In Mar. 2010, Japan’s financial regulator implemented the country’s first legislation concerning the disclosure of director compensation for named individuals. Using the first publicly available data for Japanese executives, we document direct evidence on the level, structure, and mechanisms of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in Japan and perform a matched-sample comparison between Japan and the United States. In contrast to the findings of recent studies showing that international differentials in CEO pay have largely disappeared since the mid-2000s, our results show strikingly large differences between the Japanese and American systems that are difficult to explain by differences in conventional incentive contracts.

The extant literature suggests that one of the main causes of the recent financial crisis was the excessive use of short-term debt by banks. Using a large sample of banks, we find that increases in repurchase agreements (repos) were recognized by external capital markets to increase bank risk in the pre-crisis period. In the crisis, we find a negative relationship between repos and risk. We attribute this result to evidence suggesting that “good” banks were able to continue funding their repos, whereas “bad” banks had to significantly decrease their repo funding.

Betting quotes provide valuable information on market-implied probabilities for outcomes of events such as elections or referendums, which may have an impact on exchange rates. We generate exchange-rate forecasts around such events based on a model that combines risk-neutral event probabilities implied from betting quotes with risk-neutral exchange-rate densities extracted from currency option prices. Its application to predict exchange rates around the Brexit referendum and the U.S. presidential elections shows that these forecasts, conditional on the respective outcomes, were accurate, and markets were able to separate their views on the likelihood and the impact of these events.

Estimating difference-in-differences models on a comprehensive data set of Italian companies, we provide novel insights into the literature on political uncertainty and firm investment. We first establish that local political uncertainty leads to declining investment. Next, we show that family control neutralizes this effect: Family firms are more likely than other firms to invest during politically uncertain times, especially when operating in industries dependent on public spending and/or managed by family members. Finally, we document that this investment resilience of family firms under political uncertainty translates into significantly greater profitability and growth.

We examine the impact of managerial ability on the shareholder tax sensitivity of dividends. We find that managerial ability increases the sensitivity of dividends to the dividend tax penalty. In addition, the positive association between managerial ability and the shareholder tax sensitivity of dividends decreases in institutional ownership. Further, managerial ability increases the shareholder tax sensitivity of the substitution of dividends with share repurchases. Finally, evidence from tax reforms reveals that high ability managers are more responsive to a reduction in dividend tax penalty than to an increase. We conclude that managerial ability influences the formation of tax-efficient dividend policies.

We consider a model of chief executive officer (CEO) selection, dismissal, and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention purposes, the compensation of these CEOs is more sensitive to firm value and relatively less sensitive to business conditions. Moreover, these CEOs receive lower salaries when CEO skills are sufficiently transferable. A diffusion of best monitoring practices increases competition for CEOs and raises CEO pay in all firms, including those with unchanged monitoring ability.

Overconfident CEOs/senior executives tend to have excessively positive views of their own skills and their company’s future performance. We hypothesize that overconfident managers are more likely to engage in reckless or intentional actions/disclosures that give rise to securities class actions (SCAs). Empirical evidence is supportive: Overconfident CEOs/senior executives increase SCA likelihood, though litigation risk is ameliorated through improved governance, such as following the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002. Post-SCA, companies are less likely to hire an overconfident CEO. Following an SCA, overconfident CEOs appear to moderate behavior and to reduce their litigation risk.

We conduct a comprehensive out-of-sample assessment of the economic value adding of commodities in multiasset investment strategies that exploit the predictability of asset return moments. We find that predictability makes the inclusion of commodities profitable even when short selling and high leverage are not permitted. For instance, a mean-variance (non-mean-variance) investor with moderate risk aversion and leverage, rebalancing quarterly, would be willing to pay up to 108 (155) basis points per year after transaction cost for adding commodities to her stock, bond, and cash portfolio. Previous research had reached mixed or even opposite conclusions, especially in an out-of-sample context.

This study investigates whether financial data providers serve as information intermediaries in capital markets. To this end, I examine whether the timeliness of earnings information disseminated by First Call (Thomson Reuters) affects the market’s reaction to earnings announcements. I document that the immediate price and volume response is weaker and the post-earnings-announcement drift stronger for earnings news disseminated with a delay by First Call. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, I study the market reaction on the day of the delayed dissemination and show that a significant part of the stronger drift is clustered around this day.

