Republicans have followed a quite different strategy. They have sought to maintain the basic procedures and party structure which had evolved prior to the era of the McGovern-Fraser Commission, and they have directed their efforts toward supporting federal, state, and local candidates and party organizations.

The debate on the current presidential nominating system centers on the consequences of formal changes in the rules and laws governing it: the formalization of opportunities for participation in the Democratic Party as well as changes like public financing and the increased number of primaries affecting both parties. These changes undoubtedly have made the process more permeable and have thereby diminished the power of party elites and enhanced that of the shapers of mass participation such as candidate organizations, direct mail and communications specialists, and the mass media. Critics have faulted this system for replacing party professionals with others less interested in or less able to select nominees popular with voters and capable of governing if elected. In this short essay, I will examine some of the critics' arguments, note some positive effects of the reforms, and suggest that the new system is an apt one for the present, de-aligned electoral environment.

The possibility of a black contender for the Democratic presidential nomination has raised many interesting questions. Has the Democratic Party and its past nominees taken the black vote for granted? Can the black community reach a consensus on a black issue agenda? Can it agree on a candidate? Could a black candidate actually hurt black interests by dividing the liberal vote and throwing the nomination to a more conservative Democratic contender? Could the strategy seriously backfire in other less obvious ways? Do the presumed benefits, both symbolic and real, outweigh the potential costs? Could the threat of a candidacy be just as beneficial to black interests as the candidacy itself? Are there other strategies during the nomination process that could enhance black political power even more?

Although the debate has covered a wide range of questions, one crucial question has been ignored: how many delegates could a black presidential contender conceivably win in 1984? While few experts believe that a black contender could win a majority of delegates, many argue that, if the contest is close between two other contenders, blacks could be “kingmakers,” crowning the nominee in exchange for major policy concessions, patronage appointments, and, conceivably, the vice-presidency. If the nomination is not close, then a group of black delegates, at a minimum, would increase substantially black influence on important rules and platform decisions. Hopes based on these or any other convention scenario the mind can devise, however, depend on how well a black contender fares in the race for delegates. The larger his delegation, the more power he can potentially wield at the convention. Conversely, the smaller his delegation, the less power he will have.

Whether it is the politics of the nomination process, the politics of the general election, or the politics of governance, it is safe to say that all candidates will firmly announce that they represent “all the people.” Each will pronounce profusely that he or she “owes no one or no special interest group.” And each will insist that he or she will pursue policies based on principles, not on pressures.

So much for the rhetoric, and it is quite expected and understandable. Of course, it is acceptable to be against “big government” or “big business” or “special interests.” That, too, is expected. A serious (meaning, even slightly possible) contender for, and occupant of the White House will not long remain so if he or she bluntly announces otherwise, that is, that one's candidacy is largely reliant on farmers, or business, or unions, or minorities (racial or otherwise).

The reality, however, is frequently somewhat different, and it is not necessarily a matter of political cynicism to say this. The nature of the three forms of the electoral/ governance system almost dictates that people who strive to govern one system develop strategies to appeal to several constituencies. Specifically, in order to be nominated one must court delegates. In order to be elected, one must count state electoral votes. In order to govern, one must construct still other kinds of coalitions. Always, at each step, the system mandates strategies that disaggregate the electorate into manageable blocs and available constituencies.