Asset specificity can have profound influences on the economic structure of a country. An example is post-colonial Cuba. This article demonstrates that the existence of site specificity in assets generated problems of holdup for sugar mill owners in their contractual relations with cane suppliers. Recognition of that incentive structure offers an institutional explanation for the post-1900 concentration of U.S. investment in the eastern provinces. To reduce transaction costs, mill managers avoided investing in the western part of the island where the sugar industry was well established. A consequence was the relative decline of the western region.

This article investigates the feminization of poverty prior to 1960 by focusing on three factors that contributed to the increase in the propensity to form female-headed households and to the poverty rate among such households. Compared with 1939, households headed by prime-age women in 1959 included fewer adults, thereby reducing earnings potential. The earnings level at which such women formed independent households was lower relative to the poverty line; and although higher earnings allowed more women to form independent households, the increase was not large enough to lift some of these households out of poverty.

Before the Industrial Revolution in Britain most workers controlled their pace, timing, and conduct at work. Factory discipline radically changed this. Employers now dictated how, when, and in what manner work was done. Why did discipline triumph? Was it required by the need to tightly coordinate workers with new technologies? Or was it successful because it coerced more effort from workers than they would freely give? The empirical evidence shows that discipline succeeded mainly by increasing work effort. Workers effectively hired capitalists to make them work harder. They lacked the self-control to achieve higher earnings on their own.

The lack of nineteenth-century national income figures for the small states of present-day Central and Eastern Europe hampers studies of long-term economic development in the region. This article fills the gap by using a proxy approach to estimate GDP per capita on the territories of the Habsburg successor states for the period 1870 to 1910. The results give added support for more optimistic interpretations of the region's performance under Habsburg rule. More importantly, they can be linked to national income figures for later years and used directly in comparisons of international income levels between 1870 and 1987.

This article attempts to account for the exceptional stability exhibited by the banking systems of Britain, Canada, and ten other countries during the Great Depression. It considers three possible explanations of stability—the structure of the commercial banking system, macroeconomic policy and performance, and lender of last resort behavior—employing data from 25 countries across Europe and North America. The results suggest that macroeconomic policy—especially exchange-rate policy—and banking structure, but not lenders of last resort, were systematically responsible for banking stability.

Five pitfalls commonly encountered in estimating the yield on British Consols are identified and discussed herein. The most difficult question is whether Consol prices in the later 1890s reflected expectations of a conversion of the Consol stock in 1923. This is equivalent to asking whether security markets in the 1890s regarded the then extremely low interest rates to be a temporary or permanent phenomenon. Predictions from estimated equations for the yield spread between other high-class investments and Consols are used to determine this question. A corrected monthly series of the yield on Consols between 1850 and 1914 is presented.

Due primarily to transport improvements, commodity prices in Britain and the United States tended to converge between 1870 and 1913. Heckscher and Ohlin, writing in 1919 and 1924, thought that these events should have contributed to factor-price convergence. It turns out that Heckscher and Ohlin were right: a significant share of the Anglo-American real-wage convergence was due to commodity-price convergence. It appears that this late nineteenth-century episode was the dramatic start of world-commodity and factor-market integration that continues today.

The gap between the mean wages of black men and white men in the United States narrowed substantially between 1940 and 1950. There was, however, almost no change in this wage gap between 1950 and 1960. Some of this discontinuity in the path of black progress can be explained by general changes in the wage structure—wage compression in the 1940s and slight expansion in the 1950s. However, most of the gains of the 1940s were driven by race-specific factors, including increasing relative wages controlling for worker characteristics. These race-specific gains ceased in the 1950s.

In both northern and southern cities of the United States, African-Americans faced a web of social constraints on such activities as housing, shopping, and everyday interpersonal interactions. These constraints had implications for the labor market as well. In particular, norms against white subservience to blacks played an important role in determining the racial composition of occupations. Close attention to the operation of such social norms can add much explanatory power to conventional economic analyses of discrimination based on human capital and taste for discrimination.

This article makes use of nearly one thousand patents to trace the origins and evolution of professional invention in the midwestern harvester industry. These data indicate that professional inventors had become integrated into the industry by the 1870s. This unity of business and invention made firms loci of learning and fostered the rise of a market in technology through which patents and patentees became available.

Existing output series that cover both the antebellum and postbellum periods are inconsistent and unsuitable for comparing cyclical patterns across the nineteenth century. More consistent data show that output in cyclically sensitive sectors was no less, and probably more, volatile before the War Between the States than after it.