This study explores depictions of Islam in Senate rhetoric across the 106th (1999–2000) and 111th (2009–2010) Congresses. These two periods are compared to consider overall patterns in congressional discourse on Islam and to explore how the September 11th, 2001 attacks might have shaped this discourse. The study also examines the possible effects of ideology, partisanship, and senator religious affiliation on representations of Islam. The article ultimately suggests that despite some important post-September 11 shifts in Senate rhetoric pertaining to Islam, persistent themes regarding securitization, Orientalist tendencies, moderate-fundamentalist dichotomizations, and ideological divisions merit scrutiny. This study contributes to work on Congress, religion, and American politics by assessing trends in the discursive representation of Islam by United States legislators. Theoretically, the article draws upon the Copenhagen School in International Relations to assess the securitization of Islam within legislative debates and to develop the related concept of normalization.

Bangladesh, one of the world's largest Muslim countries, is generally viewed as a success story with a strong tradition of secular democracy. Unfortunately, this assertion rests on a weak empirical foundation. Since becoming independent from Pakistan in 1971, democracy and secularism have been consistently undermined. Moreover, since 2000 Bangladesh has experienced more than 100 incidents of Islamist terrorism. More recently, the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda Indian Subcontinent have assaulted religious and ethnic minorities as well as secular and liberal activists. While these turns of events are alarming, Islamist militancy in Bangladesh remains understudied. In this article, we address this lacuna by undertaking regression analysis of recent Pew Research Center survey data to exposit the determinants of popular support of Islamist terrorism. With this study, we hope other scholars will be motivated to turn their attention to this increasingly important state.

Using data collected between 2004 and 2008 from the National Politics Studies, this study explores the impact of race on the likelihood of attending worship settings that provide supportive services for and preach sermons about immigrants. It also considers the degree to which attending such worship settings associate with the perceptions that Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics hold of immigrants. We find that while Hispanics are more likely than Whites and Blacks to attend such “immigrant-conscious” congregations, attending such congregations more strongly correlates with Whites rejecting anti-immigrant frames and accepting positive frames than is the case for Blacks and Hispanics.

The central claim of this article is that the multi-dimensional changes in the modern family structure may be explained as a manifestation of the simultaneous processes of secularization and religionization. On the one hand, the rising acceptance of secular alternatives to the traditional family structure indicates that modernization processes weaken religious behavior and authority, as the classical secularization thesis has claimed. On the other hand, ongoing loyalty to the religious family patterns, and even their relative intensification, reflect the opposite trend. Serving as a case study, the changes in the Israeli religious family structure — reflected by civil marriage, cohabitation, and out-of-wedlock children — clearly illustrate how modernization generates horizontal and vertical fragmental processes in which religion and secularism supplement as well as compete with each other, creating an increasingly divided society in which religiosity and secularism flourish side by side among various groups and within distinct realms.

Research has documented that religious minorities often face the brunt of religious discrimination. Yet formal tests, using global collections, have been lacking. Building on the religious economy theory and recent work in law and politics, we propose that minority religions face discrimination from the state because they represent unwanted competition for the state supported religion, are viewed as a threat to the state and larger culture, and lack support from an independent judiciary. Drawing on the recently collected Religion and State-Minorities collection on more than 500 minority religions, we find support for each of the propositions, though the level of support varies based on the targets of state discrimination. In general, the support is strongest when explaining discrimination against minority religion's institutions and clergy, but weakens when explaining more general discrimination against the membership.

While the role of theology in Jefferson's political thought and its implications for how we should understand the role of “Nature's God” in grounding natural-rights republicanism are topics of ongoing scholarly interest, scholars have missed important continuities between Jefferson's natural-law theory and that of classical, theistic natural-law. Many scholars who have considered Jefferson in this light have emphasized Jefferson's discontinuity and even subversion of that tradition. In critical dialogue with this vein of scholarship, we argue that Jefferson espouses a creational metaphysics and a natural-law theory of morality that has surprising continuities with classical natural-law. We seek to shed new light on Jefferson's theory of the moral sense and his the earth belongs to the living principle, which we contend encapsulates his theistic understanding of equality and property.