This article studies whether knowledge protection affects shareholder value and firms’ investment in knowledge assets using the staggered adoptions and rejections of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) by U.S. state courts as exogenous changes in the level of knowledge protection. We find positive (negative) abnormal stock returns around the IDD adoption (rejection) day for firms headquartered in the state, and we uncover a positive IDD treatment effect on firms’ investment in knowledge assets. Moreover, the effects on stock returns and knowledge assets investment are stronger in more knowledge-oriented industries and firms. Finally, enhancing knowledge protection does not discourage local entrepreneurial activity.

Using a unique sample of newly privatized firms from 59 countries, this article provides new evidence about the agency costs of state ownership and new insight into the corporate governance role of country-level institutions. Consistent with agency theory, we find strong and robust evidence that state ownership is positively related to corporate cash holdings. Moreover, we find that the strength of country-level institutions affects the relation between state ownership and the value of cash holdings. In particular, as state ownership increases, markets discount the value of cash holdings more in countries with weaker institutions.

Between 2009 and 2014, 75% of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) were announced and issued overnight, compared to 27% between 2000 and 2008. Overnight issuers obtain a higher SEO offer price because they experience more favorable pre-offer returns. Consistent with these favorable returns being due to the avoidance of pre-issue selling pressure, non-overnight issuers experience a 2.5% pre-issue stock-price decline that reverses within 7 days. This post-issue reversal is increasing in SEO offer size and bigger following large pre-issue price declines. In contrast, returns following overnight offerings are less positive and unrelated to SEO offer size or pre-issue returns.

We propose a market-based framework that exploits time-varying parameter vector autoregressions to estimate the dynamic network of financial spillover effects. We apply it to financials in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index and estimate interconnectedness at the sectoral and institutional levels. At the sectoral level, we uncover two main events in terms of interconnectedness: the Long-Term Capital Management crisis and the 2008 financial crisis. After these crisis events, we find a gradual decrease in interconnectedness, not observable using the classical rolling-window approach. At the institutional level, our framework delivers more stable interconnectedness rankings than other comparable market-based measures.

We investigate how chief executive officers’ (CEOs) risk incentive (VEGA) affects firm innovation. To establish causality, we exploit compensation changes instigated by the FAS 123R accounting regulation in 2005 that mandated stock option expensing at fair values. Our identification tests indicate a positive and causal effect of CEOs’ VEGA on innovation activities. Furthermore, dampened managerial risk-taking incentive after the implementation of FAS 123R leads to a significant reduction in innovation related to firms’ core business and explorative inventions. It implies that managers diversify their innovation portfolios and decrease explorative inventions to curtail business risk when their risk-taking incentive is reduced.

Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) are frequently thought of as risk-free real bonds. Using no-arbitrage term structure models, we show that TIPS yields exceeded risk-free real yields by as much as 100 basis points when TIPS were first issued and up to 300 basis points during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This spread predominantly reflects the poorer liquidity of TIPS relative to nominal Treasury securities. Other factors, including the indexation lag and the embedded deflation protection in TIPS, play a much smaller role. Ignoring this spread also significantly distorts the informational content of TIPS break-even inflation, a widely used proxy for expected inflation.

We find the financial condition of states impacts bank credit supply through their municipal bond holdings. In particular, we treat sudden political and statutory actions during the 2011 union bargaining rights debates in Wisconsin and Ohio as exogenous shocks to state solvency. We show bank valuations and municipal bond spreads adjust to the announcements, and, over longer horizons, a new lending channel linked to state solvency emerges, whereby banks supply credit as municipal bond appreciations free up capital.

Using a sample of completed U.S. acquisition deals over the period 1984–2014, we find that acquirer organization capital as measured by capitalized selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses is associated with superior deal performance. We show that high organization-capital acquirers achieve significantly higher abnormal announcement period returns, and better post-merger operating and stock performance, than low organization-capital acquirers. Additional tests suggest a causal relation between acquirer organization capital and deal performance. We further show that post-merger, high organization-capital acquirers cut more on the cost of goods sold, invest more in SG&A expenses, and achieve greater asset turnover and innovative efficiency.