I endorse Mark Walker's thesis that there is no moral difference between genetic interventions to make it more likely that children will develop moral virtues, such as truthfulness, caring, and justice—however, exactly, these are understood—and environmental interventions aimed at the same outcome. In this response, I offer some further considerations that tend to support the thesis in the face of “loss of freedom” or “loss of autonomy” arguments.

The Enlightenment bequeathed to us the notion that the human mind can and should dominate over nature—that there is nothing we cannot know or should not attempt. And, in fact, there is something to be said for this position, since a truthful historian has to admit that standards of living have generally been greatly bettered by the technology of the last two centuries. Without confidence in our ability to remake nature, the great medical advances of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would never have been possible: antisepsis, the discovery of the tuberculosis bacillus, sulfa drugs, the polio vaccine. Like twentieth-century researchers who faced polio and smallpox, Mark Walker has perhaps identified the central ethical malady of our twenty-first century civilization—how the lack of virtue impedes our moral progress. And just as biological researchers sought to use science to eradicate these diseases, so Walker seeks to use genetic manipulation to eradicate evil.

Breeding for virtue is no novelty. Conscientious prospective parents from deepest antiquity have hoped to breed for virtue in mate selection and peri-conceptual regimen. But methods may be changing. Plotting biotechnology's trajectory well beyond today's horizon, Professor Mark Walker asks if virtue is valuable enough to warrant breeding by molecular-genetic means. He presented this question as “Enhancing genetic virtue: A project for twenty-first century humanity?” in the previous issue of POLITICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES.

The target paper of this invited forum has a vaulting ambition: to convince readers that we ought to attempt to reduce evil in our world by constructing an interdisciplinary program, which I call the Genetic Virtue Program (GVP), to enhance the biological aspects of virtue. Most of the contributors to this forum are not sympathetic to the project—to put it mildly. Yet, one of the surprising things, at least to this author, is that comparatively little is said about the paper's overall ambition. Jamie Bronstein offers the idea that better socialization may be key: “No one would argue that there have not also been great evils; but the historical record doesn't support the level of improbability for further moral improvement through socialization that Walker would like to assign.” However, nowhere do I claim that there is no prospect for further moral improvement through socialization. Indeed, in recently published work I specifically recommend that we improve socialization efforts to enhance virtue by tracking prosocialization efforts.