In 1977, Charles Lindblom concluded his study of Politics and Markets with the assertion that “the large private corporation fits oddly into democratic theory and vision. Indeed, it does not fit.” In 1983, Robert Reich envisioned The Next American Frontier as the eradication of the distinction between business culture and civic culture in the United States and the full integration of the corporation into the country's key political and social processes. Failure to achieve such a new political-economic compact could mean, Reich asserted, the end of democracy's progress in America. Between Lindblom and Reich lie six short years in time and one vast gulf in political theory and policy perspective. Their positions set the framework for a whole series of political choices confronting American politics today. They also set an agenda for political science as a discipline that studies power, authority, and social change—an agenda calling for an expansion of both intellectual focus and analytical paradigms.

Differences between the purposes and contents of Lindblom's and Reich's studies can be cited, of course. Politics and Markets presents itself as a scholarly work in the theory of political economy, whereas The Next American Frontier has a definite prescriptive flavor designed to influence current political debate. But such differences do not obscure the important element shared by the two books: recognition of the power and position of large corporations as the determining factor in the political-economic future of liberal democracy. Generated from this are several critical questions both authors confront: What is the purpose of public power and that of private economic power in advanced industrial societies today? What should be the relationship between the two as regards the preservation of liberal democracy? What is that relationship when the large corporation is taken into account? What redirection of corporate power is necessary or possible? What blending of corporate institutions and political institutions does liberal democracy allow—or demand?

When Justin Dart, Chairman of Dart Industries, said in 1978, “talking with politicians is a fine thing, but with a little money they hear you better,” his colleagues apparently concurred. As Figure 1 indicates, subsequent to several congressional. Federal Election Commission and Supreme Court decisions which clarified some ambiguity concerning their legality, the surge in corporate PAC growth was extremely impressive. The advent of the growth in corporate PACs represented a fundamental shift in the way business money is funneled into electoral politics. Prior to the 1970s, business executives contributed to politicians in an unsystematic, ad hoc manner. Traditionally, corporate executives got together and bankrolled candidates of their choice with little pressure or need to disclose the recipients of their largess.

Gone are those days when the so-called “corporate bag-men” would pass out envelopes filled with cash on the 17th green of some exclusive country club. Today, computerized records of congressmen's roll-call votes and lists of potential PAC contributors have replaced the nine iron as an effective corporate political tool.