Can racial primes influence support for public expressions of religion? While a growing body of research demonstrates correlations between racial attitudes and support for public religion among White Americans, experimental tests of subconscious connections between the two concepts have been lacking. We utilize a novel survey experiment to prime racial considerations, and we find that Black racial primes raise support for Christian nationalism and civil religion among White Americans, compared to White racial primes. Moreover, our analysis indicates that these effects are attributable to racial animus, namely the evaluation that Black Americans are not prototypical members of the national community. The findings suggest that the preference for a Christian/religious America and a White America are subconsciously interwoven for many White Americans, providing the first experimental evidence, to our knowledge, of this relationship.

The COVID-19 pandemic has increased the political and scholarly attention on conspiracy theories. Among other predictors, religious and spiritual influences on conspiracy beliefs have been widely discussed in the literature. We suggest analyzing the relationship between religion and spirituality on the one hand and conspiracy beliefs on the other hand from the perspective of religious information processing. Based on the Post-Critical Beliefs Scale (PCBS), we argue that literal interpretations of religious information are positively associated with conspiracy beliefs. Furthermore, we assume that individual differences in analytic cognitive style account for the relationship between religious attitudes, spirituality, and conspiracism. Using a quota sample of German adults, we find that literal interpretations of religious content positively correlate with conspiracy beliefs for the literal affirmation of transcendence (e.g., orthodoxy) and the literal disaffirmation of transcendence (e.g., atheism). These findings suggest that religious information processing is related to conspiracy beliefs for religious and nonreligious individuals. Moreover, our results show a stable association between holistic spirituality and conspiracy beliefs. The relationships between different types of religious attitudes, spirituality, and conspiracy beliefs hold, even after accounting for analytic (versus intuitive) thinking. The implications for the study of religious attitudes and conspiracy beliefs are discussed.

Evangelicals arguably constitute an unexpected base of support for Donald Trump. One plausible account holds that evangelicals supported Trump reluctantly, backing him not because they strongly favored him, but rather because they viewed him as the least objectionable candidate. This perspective suggests a possible enthusiasm gap: among Donald Trump's supporters, nonevangelicals were more zealous while evangelicals were more tepid. We examine this account using data from March 2019, just past the midpoint of Trump's presidency, a period when any lack of enthusiasm with Trump among portions of his base should have been discernible. Our expansive analytical strategy, using OLS and matching, explores whether evangelicals offered Donald Trump more lukewarm support than did nonevangelicals, with support operationalized in six ways. Across 36 tests, no evidence of an enthusiasm gap between evangelicals and nonevangelicals is detected. Seen both in absolute terms and relative to nonevangelicals, evangelicals offered Donald Trump fervent support.

Are centralized leaders of religious organizations responsive to their followers' political preferences over time even when formal accountability mechanisms, such as elections, are weak or absent? I argue that such leaders have incentives to be responsive because they rely on dedicated members for legitimacy and support. I test this theory by examining the Catholic Church and its centralized leader, the Pope. First, I analyze over 10,000 papal statements to confirm that the papacy is responsive to Catholics' overall political concerns. Second, I conduct survey experiments in Brazil and Mexico to investigate how Catholics react to responsiveness. Catholics increase their organizational trust and participation when they receive papal messages that reflect their concerns, conditional on their existing commitment to the Church and their agreement with the Church on political issues. The evidence suggests that in centralized religious organizations, the leader reaffirms members' political interests because followers support religious organizations that are politically responsive.

Despite frequent claims that religion serves as a motivator of political behavior in Muslim-majority contexts, empirical evidence of political messaging in sacred spaces is scant. Building on earlier studies on political messaging in both churches and mosques, we examine the presence and nature of political messages across Muslim and Christian religious contexts in a typical Indonesian city, Yogyakarta. Through an analysis of 71 sermons that took place in mosques and churches prior to elections in 2017 and 2019, we analyze the frequency, style, tone, and consistency of political content. We find that political messages within individual houses of worship were often inconsistent from week to week, reducing their potential as a mobilizing force for political action. We also find that houses of worship frequently sought to present themselves as politically neutral spaces in an electoral context in which religious themes are politicized.

The article analyzes the network structure and dynamics of the Spanish field of catholic-inspired secular organizations (CISO-N), and their mobilization against the Euthanasia Bill amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition to a relational perspective, it adopts a historical-comparative approach to political opportunities that affect the praxis of these organizations. Drawing on 7-year fieldwork, including in-depth interviews with CISO-N activists and participant observation of their demonstrations, it traces CISO-N's discourse of ‘moral panic’ and ties to religious and political organizations, particularly the far-right party VOX. We advance a novel perspective, bridging literature on assisted dying and social movement studies, particularly focusing on far-right Christian populist mobilizations. The article offers one of the first sociological analyses of euthanasia as the new moral, political, and cultural neoconservative anti-rights front, which has been mainly studied from bioethics, socio-medical studies, and medical jurisprudence perspectives.

Tunisia's Islamist movement Ennahda has announced a separation of political and religious work, apparently reinforcing a “post-Islamist” argument that Islamic parties have left behind religious mobilization. However, the boundary between religious and political fields is highly porous. We ask why the distinction between religious and political activism remains a point of ambiguity within Islamism. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with 48 men and women who participated in the movement in the 1970s and 1980s in Tunis and Sousse, we develop a microlevel explanation of Islamist mobilization. We argue that religious and social Islamist activism is replete with political intent, which worked through three mechanisms: a counter-hegemonic ideology, an activist engagement in social transformation, and a formal organization. These findings add empirical insights to the case of Ennahda, provide leverage in explaining the politicization of Salafist movements, and underscore the legacy of asymmetric party capacities in shaping outcomes in a democratic transition.

The study of religion and international relations has achieved renewed attention in the last two decades. This study investigates a specific aspect of this field: religious soft power. It focuses on individuals who were affected by religious soft power and develop a typology of courses of action these individuals can take vis-à-vis their home state. I argue that individuals can take three different types of actions: disruptive, reformative, and transnational. Using the cases of the Catholic Church and its followers, ISIS and Sunni believers, and the relations between Israel and the Evangelicals, I assess how these alternative actions are being manifested by different groups of individuals. Lastly, I offer an answer to the question of when individuals would use disruptive action and when will they use reformative one.

This article deals with the transformation of Catholic politics in Italy between 1942 and 1945 and the emergence of Christian Democracy as the dominant political party in the postwar years. It analyzes how Catholic politicians turned from reactionary critics of democracy to its champion. The article foregrounds a dimension that has not been given sufficient attention in scholarly works on political Catholicism and Christian Democracy, namely the religious content of thought. In the experiences of politicians and thinkers living through Fascism and war, transcendence and spirituality emerged as new markers of certainty that came to re-direct and ground democracy. Our conceptual argument is that Christian Democracy can be understood as a distinct form of “political spirituality,” pace Foucault. The article further shows how this political spirituality became “applied” in a series of ways in the immediate postwar period.

This paper explores the intersections of religion, heritage, and politics in divided societies by focusing on two events that occurred in Cyprus before the crossing points opened (2003). These are the Greek and Turkish Cypriot reciprocal pilgrimages to a Christian and Muslim site, respectively, and the two sites' restoration. I argue that in these events the Cyprus Issue effected the transformation of pilgrimage practices and sites into matters of political agreement, implicating them in processes of conflict management and resolution. In this context, pilgrimage facilitated inter-communal exchanges and intra-communal frictions and antagonisms that question binary oppositions through which questions of conflict and amity have been debated in pilgrimage studies.