Americans’ perceptions of science are structured by overlapping cultural fields of politics and religion, and those cultural fields vary over time in how they influence opinion about science. This paper provides a historical narrative for understanding how religious and political factors influence public perceptions of science over the last four decades. Using data from the 1974–2012 General Social Survey, the impact of religious and political factors are examined and compared across decades using heterogeneous ordinal logistic regression models and ordinal structural equation models. Estimates show that the impact of sectarian Protestant identification and fundamentalist beliefs in the Bible are increasingly linked to lower levels of confidence in science, and that these religious factors also influence the impact of political conservatism and Republican Party identification. Political conservatism has become more oppositional towards science, and Republicans have become less enthusiastic compared to periods when science was primarily linked to militaristic endeavors.

The decline in religious identification and corresponding increase in the unaffiliated has been one of the most important religious changes in the United Kingdom (UK). The emergence of the “religious nones” is the most obvious sign of continuing secularization and the declining social and cultural relevance of religion. Yet while the religiously-unaffiliated often form the plurality — if not sometimes the majority — in many surveys, there has been little scholarly investigation into atheists, agnostics, and others who do not identify with a particular religion. This article uses a 2014 survey of UK adults to examine how those who identify as atheist or agnostic differ from the religiously-affiliated in terms of religiosity, ideology, and policy preferences. Findings reveal secular groups in the UK to be more to the ideological left than the religiously affiliated, and that atheists and agnostics differ from each other and especially the religiously affiliated on public policy.

The increase in religion-related conflicts around the world emphasizes the urgent need for a better understanding of the role of religion and religious freedom on socio-economic development, both theoretically and empirically. While studies on the role of religion on economic development have existed as early as Weber (1905), there is a dearth of studies on the effect of religious freedom on economic growth, and the existing studies overlook possible negative impacts on economies by unrestricted religious freedom. Drawing on institutional theory, we propose that different types of religious restrictions can exert either positive or negative effects on economic growth. We test our propositions using a comprehensive dataset on religious freedom covering 198 countries for seven years from 2007 to 2013.

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, United States Muslims have been increasingly targeted as “others,” accused of holding dual-loyalties, and seen as potentially subversive. Nevertheless, Muslim American interest groups have not recoiled from foreign policy engagement. I argue that this is because mobilizing around symbolic foreign policy issues provides them with an opportunity to access the policy dialogue as a minority group making rights claims. To illustrate this argument, I conduct a discourse analysis of Muslim American policy engagement toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I rely on primary documents produced by the Council on American Islamic Relations and the Muslim Public Affairs Council, the two leading United States Muslims organizations, as well as interviews conducted with institutional elites. I find that, through their policy advocacy, these organizations are framing their demands around United States interests and minority group rights, while positioning themselves as the legitimate representatives of the Muslim American community.

Drawing on the descriptive representation literature, we argue that religious identity is a social identity similar to gender or race, which leads a person to feel represented by someone who shares their religious identity. We argue that religious identity motivates approbation for public officials that is distinct from partisanship. We find that constituents who share the religious identity of their congressional representatives are significantly more likely to approve of their representative's performance in office. In addition, those who share a religious identity with President Obama are more trusting of him; particularly among those for whom religion is important. Finally, we find that shared religious identity moderates the relationship between partisanship and trust in the President. All else equal, Republicans who share a religious identity with President Obama are 500% more likely to trust him than a Republican who does not.

The relationship between religion and immigrant political participation has not been rigorously investigated in the literature set in Australia. In this study, I test whether religious attendance influences electoral and non-electoral participation among immigrants. Drawing on data from the 2013 Australian Election Study, I demonstrate that the impact of religious attendance on political participation may be overstated. I find that religious attendance is not significantly related to electoral and non-electoral participation among immigrants in Australia. This result may relate to three factors: the ability of religious attendance to affect immigrants’ key political resources; competition between religious and secular organizations; and the political salience of particular religious denominations within the Australian context. This study does not provide the much sought-after empirical confirmation to associational theories of political participation, but instead sounds a note of caution about the universal applicability of such theories.