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Genetically engineered people: Autonomy and moral virtue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2016

Russell Blackford
Russell Blackford*
Affiliation:
School of Humanities and Social Science, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, New South Wales 2308, Australia Russell.Blackford@newcastle.edu.au
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Extract

I endorse Mark Walker's thesis that there is no moral difference between genetic interventions to make it more likely that children will develop moral virtues, such as truthfulness, caring, and justice—however, exactly, these are understood—and environmental interventions aimed at the same outcome. In this response, I offer some further considerations that tend to support the thesis in the face of “loss of freedom” or “loss of autonomy” arguments.

Type
Forum: Genetic virtue, reconsidered
Information
Politics and the Life Sciences , Volume 29 , Issue 1 , March 2010 , pp. 82 - 84
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Politics and the Life Sciences 

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References

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